

# *The Journal of Historical Review*

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*The Sudetendeutsche  
Landsmannschaft*

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*Not Just Japanese Americans*

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*Shattering The Icon of  
Abraham Lincoln*

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—Book Reviews—

*Orwell: The War Commentaries • Taking Sides:  
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—HISTORICAL NEWS AND COMMENT—

*Joseph Sobran and Historical Revisionism  
Critique of John S. Conway's Review:  
Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry*

# *The Journal of Historical Review*

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## FURTHER READING ON THE SUDETEN GERMANS

### 343 NEMESIS AT POTSDAM by Alfred de Zayas.


Subtitled *The Anglo Americans and the expulsion of the Germans*, this book describes the background, cruel execution and the resultant consequences of

the expulsion of the ethnic Germans from the Sudetenland as well as from the other Eastern territories.

Millions perished as a result of the policies decided upon by the

“Big Three,” Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, and the fulfillment of those policies by their successors,

Truman and Atlee. *NEMESIS AT POTSDAM* relates the integration of German expellees to the phenomenal resurgence of West Germany, and traces the development of *Ostpolitik* and detente through to the Helsinki Declaration. This is the revised edition with 62 photos, an excellent scholarly work. Pb, 268pp, \$11.00




### 366 GRUESOME HARVEST:

#### THE COSTLY ATTEMPT TO EXTERMINATE THE PEOPLE OF GERMANY

by Ralph Franklin Keeling.

First published in 1947 by the Institute of American Economics, this book is one of the earliest attempts to inform the American people of the result of the policies of their leaders. The tragic story of the expulsion of the Germans had been swept under the rug by the Establishment press and the university academicians. This is a graphic, gripping and highly informative account of the Morgenthau years of terror, mass evacuation, starvation and re-education. Pb, 140pp, \$5.00.



There is little in the history of mankind more horrible than the sufferings of the Germans expelled from their eastern provinces, the Sudeten area, and other regions, some four to six millions perishing from butchery, starvation, exposure, and disease in the process. Their sufferings were obviously far more hideous and prolonged than those of the Jews said to have been exterminated in great numbers by the Nazis. The tragedy of Lidice was re-enacted by the Czechs hundreds of times at the expense of the Sudeten Germans during the expulsion.

— Harry Elmer Barnes, "Breaking the Historical Blackout"

## *The Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft*

PETER H. OPPENHEIMER

This paper is an examination of the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft (SL), a West German organization of Sudeten Germans expelled by Czechoslovakia from their homeland after World War II. This essay will place particular emphasis on the political activities of the SL. The intention of the essay is to enlighten the reader to the workings and evolution of a unique organization and advance some reasons for the successes, failures, and longevity of this group.

The continuing existence of an organization such as the SL seems to be an anachronism when one juxtaposes the original political objectives of the group and West German *Ostpolitik* since Willy Brandt. Yet, like the West German polity, the SL underwent successful policy alterations, reacting to developments both at home and abroad. To a certain extent, the SL adapted to contemporary conditions, discarded obsolete rhetoric, retrenched when necessary, and, in consequence, has survived until the present. Basically, the SL evolved from a politically oriented organization to a heritage preservation society. Although this description is exaggerated, it accurately indicates the direction of the SL's evolution. True, even today the SL still espouses the right to the Sudeten homeland and self-determination, but generally Sudeten Germans appear to be economically and politically content in West Germany and all signs

point to a continuance of their contentment.

The issues which this paper will discuss include the path of the SL from 1950 to the present and its reaction to West German, Central and Eastern European diplomatic and political developments. The questions which the essay will endeavour to answer encompass such topics as: What are the political objectives and aspirations of the SL? How has the SL influenced Bonn's Eastern policy? What tactics and strategies has the SL utilized to achieve its goals? What part have the Sudeten Germans taken in government? Do Sudeten Germans still desire to return to the homeland? These questions have no easy answers, but this writer hopes he will at least provoke some thought on a subject that even today has consequences for a divided Germany and an ideologically disparate Europe.

### **Background And History**

In 845, several Slav chieftains accepted Christianity in Regensburg, Germany. Thereafter, many of these chieftains married German princesses, and the land where they lived, Bohemia, became a fief of Charlemagne's Empire. The Bohemian Dukes were later made kings by the German Emperor, and became electors of the German Empire.

The Bohemian rulers invited Germans to settle the uninhabited lands bordering on Bohemia and Moravia. Through this area runs a mountain range, the Sudetes, hence the region became known as the Sudetenland.<sup>1</sup> In 1526, a Habsburg prince was elected King of Bohemia, reinforcing Sudetenland ties to Germany. Bohemia and Moravia remained a part of the Holy Roman Empire until its dissolution in 1806. Later they belonged to the German Confederation and after 1866 Austria-Hungary included them among its territories.<sup>2</sup>

The situation remained unaltered until the collapse of the Habsburg Empire at the end of World War I. The First Czechoslovak Republic, created in 1918, annexed the crown lands of Bohemia and Moravia. The Sudeten Germans, desirous of self-determination as set forth in Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, attempted to affiliate themselves with the new Austrian Republic. To prevent this "treasonous" action, the new Czech state occupied the Sudetenland with troops and forbade Sudeten German participation in Austrian parliamentary elections. Sudeten German political leaders consequently called for a general strike on 4 March 1919, and on this day fifty-four Sudeten Germans were killed by Czech troops as

they demonstrated for self-determination.<sup>3</sup>

Unable to break this iron grip, the Sudeten Germans strove for political reform within the Czechoslovak State in hopes it would grant their minority ethnic group greater freedom.<sup>4</sup> Under the leadership of Konrad Henlein, the Sudeten German Party (SGP) was formed. Henlein actively supported Hitler's pre-war annexationism, and the SGP sympathized with the National Socialists.<sup>5</sup> On the other side of the political spectrum, Wenzel Jaksch headed the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party (SGSDP). In contrast to the SGP, the SGSDP continued to work with and support the Czechoslovak Government.<sup>6</sup>

By 1935, Henlein's party received 60% of all Sudeten German votes, polled more than 1.2 million ballots, and became the single strongest party in Czechoslovakia.<sup>7</sup> Concurrently, the influence of the SGSDP waned, and after the 1938 Munich Agreement, became insignificant. When Germany occupied Czechoslovakia in 1939, Jaksch and his group fled to London, where the party operated in exile.<sup>8</sup> The SGP, having supported Hitler, was allowed to govern the Sudetenland.

Upon Germany's defeat in 1945, the Red Army entered Czechoslovakia and Eduard Benes, the former president of Czechoslovakia (1935–1938), was permitted to re-establish a government. He immediately began to expel the Sudeten Germans and eventually 3 million were "deported."<sup>9</sup> Of these, 1.9 million arrived in the American Zone of Germany. By 1947, the basic framework of the SL was assembled.<sup>10</sup>

The SL argued publicly that the Sudeten Germans were expelled to cause turmoil and unrest in West Germany. According to the SL, the Czechs reckoned that a large influx of homeless people in a war-torn country would create a social upheaval favorable to communism and enable communist agents to infiltrate West Germany.<sup>11</sup> Prague maintained that it expelled the Sudeten Germans to guarantee the existence of an independent Czech State and to punish the Sudeten Germans for crimes perpetrated by the National Socialists during the Second World War.<sup>12</sup>

In 1948, the Czech Communist Party seized control of the country and continued the expulsions begun by the previous government. One of the most significant results of this policy was to make the Sudeten Germans staunch anti-communists.<sup>13</sup> Prague in turn has viewed the SL as a revanchist organization with pan-germanic aims.<sup>14</sup> Needless to say, both sides believed the existence of the other precluded the achievement of their own foreign policy goals. In hindsight, this has not proven to be the case, and although

Prague has triumphed, the SL is still extant.

### The Structure of the SL

The SL set up regional headquarters in Bavaria in 1947.<sup>15</sup> A national headquarters was established in Munich in 1950.<sup>16</sup> The organization encompasses several regional groups and its membership (defined as dues-paying adherents) was approximately 350,000 in 1960.<sup>17</sup>

From its inception, the SL functioned as a well-organized association. In 1954 it became the only democratic representation of the Sudeten Germans, and the Sudeten Germans became the first ethnic expellee group in West Germany to have a democratic organization based on secret elections.<sup>18</sup> The SL has a central assembly consisting of seventy-one representatives elected by seventy-one electoral districts all over West Germany.<sup>19</sup> These representatives serve two-year terms and they elect the president, whose tenure is three years, and the executive board.<sup>20</sup>

The Sudeten Council, loosely linked to the SL, plays a most important role in the Sudeten German cause. It consists of thirty members, ten deputies from political parties represented in the Bundestag, ten members from the SL, and ten members co-opted from other relevant West German institutions.<sup>21</sup> The council is the official representation of external Sudeten German interests, and can accurately be termed the Sudeten German foreign-policy body.<sup>22</sup>

From 1954 until 1968, the SL had a marked right-wing slant, mirroring the beliefs of its first two presidents, Rudolf Lodgman von Auen (1954–1959) and Hans-Christoph Seebohm (1959–1968).<sup>23</sup> Since 1968, Walter Becher, a more moderate politician, has presided over the SL. As we shall see, under his direction, the SL has more realistically reflected the political situation of present day Europe, such as that brought about by the Prague–Bonn Treaty of 1973.

### Rights and Tenets

The basis for SL political aims have rested upon two rights and two tenets. Because for so long these have dictated SL foreign policy, it is necessary to outline them.

The right to the homeland and the right of self-determination have formed the cornerstone of Sudeten German hopes and aspirations *vis-à-vis* the Sudetenland. These rights, supported throughout the

years by increasingly sophisticated legalistic and moralistic arguments, hark back at least as far as Wilson's Fourteen Points of 1918. The SL also has pointed to the incorporation of both of these rights in numerous international documents as a further justification of their validity. Among the documents that have declared these rights are The Atlantic Charter (12 August 1941), Statutes of the UN (26 June 1945), General Declaration of Human Rights (10 September 1948), and the European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms (14 November 1950).<sup>24</sup> Most importantly, the Basic Law of the BRD\* states that one of the country's duties is "to effect the unity and freedom of Germany in an act of self-determination."<sup>25</sup> However, in spite of all such legal documents, the Sudeten Germans have come no closer to the realization of either right.

The two tenets that have supplemented the basic rights asserted by the SL were incorporated in the *Charta der Deutschen Heimatvertriebenen*, a lofty proclamation to which the SL subscribed. The tenets constitute a renunciation of revenge and retaliation in all actions, and the belief that only in a united Europe can people live in peace without fear and threat to their basic human rights.<sup>26</sup> By assuming these tenets, the SL hoped to make their cause acceptable to their countrymen and the world. In light of Germany's role in World War II, renunciation of revenge and retaliation laid the foundation for respectability for the SL. It is unlikely that the Federal Government or the Western Allies would have tolerated the existence of the organization in the post-war years if not for this declaration. The desire for a united Europe has expressed itself in the foreign policy objectives of the SL. In this context, it suffices to remark that the SL hoped that the creation of a supra-national state would enable the peoples of Europe to transcend nationalism and allow the Sudeten Germans to return to their homeland.

### Political Development

The development of the SL, its foreign policy and political aspirations can be divided roughly into three periods. The first of these, from the SL's inception in 1950 until the 20-Point Program of 1961, witnessed the apogee of SL political potency as well as the climax of hard-line ideology. The second period, from the 20-Point Program until the Prague-Bonn Agreement of 1973, saw the gradual reconciliation of SL aspirations with the political realities of

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\*West Germany (*Bundesrepublik Deutschland*)

Europe. During this period, the children of those expellees who had lived in the Sudetenland as adults reached maturity, and this accounted in part for the softening of SL rhetoric. The final period, the ten or so years since 1973, has not marked the demise of the SL, as one might have expected. West German political leaders still espouse the right of self-determination, as Chancellor Kohl did in 1983 in a speech on the state of the German Nation.<sup>27</sup> And, on the thirty-fifth annual Sudeten German day in 1984, 50,000 Sudeten Germans assembled to hear President Karl Carstens address their cause.<sup>28</sup> The survival of the SL has entailed adaptation, reconciliation and concession. It also implies that at the core of the SL there lies a purpose that transcends politics and foreshadows an enduring place for the organization in Germany's future.

### The First Period (1950-1961)

The first period in the evolution of the SL lasted approximately twelve years and paralleled the re-emergence of West Germany as an economic powerhouse and its acceptance into the family of nations. The SL's main goals during this period, as reflected by the 1950 Detmold Declaration, consisted a mixture of idealism, hope and *realpolitik*.<sup>29</sup> The goals included the attempt to raise their cause to an all-German and then an all-European one, the promotion of a supra-national European State — with its implications of “rolling back communism” — the enlistment of Western, especially American support, the dissemination of information to publicize their views, and the integration of Sudeten Germans into the BRD economy. The last of these goals, accomplished by the *Wirtschaftswunder*,\* will not be discussed in this essay. The first five, however, will be examined in depth.

The early years of the SL were marked both with success and occasional failure. The *Charta der Deutschen Heimatvertriebenen* conferred respectability on the SL and further reputability was bestowed upon the organization with the promulgation of the Wiesbaden Agreement in 1950. This document was concluded between the Czech National Committee — an organization of exiled non-communist Czechs — and the SL. Apart from an abiding belief in democracy, the Wiesbaden Agreement recognized the right of Sudeten Germans to return to the homeland, bound both signatories to work for the liberation of the Czech people, rejected the theory of collective guilt, and established claims for the compensation of

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\*economic miracle

damages suffered by either party.<sup>30</sup> This last point is noteworthy, for the SL was the only expellee organization to claim compensation for the expulsions.<sup>31</sup> This claim contradicted the spirit of the *Charta der Deutschen Heimatvertriebenen*, for it raised the spectre of retaliation for injury. However, the SL leadership found no difficulty reconciling the two, which suggests that beneath the façade of formal, peaceful declarations lay latent feelings of resentment. Nevertheless, the Wiesbaden Agreement enhanced the position of the SL, for it was the only *Landsmannschaft* to cement such a "foreign" agreement, and showed the type of supra-national state the Sudeten Germans desired in Europe. Evidently, this state was supposed to be democratic and non-totalitarian, implying that the elimination of communism from Eastern Europe was a prerequisite to the return to the homeland.

SL reaction to political events within West Germany and Western Europe serves as an indication of the organization's goals. The SL supported the European Defense Community and decried its demise in 1954.<sup>32</sup> In 1955, the SL supported Germany's entrance into NATO and logically German rearmament.<sup>33</sup> Again in 1957, the SL approved of the European Common Market because "This marks another great milestone on the way to uniting the free peoples of Europe."<sup>34</sup> One year later, the Sudeten German Council rejected the Soviet Peace Plan because it sought German recognition of the Sudetenland as part of Czechoslovakia and the legalization of the expulsions.<sup>35</sup> The reasons the SL supported economic and military organizations was intrinsically related to the objective of constructing a supra-national European State and pushing back communism. Additionally, co-operation among Western European countries may have facilitated SL opportunities to enlist aid for their cause and as a consequence thereof, hasten the return of their homeland.

Initially, the SL endeavoured to elevate the Sudeten Question to national importance. This attempt was met with marked success and should be traced for its past, present and future implications. Even before the SL had established a national headquarters, Sudeten Germans were represented in the German Bundestag and the Bavarian Landtag. West Germany's political parties were quite supportive of expellee aims in general, and Sudeten Germans in particular. This should come as no surprise for in 1950, West Germany's population of 47,696,000 included 7,900,000 expellees, or 16% of the population.<sup>36</sup> Sudeten Germans, 1,900,000 of them, constituted 20% of Bavaria's population.<sup>37</sup> It would have been extremely difficult for political parties to ignore

such a large part of the populace, particularly since most expellee groups, like the Sudeten Germans, were well-organized. Initially, Sudeten Germans seemed to support political parties dependent upon the degree to which the party catered to their stated objectives. In 1950, a political party, the *Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* (BHE) (the organization of expellees and those deprived of their rights) was created expressly to serve expellee interests.<sup>38</sup> However, being as socially, economically, and politically diverse as any other group, Sudeten Germans cast votes for all political parties. A brief examination of each follows.

The CDU (Christian Democratic Union), as the party in power after 1949, made a special effort to attract expellee support.<sup>39</sup> In 1945, the party established a special sub-branch led by expellees "primarily responsible for formulating expellee and refugee policy for the CDU."<sup>40</sup> The party's 1953 Hamburg Program upheld claims to the homeland and insisted on the right of self-determination.<sup>41</sup> In 1966, when the BRD moved toward improved relations with Czechoslovakia, the CDU reiterated its 1953 stance, but explained that it sought reconciliation with East Bloc countries.<sup>42</sup> On the regional and national levels, the CDU got marginally smaller support from expellees than the SPD (Social Democratic Party), despite its control of government and more conservative slant.

The SPD, unlike the CDU, did not establish a special expellee infra-organization until the mid-1960's but did exert efforts to obtain expellee votes.<sup>43</sup> The Bad Godesberg Party Program of 1959 explicitly demanded "Recht aller Menschen auf ihre Heimat, ihr Volkstum, ihre Sprache und Kultur."<sup>44</sup> However, the SPD was criticized by the CDU and CSU for being too soft towards Eastern Europe.<sup>45</sup> Especially after the erection of the Berlin Wall, the SPD was the vanguard of political parties adopting a more flexible attitude towards East Bloc countries.<sup>46</sup> Perhaps because expellees were more likely to be economically disadvantaged, the SPD, despite its policies, received substantial expellee support.

The Free Democratic Party (FDP) position regarding expellees was similar to the SPD's. In its 1957 Berlin Program, it advocated the right of self-determination, the right to the homeland, and the rights of free mankind.<sup>47</sup> Because the FDP was so much smaller than the SPD and CDU, its expellee mandate was correspondingly smaller.

The Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian counterpart and essentially smaller partner of the CDU, usually espoused the same

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\*The right of all people to their homeland, nation, language and culture.

program as its big brother. However, the CSU's chairman, Franz Josef Strauss, was perhaps one of the most outspoken supporters of expellee interests.<sup>48</sup> In 1961 in a resolution supporting the SL's 20-Point Program (see below), the CSU stated it felt particularly closely tied to and responsible for the Sudeten Germans.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, "Die CSU ist bereit, entsprechende Anträge der SL mit besonderer Bereitwilligkeit zu unterstützen."<sup>50</sup> This attention to Sudeten German interests has been undoubtedly rewarded at the polling place.

Perhaps the most interesting, and certainly one of the most ephemeral political parties, was the BHE. Created in 1950 specifically to represent expellee interests, it obtained Bundestag representation only once, in 1957, and declined rapidly thereafter.<sup>51</sup> During its existence, Sudeten Germans voted the BHE ticket more than for any other political party, and supported the BHE more than any other expellee organization. The BHE eventually failed because of internal dissension, economic integration of expellees, and demographic factors.<sup>52</sup> The SL did not mourn the BHE collapse, but neither did it accurately gauge Sudeten German support of the party. SL President Lodgman von Auen explained after the BHE's electoral failure in 1957, "The BHE/GB's loss of votes in the last election is no symptom of shifting interests among expellees with regard to German reunification or the lost German territory in the East. The BHE/GB never represented a majority among expellees."<sup>53</sup>

The National Democratic Party (NPD), a neo-fascist group which grew in size in the 1960's, was another party which tried to attract expellee support.<sup>54</sup> The party was formed in 1964, and although it never broke the 5% barrier for a national mandate, it achieved regional representation. The NPD program, a mixture of nationalism, pan-germanism, and irredentism, seemed attractive to expellees. According to the NPD, the Sudetenland had been legally ceded to Hitler in 1938 in fulfillment of the principle of self-determination.<sup>55</sup> Thus the region was still considered a part of Germany, contrary to Government declarations which only recognized 1937 borders. In spite of the expulsions, "the Sudeten German's right to the homeland...has not been extinguished," and the NPD "pledges especially to support the SL in its battle for rights."<sup>56</sup> Many expellee organizations denounced the NPD as neo-fascist, however the SL was not among them.<sup>57</sup> Notwithstanding Sudeten German support, the NPD expired as a political party by

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\*"The CSU is ready to support suitable proposals of the SL with marked enthusiasm."

1970.<sup>58</sup> The SL, as shown below, had certainly become less politically active by this time as well. It appears that the NPD took with them their radicalism and rightist-extremism, and these -isms no longer seem to have an audience among Sudeten Germans.

On the whole, expellees as a group have come to support the major democratic parties.<sup>59</sup> Although 20% of all expellees "were attracted to the BHE's thin mixture of narrow economic appeal and nostalgic nationalism" this did not prevent that party's decline.<sup>60</sup> Indeed, one historian credits the BHE with "having organized sections of the population that were ready to swing to radicalism, of having helped to make them feel that there was a place for them in West German politics, and of having led them to participate in the processes of a new democracy."<sup>61</sup> Whatever the case may be, the Sudeten Germans seemed to have followed the broad path towards moderation. They gave disproportionate support in comparison with other expellee groups to rightist parties — the BHE and NPD — but have gradually succumbed to mitigating political, social, and economic forces. The German economy has successfully absorbed them, Bonn's social legislation (*i.e.*, Equalization of Burdens) has recognized many of their claims, and they generally have acquired a stake in society.<sup>62</sup> Sudeten Germans today are indistinguishable in their political preferences from other West Germans. Therefore, political parties, especially since the SPD came to power in 1969, have made much less of an effort to attract expellee support.<sup>63</sup>

In retrospect, the number of Sudeten German representatives has fluctuated in the Bundestag, but increased absolutely in both parliaments between 1946 and 1965. The numbers themselves explain little, but government statements at the time tell that the ballot box voice of the Sudeten Germans was not insubstantial. For example, West Germany responded to the 1950 Prague Agreement by rejecting it. The Prague Agreement was a treaty of friendship between East Germany and Czechoslovakia of 14 July 1950 in which Pankow and Prague sanctioned the expulsions of the Sudeten Germans and recognized the Oder-Neisse line.<sup>64</sup> Bonn said that Pankow was unauthorized to represent the German peoples and refused to surrender the right of the homeland of Germans from Czechoslovakia who "had been placed under the protective patronage of the BRD."<sup>65</sup> Of course, Bonn reacted to national and international anti-communist pressures distinct from the Sudeten German constituency, but the proclamation was undoubtedly a victory if not a life-saver for the SL. In 1954, Bavaria became the official patron of the SL.<sup>66</sup> The then Bavarian Minister President, Dr. Hans Ehard, after declaring Bavarian patronage, stated that his

land would do everything in its power to support Sudeten German claims to their homeland.<sup>67</sup> Among his many reasons for declaring this patronage, Ehard was certainly motivated by politics, as the Sudeten Germans comprised 1.9 million of Bavaria's population. Ehard's political magnanimity was also a significant step toward raising the political consciousness of the German people on the Sudeten Question. Shortly thereafter, BRD foreign minister Dr. von Brentano assured the Sudeten Germans that "The West German Government (would) adhere to the 1950 resolution according to which it had pledged the German expellees its guardianship of their rights to the homeland in Czechoslovakia."<sup>68</sup> A few months later on 28 June 1956, Brentano reiterated this position adding that Bonn backed "the rights to the homeland and self-determination right of people as an unconditional prerequisite for the resolution of the fate of those persons in exile or slavery."<sup>69</sup> This statement was admittedly ambiguous, for exiles could refer to all inhabitants of communist ruled countries or more specifically ethnic Germans still living in communist countries. Yet, the SL inferred support of their aspirations from Brentano's remark, which was perhaps most important. Final proof that the SL had succeeded in elevating theirs to an all-German cause came as a subsection of the Hallstein Doctrine. In 1956, at the 161st session of the Bundestag, State Secretary Hallstein, *inter alia*, recognized expellees' right to the homeland and self-determination.<sup>70</sup> On the heels of this proclamation, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag stated that the Federal Government was "charged with defending the legal claim to German eastern territories and the expellees' right to the homeland *vis-à-vis* foreign governments."<sup>71</sup>

These proclamations signified SL success at solidifying the Sudeten Problem within the political mind of West Germany. Their success at the European level, however, was much less impressive. In 1960, Dr. Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, past president of the SL, wrote that the SL ought to extend the Sudeten German cause abroad by establishing relations with exile groups outside of Europe and their respective organizations.<sup>72</sup> The absolute dearth of information on this objective in subsequent issues of the *Sudeten Bulletin*, while not proving its failure, definitely indicate the insignificance of its result. This was one of the problems of the SL; it was never able, beyond symbolic gestures, to obtain foreign or international recognition of its cause. Much hoopla was given to the Nationalist Chinese who, on 11 December 1956, brought before a plenary session of the UN the question of the German expulsions after World War II.<sup>73</sup> Seen as a step toward the international recognition

of expellee legal claims, it had only minor repercussions and the UN did not pass a resolution. A similar failure occurred when the SL tried to obtain Radio Free Europe (RFE) airtime to project their views and broadcast Sudeten German programs. Czech commentators on the RFE opposed the SL and were vehemently attacked for their anti-Sudeten German stance. One SL spokesman said, "The RFE has developed into a stronghold of the late Dr. Benes' National Socialist Party."<sup>74</sup> The SL was unable to obtain RFE airtime and called for its own expellee transmitter station.<sup>75</sup> This project, too, never reached fruition, and ultimately, the SL had to be content with transmissions by Radio Madrid of Sudeten German programs in the Czech language.<sup>76</sup> This string of failures marked SL attempts to achieve international recognition of their cause. The one exception, the one country that did take notice of the SL was the USA, although in a half-hearted, superficial way. Perhaps because Bavaria, the home of the majority of Sudeten Germans, had been part of the American Zone, or perhaps because the USA had a guilty conscience arising from the Potsdam Agreement, which, among other things, had sanctioned the expulsions, a steady stream of US Congressmen and Senators sent congratulatory messages to the SL every year upon the annual *Sudetendeutscher Tag*, approving their intentions and encouraging their aims.<sup>77</sup> For example, Senator Strom Thurmond wrote in 1957, "The spirit of independence demonstrated by the Sudeten Germans who suffered such great persecution at the hands of the communist-led government should inspire the world."<sup>78</sup> The inaccuracy of this statement — the Benes-led National Socialist Government, not the communists, first expelled the Sudeten Germans — typified American ignorance of Central European history and proved that US support was probably part of a general anti-communist stance for domestic political profit rather than a knowledgeable response to perceived injustice. Furthermore, the Senator's message proved that despite all efforts, the SL had failed to elevate the Sudeten Question to the international level or to enlist the whole-hearted support of the West. As the SL president lamented in 1957, the West was interested only in combatting communists in Europe and has yet to move beyond theoretical declamations on the expellee issue.<sup>79</sup>

Against these prevailing currents, the SL participated in the World Refugee Year of 1959, and in 1961 the Sudeten German Council joined the Federalist Union of European Ethnic Groups.<sup>80</sup> The latter meant that from then on the Sudeten German Council still represented the 165,000 Sudeten Germans still living in Czechoslovakia. However, neither action significantly enhanced the

international position of the SL.

1961 was a benchmark year for the SL. There surfaced an internal conflict between the wish to accommodate political realities in Europe and the desire to continue the hard-line policies. One Sudeten German leader voicing the latter opinion explained that the SL "(does) not want to be a mere cultural society, or an auxiliary wing of political parties, but an ethnic organization with responsibilities and aspirations unique for all times."<sup>81</sup> However, his was a dissenting voice amidst a growing acceptance of a conciliatory line. The 20-Point Program of 1961, while retaining many hard-line positions to pacify SL right-wingers, was the first indication of the SL's new direction.

### The Annual Rally

The annual Sudeten German Rally (*Sudetendeutscher Tag*) has been and continues to be the most prominent event of the SL. As a measure of Sudeten German vitality, the rally reveals an almost uninterrupted well-being since the first one took place in 1950.<sup>82</sup> Because this event provides a common thread in the SL chronology, it constitutes an appropriate transition from the first to the second period of SL history.

In the early years, the rally offered expellees the opportunity to find family and encounter old friends.<sup>83</sup> It also enabled the SL to remind the public of the right to the homeland and self-determination and to denounce the Czech Government.<sup>84</sup> Later, the rallies increasingly became a forum for politicians and an exhibition of Sudeten German culture (*i.e.*, sports, dances, plays, and parades).<sup>85</sup> Looking at pictures of the rally in the *Sudeten Bulletin*, one is struck overwhelmingly by the predominance of elderly people. Certainly the annual rally was for many simply a reunion, a time to get together to share memories of the homeland and reminisce about old times.

The number of Sudeten Germans who attended these rallies is instructive, if only in showing the extent of support for the SL and the unflagging desire of Sudeten Germans to congregate year after year. Even given the difficulty of accurately estimating such large numbers and the likely tendency of the *Sudeten Bulletin* to exaggerate, the attendance figures are impressive and reveal that there has been an attraction, be it political posturing, cultural exhibitions, or simply fond memories that has consistently drawn Sudeten Germans to the rallies.

It was usual at the rallies for SL leaders to direct verbal

exhortations at the Federal Government or Prague. Frequently, BRD representatives came to the *Sudetendeutscher Tag* as well to explain government policies with regard to expellees, as Foreign Minister von Brentano did in 1956.<sup>86</sup> Congratulatory messages always poured in from abroad, especially from the US, demonstrating the perceived importance of the rallies. Prague, on the other hand, often denigrated the rally, viewing it as a symbol of German revanchism. In 1956, *Rude Pravo*, Prague's newspaper, labelled the event a "rusty weapon left over from the stubborn period of the cold war."<sup>87</sup>

The purpose of the rally, in the opinion of a member of the Bavarian Landtag, was basically to remind the world of the expulsions and reaffirm the Sudeten German claim to the homeland.<sup>88</sup> With the passage of time and the repercussions of such events as the erection of the Berlin Wall, the establishment of a BRD trade mission in Prague and the suppression of the "Prague Spring," the purpose of the rally gradually changed. In 1970, one spokesman described the rally as a "testimony of support for Europe, justice, and the preservation of peace."<sup>89</sup> The late 60's and early 70's witnessed a mitigation of Sudeten German rhetoric at the annual rally and West Germany's establishment of diplomatic relations with Prague in 1973 reinforced this trend. In more recent years, with West Germany's growing desire to improve ties with East Germany (DDR), the rally has once again become a platform for national politicians. At the thirty-fifth rally in 1984, BRD President Karl Carstens praised the Sudeten Germans for their intellectual and cultural contributions to Germany and their role in preserving Eastern German traditions.<sup>90</sup> As the hope of German reunification receives new life, it is possible that the *Sudetendeutscher Tag* will regain some of its lost luster while the SL itself may recoup some of its past political prestige.

### The Second Period (1961-1973)

The second period of SL history covers the period 1961 to 1973 and witnessed many events of far-reaching importance in Central Europe. The period was characterized by temporizing action on the part of the SL as the organization endeavoured to withstand forces that generally ameliorated relations between West Germany and Czechoslovakia. Throughout this period, the SL maintained its existing political objectives. However, in line with numerous West German diplomatic decisions which the SL perceived to threaten its future, SL leaders exerted a greater effort to influence the BRD

government. Paradoxically, the failure of the SL to prevent, or even attempt to impede Germany from establishing diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia (CSSR) did not spell the end for the organization. Instead, that event, which marks the close of the second period, confirmed the SL propensity to focus on cultural and historical activities over political agitation as the sustaining purpose of the organization.

The Sudeten German 20-Point Program of 7 May 1961 demarcates the beginning of the second period of SL history. Beneath a biased view of the expulsions, evidence of appeasement was present. For the first time, the SL recognized that the Munich Agreement, which it had hitherto regarded as legal and just according to international law, was a document of dubious character.<sup>91</sup> The SL also reversed its position concerning negotiations with the CSSR. The criterion of SL policy had always been to "reject negotiations with persons who instigated or carried out the expulsions."<sup>92</sup> The new program averred that "people are to be judged exclusively by what they think of the expulsion today and what they are sincerely working for today."<sup>93</sup> Although this last point specifically referred to Sudeten Germans, it implied a more tolerant attitude toward Prague as well. Finally, the right of self-determination, though reiterated in its traditional form, was qualified by point 19 which explained that self-determination "admitted different constitutional or international solutions."<sup>94</sup>

The 20-Point Program set the SL upon a new path of pragmatism. It arose largely from the realization by SL leaders that the West judged other international problems as more important than the expellee question.<sup>95</sup> Additionally, trends visible within the BRD government portended improved relations with Central Europe. Indeed, on 14 June 1961 the Bundestag passed a resolution calling for a gradual normalization of relations with Central European countries.<sup>96</sup> Apparently, the SL leaders were not purblind and, in a sense, were accommodating themselves to diplomatic developments.

One result of the 20-Point Program was that each of the major political parties of West Germany endorsed the new, liberal program as a solution to the Sudeten German Question.<sup>97</sup> Party support of the SL, as has been shown, was not unprecedented and in fact dated back to 1950. At that time, all of the West German parliamentary parties had sanctioned the *Obhutserklärung*.<sup>98</sup> In this Declaration of Protection, the BRD Government promised to protect the rights of Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia.<sup>99</sup> Although the parties renewed their support of the SL in 1961, they concurred with Bonn that the BRD had no territorial claims against the CSSR,

but that this did not prejudice the inalienable rights of the Sudeten Germans to their homeland.<sup>100</sup> This disclaimer was an important qualification that reflected Bonn's desire to improve relations with Central Europe. As such, it served notice to the SL that their political position was perhaps not as strong as it had previously been.

Any hope engendered by the 20-Point Program for a return to the homeland was stricken when the Berlin Wall was erected during the night of 13 August 1961. More than any other single event, this action drove home to the SL as well as the rest of the world the permanence of Germany's division. The SL's prerequisite for returning to the Sudetenland — the reunification of Germany followed by the founding of a supra-national European state — received a severe, if not fatal, blow. The shock waves that rumbled through the world community affected the Sudeten Germans no less than any other Germans, and it perhaps indicated that a more practical strategy was in order. That this was not immediately the case is illustrated by SL actions in the early 1960's.

In 1962, members of the Bavarian Diet, evidently responding to pressure from Sudeten German constituents, sent a letter to the Federal Minister of Justice of the BRD. The letter demanded the extradition or punishment of those Czechoslovak citizens responsible for the deaths of 300,000 Sudeten Germans during the expulsions.<sup>101</sup> This behest contradicted the spirit of the *Charta der Deutschen Heimatvertriebenen* and scarcely mirrored the more conciliatory aims outlined in the 20-Point Program. Apparently, the Berlin Wall and its implications for the SL had boosted conservative sentiment within the organization.<sup>102</sup> Bavaria's reaffirmation of its patronage of the Sudeten Germans shortly thereafter may have been related to this forward, aggressive attitude. Yet, the pre-eminence of this hard-line was short-lived.

On 11 December 1962 Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, past president of the SL and staunch conservative, died.<sup>103</sup> The passing of Auen seemed to weaken conservative initiative among Sudeten Germans, for in 1963, when Bonn began to consider establishing a trade mission in Prague, the Sudeten Council acted reasonably. It passed a resolution which stated in part, "The Sudeten German Council welcomes all endeavours aimed at improved relations between the two peoples."<sup>104</sup> Assuredly the council restricted its resolution by warning the BRD government to avoid recognizing Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the pragmatic, more "liberal" attitude initiated in 1961 appeared once again to prevail.

Pragmatism, however, did not prevent the negotiations between Prague and Bonn from being stormy. The CSSR demanded that

West Germany annul the Munich Agreement *hic et nunc* as a precondition to negotiations.<sup>105</sup> The SL went into a frenzied state announcing that an annulment would be extremely detrimental to their cause, essentially invalidating their claims to the homeland.<sup>106</sup> Eventually the negotiations were concluded with the Munich Agreement intact. However, the near catastrophe exposed the precarious position of the SL and the willingness of Bonn to ponder, though not as yet bargain with, Hitler's 1938 diplomatic coup. The *Münchener Abkommen* had possibly become the vulnerable shield of a retreating SL knight.

The SL knight arguably lost that vulnerable shield in 1966. In April of that year, West Germany transmitted a Peace Note to Prague avowing "The BRD is of the opinion that the Munich Agreement of 1938 was torn up by Hitler and that it is no longer of territorial significance."<sup>107</sup> Although Bonn did not explicitly annul the Munich Agreement, it was clear that SL objections had been overridden and Bonn was finally pursuing better formal relations with the CSSR.<sup>108</sup> Perhaps partly as a result of the Peace Note, partly as a result of declining interest in the Sudeten Question in the West, the *Sudeten Bulletin* underwent major changes in 1966. The bulletin dropped its title, merged with another publication, the *German News*, and was renamed the *Central European Journal*.<sup>109</sup> The editor, Anton Wuschek, explained that the bulletin's content would deal with historical and contemporary European affairs instead of solely Czech-German relations and Sudeten German issues.<sup>110</sup> More important, the primary emphasis was thenceforth to be placed upon "articles concerned with modern history, international relations, arts, economics, and the current affairs of Central Europe."<sup>111</sup> That its major English language publication no longer focused exclusively on Sudeten German issues implied that treatment of such issues no longer supported an English-speaking readership. Western, especially American, heed of the Sudeten German Question had either declined or been replaced with a greater desire for a European detente. In any case, the SL presumably believed that its cause would be better served by stressing a broader spectrum of Central European topics instead of specific Sudeten German matters.

Two years after Bonn's Peace Note and the reorganization of the *Sudeten Bulletin*, Russian troops cracked down on blossoming intellectual and personal freedoms in Czechoslovakia.<sup>112</sup> The suppression of the Prague Spring, as it came to be known, affected both Bonn and Sudeten German leaders. Franz Josef Strauss, chairman of the CSU, must have expressed the feelings of many

Germans when he said "a curtain (fell) on the prospects for a peaceful coexistence with the East Bloc states, obscuring a view of the future."<sup>113</sup> But the event elicited no further response in the *Central European Journal*.<sup>114</sup> The silence of the journal is possibly indicative of Sudeten German disinterest and depoliticization with regard to the country of their homeland. If this is the case, it reinforced the already visible trend — axiomatic in the *Sudeten Bulletin*'s merger and change — away from purely Sudeten German political issues.

In 1970 Bavaria established the House of the German East for the Sudeten Germans in Munich.<sup>115</sup> The purpose of this institution was twofold: first and foremost was to preserve the Sudeten German cultural heritage and second, to provide a place where peoples from all over Europe could meet to exchange ideas. In a closing address at the official opening of the House, a member of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences defined the House as follows, "These houses are a socio-political, and interpersonal necessity; they depoliticize and de-ideologize old concepts and relations... At stake is a new healthy attitude on the part of Germans from the East ...towards a new intellectual and cultural focus in Europe."<sup>116</sup> As a reflection of the trend away from political activism, as a signpost indicating a new cultural-historical orientation for Sudeten Germans, and as a result of Central European diplomatic realities, the *Haus des deutschen Ostens* symbolized the SL revelation that they were not going to ever regain the homeland. Hence, the best, and perhaps only way to preserve the Heimat for their children was to create a place where their arts, handicrafts, customs, and traditions would be preserved.

The evolution of the SL from a politically oriented organization to a homeland preservation association probably made it easier for the Sudeten Germans to accept the Bonn-Prague Treaty of 1973.<sup>117</sup> During preliminary negotiations, the SL magnanimously offered "its expert knowledge and advice" to the BRD Government.<sup>118</sup> It is quite likely that Bonn did not avail itself of the offer, for the treaty was highly unsatisfactory to the Sudeten Germans, although it probably would have been so under any circumstance. Once the treaty was signed establishing formal diplomatic relations between West Germany and Czechoslovakia, an outcry arose from SL leaders. But it was more the form the treaty took than the fact of the treaty itself which provoked them.<sup>119</sup> Nonetheless, indignation among SL leaders was so great that Bavaria, as patron of the Sudeten Germans, was compelled to reject the treaty.<sup>120</sup> One Sudeten German explaining his displeasure said, "The Bonn-

Prague Treaty perpetuates the tragedy of 3½ million Sudeten Germans who had no effective voice in any one of the significant historical decisions affecting their fates as a people."<sup>121</sup> Needless to say, the anti-treaty protest had no tangible effect on the ratification of the treaty. To all intents and purposes, the treaty simply reconciled the political reality of the loss of the Sudetenland with the personal conviction of many Sudeten Germans. The only apparent victim of the treaty, the *Central European Journal*, ceased publication shortly after the treaty was promulgated.<sup>122</sup> The SL must have decided to channel its journalistic energies in other, more fruitful and probably less political directions. Twenty-five years after first going to press, the journal ended, culminating the second period in SL history.

### The Third Period (1974-1984) And Conclusion

The third period in SL history, dating from 1974 to the present, is notable primarily for the dearth of information this writer was able to obtain. Indeed, only a few recent speeches and an article or two were located. However, with an eye to trends evident within the SL at the time of the Bonn-Prague Treaty, the balance of the 1970's was liable to have been marked by continued emphasis on cultural activities and a further decline in interest in the Eastern Question. Attendance at the annual rally dipped enormously between 1974 and 1984, supporting this hypothesis. Aging must have contributed to a declining interest in the homeland; most Sudeten Germans who had been adults in 1945 have probably died. Furthermore, for those Sudeten Germans who had experienced the expulsions and are still alive, the passage of time inevitably heals emotional and psychological wounds, including those caused by the loss of the Sudetenland. Polls taken in the 1950's and 1960's had demonstrated the diminishing desire of expellees to return to the homeland, and one author attributes this to the Berlin Wall and the complete economic integration of expellees by 1961.<sup>123</sup> If public clamoring for *Die Recht auf Heimat*\* did not always decline in correspondence to the true desires of expellees, this was because there was often a disparity between what some expellee leaders professed and what their followers believed.<sup>124</sup> On the whole, Sudeten Germans had no desire, even if given the opportunity, to return to the Sudetenland, and this accounted, most likely, for the growing lack of interest in political activity aimed at regaining the

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\*The right to a homeland.

homeland and the increasing stress placed upon institutions like the German House of the East.

Very recently there appears to have been a resurgence in interest in the expellee question and Sudeten Question. West German *Bundeskanzler* Helmut Kohl remarked in June, 1983, that the BRD does not "accept our German compatriots being denied the right to self-determination and their human rights being violated."<sup>125</sup> On 9 February 1984 Kohl appeared at the *Tag der Heimat des Bundes der Vertriebenen* (Day of the Homeland sponsored by the Association of Expellees) and enunciated the belief that expellees had been a constructive force in their support of democracy and peace in West Germany.<sup>126</sup> He went on to state "ich setze mich ein für ein geeintes Europa, das uns allen Heimat ist und bleiben kann."<sup>127</sup> With East and West Germany moving closer over the last several years, speculation about reunification has become rife, and this obviously has great significance for all expellees. SL objectives for a supra-national European state are alluded to in Kohl's "geeintes Europa," and in the desire for peace, a unified Europe may lead at long last to a peace treaty ending World War II. On the thirty-fifth annual *Sudetendeutscher Tag*, Franz Josef Strauss, speaking to 50,000 Sudeten Germans, said, "Die Teilung Europas und Deutschlands werde sich ändern, auch wenn es noch so lange dauert."<sup>128</sup> Expellee groups like the SL may still have a role to play in Europe's future. Very few things are absolutely certain, but we can be reasonably sure about two things concerning the SL: the Sudetenland will in all probability never again be occupied by Sudeten Germans; and secondly, this is no longer a crucial matter to Sudeten Germans. Content where they are, Sudeten Germans will sustain memories of the homeland through institutions such as the Munich House of the German East and the SL, having refocused its attention on cultural and historical matters, will continue to exist for some time.

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\*"I declare that I am for a united Europe, that is and can remain a homeland for all of us."

\*\*"The partition of Europe and Germany will be changed, no matter how long it takes."

## Notes

1. *The Concise Columbia Encyclopedia* (New York: Columbia University Press), 1983, p. 815.
2. "Sudeten German 20-Point Program," *Sudeten Bulletin*, ed. Anton Wuschek (Munich: Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft), June, 1961, pp. 150-52.
3. Smelser, Ronald M. *The Sudeten Problem: 1933-1938* (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1975), p. 9.
4. Sudeten Germans comprised approximately one-fifth of Czechoslovakia's population of 14 million in 1930. *The Expulsion of the German Population from the Territories East of the Oder-Neisse Line*, ed. Theodor Schieder, trans. G.H. de Sausmarez et al. (Bonn: Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims, 1960), Vol. IV, pp. 7, 17.
5. Schoenberg, Hans W. *Germans from the East: A Study of Their Migration, Resettlement, and Subsequent Group History Since 1945* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 99-100.
6. Luza, Radomir *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: A Study of Czech-German Relations 1933-1962* (New York: New York University Press, 1964), pp. 310-312.
7. Smelser, p. 120.
8. Bachstein, Martin K. *Wenzel Jaksch und die Sudetendeutsche Sozialdemokratie*, (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1974), pp. 184-5.
9. Theodor Schieder, p. 127.
10. Schoenberg, p. 96.
11. *Sudeten Bulletin*, September, 1954, pp. 1-3.
12. Luza, pp. 320-21.
13. *Sudeten Bulletin*, November, 1959, p. 219.
14. *Op. cit.*, July/August, 1956, p. 75.
15. *Op. cit.*, July, 1959, p. 71.
16. Schoenberg, p. 96.
17. *Loc. cit.* The Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV), a national organization comprising twenty Landsmannschaften, among them the SL, when formed in 1957 had a membership of 2.8 million (*Sudeten Bulletin*, December, 1957, p. 149). In 1970, the BdV's membership was 2.7 million (Meyer's *Enzyklopädisches Lexikon*, 1972, p. 67). Assuming SL membership has remained relatively constant, one can posit that it has declined but slightly over the ten year period.
18. *Sudeten Bulletin*, June 1954, p. 1.
19. *Op. cit.*, February, 1954, p. 2.
20. *Loc. cit.*
21. *Op. cit.*, March, 1955, p. 1.
22. *Op. cit.*, June 1961, p. 150.
23. Schoenberg, p. 97.
24. *Sudeten Bulletin*, September, 1958, pp. 177-78.
25. *Op. cit.*, September, 1958, p. 178.
26. *Charta der Deutschen Heimatvertriebenen*, promulgated on 5 August 1950 in Cannstatt near Stuttgart, West Germany.

27. "State of the Nation in a Divided Germany," address by Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the German Bundestag on 23 June 1983 (German Information Center, 950 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10022 — *Statements and Speeches*, Vol. VI, No. 12).
28. *Die Zeit* (article received from German Information Center without a date — unable to ascertain date by research at SML).
29. "Detmold Declaration," *Sudeten Bulletin*, April 1960, p. 175.
30. *Op. cit.*, July/August, 1954, p. 7.
31. Schoenberg, p. 200.
32. *Sudeten Bulletin*, December 1954, p. 2.
33. *Op. cit.*, March, 1955, p. 2 and May, 1955, p. 51–53.
34. *Op. cit.*, May, 1957, p. 49.
35. *Op. cit.*, April, 1959, p. 91.
36. Schoenberg, pp. 37, 43.
37. *Loc. cit.*
38. Walton, Henry. *Germany* (New York, Walker and Company, 1969), p. 59.
39. Schoenberg, pp. 244–45.
40. *Loc. cit.*
41. *Loc. cit.*
42. *Loc. cit.*
43. Schoenberg, p. 246.
44. *Die Sudetendeutsche Frage: Entstehung, Entwicklung und Lösungsversuchen 1918–1973*, ed. Wolfgang Götz (Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler Verlag GmbH, 1974), p. 112.
45. Schoenberg, p. 246.
46. *Op. cit.*, pp. 248–49.
47. *Op. cit.*, p. 252.
48. *Op. cit.*, pp. 244–45.
49. *Die Sudetendeutsche Frage in der Deutschen Politik*, herausgegeben vom Sudetendeutschen Rat E.V. München (Mitteleuropäische Quellen und Dokumente, Band 9), (München: Universitäts-Buchdruckerei und Verlag Dr. C. Wolf & Sohn, 1965), p. 9.
50. *Loc. cit.*
51. Heidenheimer, Arnold J. and Kommers, Donald P. *The Governments of Germany* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1975), p. 95.
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53. *Sudeten Bulletin*, November, 1957, p. 133.
54. Schoenberg, pp. 297–98.
55. *Op. cit.*, p. 299.
56. *Loc. cit.*
57. *Op. cit.*, p. 303.
58. Nagle, John David. *The National Democratic Party: Right Radicalism in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970).
59. Schoenberg, p. 304.
60. Long, Wellington. *The New Nazis of Germany* (Philadelphia: Chilton Book Company, 1969), p. 123.
61. *Op. cit.*, p. 180.
62. Kitzinger, p. 10.
63. Schoenberg, pp. 314–15.

64. *Sudeten Bulletin*, December, 1964, p. 370.
65. *Op. cit.*, December 1961, p. 370.
66. *Op. cit.*, January, 1959, p. 2.
67. *Op. cit.*, April, 1955, p. 46.
68. *Loc. cit.*
69. *Op. cit.*, July/August, 1956, p. 74 and November, 1956, p. 121.
70. *Op. cit.*, November, 1956, p. 121.
71. *Op. cit.*, January, 1965, p. 33.
72. *Op. cit.*, April, 1960, p. 175.
73. *Op. cit.*, February, 1957, p. 23.
74. *Op. cit.*, December, 1955, pp. 3–4.
75. *Op. cit.*, May, 1957, p. 132.
76. *Op. cit.*, April, 1960, p. 175.
77. *Op. cit.*, July/August, 1957, p. 79.
78. *Op. cit.*, July/August, 1957, p. 80.
79. *Op. cit.*, June, 1957, p. 80.
80. *Op. cit.*, January, 1961, p. 18.
81. *Op. cit.*, July/August, 1961, p. 18.
82. *Op. cit.*, April, 1954, p. 5.
83. Schoenberg, pp. 118–19.
84. *Sudeten Bulletin*, April 1954, pp. 5–6.
85. Schoenberg, pp. 118–119.
86. *Sudeten Bulletin*, May 1956, pp. 73–74.
87. *Op. cit.*, July/August, 1956, p. 75.
88. *Op. cit.*, June, 1957, p. 61.
89. *Op. cit.*, June, 1970, p. 291.
90. *Die Zeit*.
91. "Sudeten German 20-Point Program," *Sudeten Bulletin*, June 1961, pp. 150–52.
92. *Op. cit.*, July/August, 1954, p. 40.
93. *Op. cit.*, June, 1961, pp. 150–52.
94. *Loc. cit.*
95. Schoenberg, p. 235.
96. *Sudeten Bulletin*, July/August, 1964, p. 226.
97. *Die Sudetendeutsche Frage in der Deutschen Politik*, pp. 49–54.
98. Schoenberg, p. 249.
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## *Not Just Japanese Americans: The Untold Story of U.S. Repression During "The Good War"*

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### I. Pre-Pearl Harbor

The sad saga of civil liberties in the United States during the Second World War begins well before Pearl Harbor. The popular impression is that the Japanese surprise attack in December 1941 caught the U.S. government totally unaware. In an effort to counter this impression, countless Revisionist historians have raked over the diplomatic events that preceded the attack.<sup>1</sup> Yet, prior domestic developments within the U.S. probably belie the impression of U.S. unpreparedness much more forcefully. For the U.S. government was, without a doubt, better prepared to fight World War II than any previous war in its history.

This unprecedented military preparedness resulted from a massive prewar mobilization that involved 1 the U.S.'s first large peacetime foreign aid program: lend-lease; 2 an emergency peacetime military buildup; 3 the first peacetime draft in U.S. history to support that buildup; 4 an array of new and heavy emergency taxes to pay for the buildup; 5 the creation of a new and broad regulatory bureaucracy, supplementing New Deal agencies, to direct the economy toward war production; 6 the use of troops to enforce labor settlements within critical defense industries; and finally 7 the adoption of a peacetime sedition law to suppress disloyalty.<sup>2</sup>

This last is what concerns us. The pre-Pearl Harbor sedition law, the Smith Act, is more generally known for its postwar enforcement, in a period of tense U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. In fact, it was just the most glaring manifestation of the growing precariousness of civil liberties as the nation went on a war

footing prior to its intervention in World War II. The deteriorating international situation brought a rash of related legislation, Congressional inquiries, executive harassment, and state government repression, all aimed at so-called subversive activities.<sup>3</sup>

Because of disillusionment with the First World War, Americans initially wished to stay out of the Second. An early generation of Revisionist historians had successfully debunked the official justifications for U.S. participation in World War I, and had overturned the judgment of exclusive German war guilt. In 1934 and 1935, a Senate committee, under the chairmanship of Gerald P. Nye, a progressive Republican, investigated the munitions industry. It concluded that American financiers and arms merchants had maneuvered the U.S. into the previous European conflict for their own profit. All of these trends coalesced into a powerful isolationist movement, opposed to any future U.S. involvement in European quarrels.

The debate between the isolationists and interventionists became intense and bitter with the onset of war in Europe. By 1940, a broad-based coalition of noninterventionists had joined together in the America First Committee. Among the committee's luminaries, supporters, and sympathizers were Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, the aviator hero of the twenties; General Robert E. Wood, chairman of the board of Sears, Roebuck; Colonel Robert R. McCormick, publisher of the conservative *Chicago Tribune*; ex-President Herbert Hoover; labor leader John L. Lewis, who had co-founded the militant Congress of Industrial Organizations as a rival to the American Federation of Labor; Norman Thomas, Socialist Party candidate for President; and progressive Democratic Senator Burton K. Wheeler from Montana.<sup>4</sup>

Although the isolationists were influential enough to prevent President Franklin D. Roosevelt from dragging the nation overtly into the war before Pearl Harbor, they were unable to prevent the prewar mobilization. Eventually their loyalty came under question, and the government subjected them to increasing harassment. But before that transpired, the State had already honed its repressive instruments upon much less prominent targets on the extreme Right and extreme Left.

Numerous American fascist groups, nearly all minuscule, had sprouted in the Great Depression's fertile soil. The two most vocal were the German-American Bund and the Legion of Silver Shirts. Both groups were virulently anti-Jewish, with paramilitary trappings, and both received public attention grotesquely out of proportion to their numbers. The German-American Bund, virtually but not

officially a U.S. branch of Germany's National Socialist Party, drew its fewer than 25,000 and probably closer to 8,500 members from among recent German immigrants. At its peak, the Bund packed Madison Square Garden in New York with 22,000 sympathizers for a George Washington's birthday rally in 1939. The Silver Shirts was an independent organization, headed by mystic William Dudley Pelley. Its membership may have reached 15,000 in 1934, but thereafter it declined to less than 5,000. None of the native fascist organizations, separately or in combination, ever approached the influence of the Ku Klux Klan in the twenties.<sup>5</sup>

The U.S. Communist Party had likewise experienced a surge during the depression decade, growing from 7,500 in 1930 to 30,000 in 1935. By the mid-thirties, the party had adopted the strategy of joining thousands of non-communists in popular front organizations, such as the American League for Peace and Democracy. Many party members found employment in the burgeoning bureaus of the New Deal. With the signing of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact in August 1939, the Communist Party also indirectly arrived at an isolationist foreign policy stance.<sup>6</sup>

Very early in the depression the House's Fish Committee had briefly looked into Communist propaganda. With this one lone exception, the precedent established during the post-World War I Red Scare of Congressional investigation into subversive activity had lain dormant until the German Reichstag granted absolute power to Adolf Hitler in March 1933, the same month as F.D.R.'s inauguration. Immediately, the internal threat to this country from the right received equal billing with the internal threat from the left, in what one historian has recently dubbed the "Brown Scare." The House established a new special committee to investigate these twin "foreign" dangers, with John W. McCormack as chairman and Samuel Dickstein as vice-chairman. The committee released a report in 1935 that branded the Communist Party, the Silver Shirts, and several other organizations as subversive.

The ultimate results of the committee's efforts was enactment in 1938, while events were reaching the boiling point in Europe, of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. This first of the pre-World War II repressive laws provided a maximum penalty of two years and \$1000 (later increased to five years and \$10,000) for anyone whom the U.S. government deemed a "foreign agent" but who failed to register as such with the Secretary of State.

At the time that the Foreign Agents Registration Act passed, the most significant loyalty legislation already on the books was the World War I Espionage Act. The Espionage Act had combined

three features: 1 a true espionage law, which punished spying and wartime sabotage, 2 a neutrality law, which restricted the non-neutral acts of private citizens in foreign conflicts, and 3 a sedition law, providing up to twenty years in jail and a \$10,000 fine for aiding the enemy with "false reports or false statements," for obstructing recruiting, or for causing insubordination, disloyalty, or mutiny in the U.S. armed forces. The act also empowered the Postmaster General to exclude from the mail issues of newspapers and periodicals that he felt were subversive.

The sedition portions of the Espionage Act, however, were inoperative in peacetime. During the infamous Red Scare, the Wilson Administration had sought a peacetime sedition act, but had failed. The Foreign Agents Registration Act represented a minor step toward closing that loophole.

Congress also implemented a second of the McCormack-Dickstein Committee's recommendations: an extension of the Congressional subpoena power beyond the District of Columbia. A new Special House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities, created in 1938 with Martin Dies of Texas as chairman, put this added power to effective use. Like its predecessor, the Dies Committee went after both domestic fascists and Communists. It paid greater attention to the latter, however, as Dies, an arch-foe of the New Deal, attempted to taint the Roosevelt Administration with Communist associations. Each succeeding House faithfully renewed the committee, and several states copied it, with their own "little Dies" committees.<sup>7</sup>

While the Dies Committee's spectacular hearings and voluminous reports gathered headlines, Congress approved an array of additional security laws: the Hatch Act of 1939, which generally restricted the political freedom of government employees and specifically prohibited Communists from working for the national government; an amendment of March 1940 to the Espionage Act, increasing the act's penalties for spying, neutrality violations, and other infractions that applied during peacetime; and finally the Smith Act of June 1940.

The Smith Act bore the somewhat misleading official title of Alien Registration Act. To be sure, provisions of the act affected the 3.5 million immigrants in this country who had not attained citizenship. It required their registration and fingerprinting, and it made deportation for revolutionary activities and beliefs easier. Several states had already foreshadowed these moves. With the outbreak of war in Europe, Georgia and Pennsylvania had both required aliens to register, and Pennsylvania had also forbidden

them to hunt, fish, or own dogs.

The Smith Act's most far-reaching provisions, however, established a penalty of up to ten years in jail and a \$10,000 fine for encouraging insubordination in the military, for advocating, in speech or writing, the forceful overthrow of the U.S. government, or for joining any organization that so advocated. Thus, the Smith Act was, in fact, a true peacetime sedition law of the same sort that had previously failed to pass at the height of the Red Scare. It took the approach of World War II to secure enactment.

Following the Smith Act, Congress added still more "security" legislation. The Selective Service Act of September 1940, which gave the U.S. its first peacetime draft, also carried penalties for urging resistance to the draft. The Nationality Act of October 1940 facilitated divesting naturalized immigrants of their citizenship for radical political beliefs. The Voorhis Act, passed later the same month, required registration with the Attorney General of all *organizations* subject to "foreign control," if involved in civilian-military activities or if advocating the overthrow of the government. (The previous Foreign Agents Registration Act applied to *individuals*.) The fact that the Voorhis Act could require members of the radical organizations to incriminate themselves under the Smith Act did not faze Congress. Just before the Pearl Harbor attack, another amendment to the Espionage Act made sabotage a national crime during peacetime as well as wartime. In short, the pre-Pearl Harbor period witnessed the most sustained outburst of repressive legislation in the nation's history.<sup>8</sup>

Executive-branch harassment of government opponents kept pace with Congress's steady prewar infringement of people's political liberty. At the van of this harassment was the national government's police force: the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). To fully appreciate the FBI's prewar politicization, we must take a brief retrospective look at that agency's evolution during the interwar years.<sup>9</sup>

In the midst of the Red Scare, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer had established within what was then called the Bureau of Investigation (it got its current name in 1935) a special section to investigate radicals: the General Intelligence Division, with the young J. Edgar Hoover at its head. The Bureau's subsequent raids and deportations had left it, however, with a severely tarnished reputation. As a result of further revelations that the Bureau had even spied upon Congressmen in order to suppress the Teapot Dome scandal, the supposedly reactionary Coolidge Administration ordered an abrupt halt to all the Bureau's political activities and abolished the General Intelligence Division.

Unfortunately, to clean up the Bureau, the Coolidge Administration made none other than J. Edgar Hoover its new director. Defenders of Hoover cite this as proof that his role in the Red Scare had been merely perfunctory. Detractors on the other hand speculated that Hoover got the promotion because, in the words of intelligence expert William Corson, "there was enough in his files to effectively sink the Republican Party in the upcoming Presidential election." Whichever the case may be, recent documents secured by historians under the Freedom of Information Act reveal that Hoover secretly defied the Coolidge Directive against political surveillance and sporadically monitored such groups as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), even to the point of illegal break-ins.

Nonetheless, the Bureau's low political profile coupled with its emphasis on catching criminals transformed its public image during the next decade. An extremely significant but oft-neglected feature of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal was a "war with the organized forces of crime," involving a new deal for the Bureau. Congress passed nine major anti-crime bills in 1934. These gave Bureau agents full arrest power and the authority to carry any kind of firearm, and they put a variety of crimes under its jurisdiction: robbing any bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, fleeing across state lines to avoid prosecution or subpena, extorting money by phone or mail, or transporting stolen property valued at \$5000 or more across state lines. Among these new laws was the National Firearms Act of 1934, the first federal gun control law.

In his war on crime, as in most other respects, F.D.R. was fully anticipated by President Herbert Hoover. Hoover had appointed the national Wickersham Commission to study the problems of law enforcement. In his zest for increased bureaucratic efficiency in national crime control, he had created a separate Bureau of Prisons and a separate Bureau of Narcotics. He also had signed the bill that established the Bureau of Investigation's fingerprinting division in 1930 and the Lindbergh Bill, which made kidnapping a national crime, in 1932.

Most important for the future of civil liberties, Hoover was the first U.S. President to request formally that the Bureau of Investigation collect political intelligence. We have already observed that under J. Edgar Hoover, the Bureau continued throughout the twenties to monitor radical activities on its own. But President Hoover legitimized these transgressions by requesting Bureau reports on groups as diverse as the Sentinels of the Republic (a

minor far right organization), the Navy League, the ACLU, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the Foreign Policy Association.

Roosevelt, upon assuming the Presidency, expanded the Bureau's political surveillance. While continuing Hoover's precedent of soliciting FBI reports on his political adversaries, he secretly ordered the Bureau to look into the American Nazi movement in 1934, and he widened that general mandate to include all potentially subversive groups in 1936. In June of 1939, with concern about foreign spies and "fifth columnists" on the rise, Roosevelt centralized responsibility over all "espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters" into the FBI's hands, with Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence playing supporting roles. This directive became public and was broadened to include "subversive activities and violations of neutrality laws," when the European war erupted later that year.

J. Edgar Hoover thereupon reactivated the dreaded General Intelligence Division and compiled a secret Custodial Detention list of persons to be jailed summarily during wartime. FBI officials opened first-class mail and regularly practiced, with Roosevelt's explicit blessing, wiretapping, despite the 1939 Supreme Court ruling that the Federal Communications Act of 1934 proscribed government wiretapping. The executive branch instituted a loyalty program for federal job holders, with FBI checks, to help implement the Hatch Act, and the Attorney General drew up his first list of subversive organizations.

At the same time, Roosevelt prepared other sections of the executive branch for the suppression of dissent. In the spring of 1940 he transferred the Immigration and Naturalization Service from the Labor to the Justice Department. Roosevelt thought the Labor Department too lenient; it was the Labor Department which in 1920 had initially called a halt to the Red Scare by refusing to deport the aliens that the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation had rounded up. Also within the Justice Department, a newly established Neutrality Laws Unit (which would become the Special War Policies Unit once the U.S. entered the war) assumed responsibility for sedition prosecutions. The Post Office invoked a strained interpretation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act to reinstitute its World War I practice of mail censorship. It seized and destroyed over fifteen tons of alleged foreign propaganda mailed to the U.S. from Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union.

The FBI invariably serviced White House requests for derogatory information on critics of Roosevelt's foreign policy. Roosevelt's press secretary, in May of 1940, turned over to J. Edgar Hoover

for checking the names of persons who had sent telegrams critical of a Presidential fireside chat on national defense. The FBI furnished the President with reports on leading isolationists, including Senators Nye and Wheeler. After the America First Committee was organized, Roosevelt subjected it to the meticulous scrutiny of first the FBI and later the Internal Revenue Service. In an ironic twist of fate, F.D.R. even ordered ex-President Hoover put under FBI observation.

The Dies Committee, while continuing to harass the Roosevelt administration, also started a probe of the America First Committee, one month before Pearl Harbor. F.D.R., however, fully reciprocated Dies's enmity and ordered the FBI to investigate Dies and his supporters for election fraud and then, after Pearl Harbor, for fascist links. J. Edgar Hoover skillfully played both political foes off against each other. While investigating Dies for the President, he confidentially cooperated with the Dies Committee, feeding it FBI tips. This tactic generally induced Roosevelt to give Hoover wider leeway, so that the FBI could preempt the exposés of the Dies Committee.

The hardest hit victims of this labyrinth of political ploys and government intrigue were not major political figures, but usually less influential and sometimes insignificant dissidents. During the opening months of 1940, the FBI conducted two sets of widely publicized raids. The first picked up seventeen members of the Christian Front Sports Club in Brooklyn, New York — young rightists, unemployed or very poor, who were supposedly plotting to overthrow the government. The second, in Detroit, swooped down upon a dozen veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, all leftists who had fought against General Franco in the Spanish Civil War in 1936 and 1937 and were therefore charged with neutrality law infractions. The trial of the Christian Fronters resulted in an acquittal after revelations that the defendants had received drunken encouragement from an FBI *agent provocateur*, while the Justice Department, facing a public outcry, dropped its three-year-late charges against the Abraham Lincoln Brigade veterans.

The Justice Department was successful, however, in convicting Earl Browder, the Communist Party's General Secretary, of passport fraud in January, 1940, after his testimony before the Dies Committee. He received the ridiculously long and obviously political sentence of four years in prison and a \$2000 fine. (Another person convicted of the same offense shortly thereafter received merely a \$500 fine.) The government also initiated denaturalization proceedings against William Schneiderman, leader of the California

Communist Party, and deportation proceedings against Harry Bridges, the left-wing leader of the west coast longshoremen.

A federal grand jury in October 1941 indicted pro-German publicist George Sylvester Viereck for infringement of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Viereck was on the German government's payroll and *was* among the four hundred persons who had by March of 1940 dutifully registered under the act's provisions. But he was also involved in a Congressional scandal in which he had solicited isolationist writings for insertion by various legislators into the *Congressional Record* so that he could distribute them through mass mailings under Congressional franking privileges. The State's indictment charged him with not filling out his registration forms fully and properly. His was only the most noteworthy of a whole slew of cases brought against both leftists and rightists under the same act.<sup>11</sup>

The first to fall prey to the Smith Act was the Socialist Workers Party. The Socialist Workers Party was a Trotskyite splinter from the Communist Party. It was also one of the few leftwing groups still opposed to U.S. involvement in the war after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The Trotskyites committed the additional political sin of gaining control over Teamster locals in Minnesota and challenging the leadership of union president Dan Tobias, a Roosevelt ally. Federal marshalls raided the Minneapolis headquarters of the Socialist Workers Party on June 28, 1941, and indicted twenty-nine leaders. Eighteen were convicted and jailed for from one to one and a half years.

The national government did devote some effort to the persecution of genuine spies. Thus, the FBI cracked the two major German rings in 1941 and set in motion the process that would put their members behind bars. It also began, under F.D.R.'s direct orders, secretly collaborating with British Intelligence, in violation of U.S. neutrality laws. Although designed to keep the State out of war, neutrality laws ended up more often in practice being used by the State to harass private citizens.<sup>12</sup>

A most unusual prewar espionage case involved a code clerk at the U.S. Embassy in Great Britain: Tyler Kent. Kent was presumably responsible for a leak of embassy communications to the Axis. The U.S. government, in an unheard-of diplomatic irregularity, waived Kent's diplomatic immunity so that the British could apprehend him. It then pressured the British into trying Kent, rather than deporting him to the U.S. An American trial would have disclosed the existence of the major documents that Kent had purloined — the clandestine personal correspondence between

President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, carried on *prior* to Churchill's becoming British Prime Minister, while he was still only a cabinet member in Chamberlain's war government. Such a patent exposure of F.D.R.'s unneutral designs would probably have outraged the American people and damaged F.D.R.'s bid for a third term in the 1940 Presidential race. The British trial, on the other hand, was conducted behind closed doors, under harsher statutes. Kent received a seven-year sentence, and the American public heard absolutely nothing about the case until four years later, long after the U.S. was fully committed to the war.<sup>13</sup>

Finding a legal basis for suppressing the German-American Bund before Pearl Harbor proved more difficult for the U.S. government. Back in 1933, it had indicted Heinz Spanknoebel, then Bund leader, for violating an obscure notification clause in the Espionage Act. But Spanknoebel fled to Germany, and after that, the Justice Department could find no grounds for further prosecution, despite all the new repressive laws. Not until June of 1941 did Roosevelt order the seizure of Bund assets as part of his general order freezing all Axis assets in the United States. Soon afterward, the government filed tax liens against the Bund.

The most telling blows against the Bund came from state and local governments. New Jersey passed an anti-Bund law, forbidding the wearing of foreign uniforms, as early as mid-1938, and several years later, confiscated the Bund's Camp Nordland. New York City's mayor, Fiorello La Guardia, bent upon imprisoning Bund leaders under any pretext, established an anti-subversive squad in the city's police department and launched an investigation into Bund finances. The young and aggressive New York District Attorney, Thomas Dewey, secured a conviction of Fritz Kuhn, head of the Bund, for misuse of Bund funds, and sent him to Sing Sing Prison for two and a half years in December, 1939. By the summer of 1941, California had a comprehensive Subversive Organization Registration Law aimed at the Bund, while Florida had made membership in any "anarchistic, communistic, Nazi-istic or fascistic organization" a felony.

The Bund was not the only fringe organization to feel the sting of state and local repression. Pelley of the Silver Shirts, to give just one more example from the right, was constantly in trouble with North Carolina authorities from 1935 on. Several states made libel of racial, religious, and ethnic groups a criminal offense. To drive the Communist Party off the ballot, many states made their ballot requirements more stringent during the 1940 election or immediately thereafter. Four states, at the instigation of the Dies Committee,

indicted over a hundred Communist petition circulators for election fraud. Oklahoma handed down sentences of ten years to four Communist leaders under the state's criminal syndicalism laws, while the Washington legislature refused to seat an elected state senator who was a former party member.

But it was neither fascists nor Communists who suffered most during the pre-Pearl Harbor hysteria. According to the the ACLU's annual report for 1940-41, "the most numerous attacks on civil liberties of any single minority were directed against the Jehovah's Witnesses."<sup>14</sup> The Jehovah's Witnesses are a millennialist Protestant sect, founded in the last third of the nineteenth century and numbering a quarter of a million American adherents. Their theology is extremely anti-Statist, and it even opposes flag salutes. This opposition so enraged local authorities, the American Legion, and other protectors of patriotism that the Witnesses were the only group during the World War II period to endure the kind of vigilante violence that had been so prevalent during World War I. Mob attacks upon Witnesses occurred in 335 communities in 44 different states in the six months running from May to October 1940 alone. Many of the injured were women and children.

The Supreme Court defended the Witnesses' First Amendment right to distribute religious literature without restrictions from local ordinances beginning in 1938. But in the 1940 *Gobitis* case, the Court held that children could legally be expelled from government schools for not saluting the flag. "National Unity is the basis of national security," wrote Justice Felix Frankfurter in the majority opinion.<sup>15</sup> Massive expulsions were the result, followed sometimes by state prosecutions of Witness parents for violating compulsory attendance laws. A few attempts were made to take children from their Jehovah's Witness parents but were unsuccessful. Indiana, under its state sedition law, sentenced two elderly Witness women who refused to salute the flag to prison terms of two to ten years, although their convictions were later overturned on appeal.

## II. Post-Pearl Harbor

All the aforementioned events, entailing enormous gains for State power, occurred, we should stress, at a time when the United States was technically at peace. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor merely accelerated the civil liberties trends already in motion. The awesome repressive machinery constructed by Congress and the President during the prewar period now became fully operational.

The only well-known World War II civil liberties outrage is the internment of Japanese-Americans. Actually, the U.S. government amplified its harassment of aliens from *all* enemy nations at the first news of the Japanese attack. Within seventy-two hours of the attack, the FBI had 3,846 Japanese, German, and Italian immigrants in custody. A grand total of sixteen thousand were seized throughout the war and about four thousand of them were held for the duration. This was done under authority of the old Alien Enemies Act, which permitted alien internment during wartime. It was one of the four notorious Alien and Sedition Acts passed by the Federalists in 1798, and the only one of the four that President Jefferson had left on the books.<sup>16</sup>

The "enemy" aliens who were paroled or who remained at large suffered numerous other infringements of their liberty. The national government forced more than ten thousand to leave their homes near defense installations, and it imposed rigid curfews upon others. They all needed permission to travel or move and could not possess firearms or short-wave radios. The Justice Department's only leniencies were to exempt Italian aliens from these restrictions after Columbus Day, 1942, and west coast Germans two months later.

Unlike the policies already mentioned, the State's treatment of the west coast Japanese made no distinction between native-born citizens (*Nisei*) and foreign-born aliens (*Issei*).<sup>17</sup> (None of the foreign-born Japanese were naturalized American citizens because they were legally ineligible.) As U.S. defeats in the Pacific mounted during the war's early days, west coast leaders intensified their demands that all Japanese be singled out for special treatment. These demands arose out of the area's deep-rooted racism, as well as from resentment at economic competition with this industrious minority. Many people were more than anxious to accept columnist Walter Lippmann's strained explanation for the complete absence of any act of sabotage by Japanese-Americans. According to Lippmann, this merely indicated that they were waiting with Oriental patience for the propitious moment to commit some massive coordinated atrocity.<sup>18</sup>

Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942, empowering the army to exclude "any or all persons" from designated military zones. One month later, he signed a Congressional measure stipulating criminal penalties for disobeying this order. The War Department had already declared the western parts of California, Oregon, and Washington and the southern part of Arizona a "prohibited zone." No one was ordered to leave yet, but about nine thousand Japanese-Americans saw the handwriting

on the wall and decided to move inland on their own. They encountered a very chilly reception. Officials from other western states objected to being made, in the words of the Governor of Arizona, "a dumping ground for enemy aliens," and violence threatened.<sup>19</sup>

The Army therefore forbade any more voluntary evacuation. Instead, it forcibly collected at race tracks, fairgrounds, and other makeshift assembly points all persons of Japanese ancestry residing not only within the original restricted zone but anywhere within California, Washington, Oregon, southern Arizona, and Alaska. Evacuees could only take clothing, bedding and utensils. The government offered to store their remaining personal property, but would assume no liability for it. So most evacuees sold their property on five-days' notice for what they could get. After they left, their leases expired and their farms were generally confiscated. Japanese-Americans suffered an estimated \$350 million loss in property and income.<sup>20</sup>

The War Relocation Agency (WRA), a civilian agency created in mid-March, erected ten semi-permanent relocation centers in inhospitable regions of seven western states. By September, the army had turned over 110,000 Japanese-Americans to these camps. Nearly two-thirds of that total were native-born American citizens. Anyone with simply one Japanese *great* grandparent qualified for internment, although this rule was later relaxed. The relocation centers were, as F.D.R. admitted in a slip of the tongue, "concentration camps,"<sup>21</sup> ringed with barbed wire and armed guards. In at least one instance, a sentry shot and killed an elderly internee who wandered too close to the outer fence, in violation of camp regulations.

The WRA began granting leaves to those inmates who could prove that they were not disloyal, that they had a job waiting, and that the community would accept them. But only 35,000, mostly young *Nisei*, left the camps under this dispensation. Meanwhile, the War Department sought to register male internees for the draft, following Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson's announcement of the "inherent right of every faithful citizen regardless of ancestry, to bear arms in the nation's battle."<sup>22</sup> Of the 75,000 who were asked whether they would renounce allegiance to the Japanese emperor, however, 8,700 either refused or equivocated. Many of these were Issei who, being forbidden American citizenship, were afraid to put themselves in limbo, without any formal nationality. Riots also erupted in some of the camps. The worst took place at Camp Manzanar in California, where soldiers fired into unarmed crowds, killing two and wounding ten.

Congressional critics thought the WRA was too lenient, and forced the agency, beginning in the summer of 1943, to isolate those inmates who would not swear loyalty or who were trouble-makers. The WRA consequently transferred about 18,500 to a special camp in Tule Lake, California. The Tule Lake inmates organized a campaign of passive resistance which turned into rioting, with the result that the government put the camp under military rule for two months and put two hundred internees in the stockade. After Congress passed the Denationalization Act of 1944, making it easier for Americans to renounce their citizenship, some eight thousand Japanese-Americans were eventually returned to Japan.<sup>23</sup>

The Roosevelt Administration conceded that, whatever the military justification for evacuation, it no longer applied in the spring of 1944. Roosevelt, however, continued Japanese internment to avoid any political repercussions from west coast voters. Only after he was safely reelected to a fourth term that November did he permit the inmates to leave the camps and return home. Some, their lives disrupted and fearing racist attacks, were reluctant to leave the camps. But the WRA all of a sudden became concerned about the \$250 million that the camps had already cost taxpayers, and it booted out the last of the internees at the end of 1945.

The U.S. State extended its deprivations against people of Japanese ancestry beyond the borders. It pressured more than a dozen Latin American nations to implement similar policies and even interned two thousand of their Japanese residents right here in U.S. relocation centers.<sup>24</sup> Curiously, the Japanese in Hawaii, who numbered 250,000, one-third of the islands' population, were untouched by the internment program, except for about two thousand who were shipped to the mainland. Extensive internment would have disrupted Hawaii's economy. The government did, however, put Hawaii under strict martial law for the three years following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, suspending trial by jury, habeas corpus, and other procedural safeguards. Out of the over 22,000 military trials of civilians on the islands during 1942, 99 percent resulted in conviction.<sup>25</sup>

Internment was not the only consequence of F.D.R.'s Executive Order 9066, nor Japanese the only class of U.S. citizens affected. The vague phrasing of the order would have permitted the army to evacuate or incarcerate any American anywhere in the country, had it so chosen. Thus, even after the Japanese were free to leave the relocation centers, five thousand still faced individual exclusion from the west coast. The military also forcibly ejected, after secret deliberations, 250 citizens not of Japanese ancestry from the west

coast, and an additional fifty from the east coast.<sup>26</sup>

Most historical accounts of the World War II homefront report that, except for Japanese-American internment, the U.S. civil liberties record was relatively clean. It never approached, this view argues, the repressive heights of World War I. The first observation we can make about this view is that Japanese-American internment is a pretty glaring exception. Even one of the early defenders of the Second World War civil liberties record, legal scholar Edward S. Corwin, has rated the treatment of the Japanese as "the most drastic invasion of the rights of citizens of the United States by their own government that has thus far occurred in the history of our nation."<sup>27</sup> During the First World War, the total number of victims of the Espionage and Sedition Acts, of alien internment and deportation, of state prosecutions, and of mob violence could not have exceeded fifteen thousand. Contrast that figure with 110,000 interned Japanese-Americans.

Then there is the internment and imprisonment of conscientious objectors during the Second World War. True, the options available to conscientious objectors were slightly improved over the First World War. About 25,000 accepted noncombatant military duty. Another 11,950 worked in civilian public service camps at tasks mainly involving conservation, forestry, and public health. The pacifist churches and organizations agreed to fund these camps, at an eventual cost of over \$7 million.

But rigid military discipline prevailed, making the camps nothing more than outdoor prisons. The objectors in the camps received no pay for fifty hours per week of generally arduous and sometimes dangerous work. In the rare case where an objector was allowed to work outside the camps, the State confiscated his wages. About five hundred objectors volunteered for medical experiments in which they were infected with lice, bitten by mosquitoes to test typhus and malaria cures, or subjected to other potentially disabling or fatal procedures. Not until two years after the war ended did the government release the last of the objectors from these camps. Then, to add insult to injury, several states barred objectors from licensed professions, and the Supreme Court upheld these bars.

Whether one received conscientious objector status at all depended upon the vagaries of local boards. In any case, only religious objectors qualified under the Selective Service Act, and Selective Service Director General Louis B. Hershey ordered this provision interpreted strictly. Of the sixteen thousand men convicted for draft resistance of one kind or another during the war, six thousand were conscientious objectors whose status was not

recognized, and three quarters of those were Jehovah's Witnesses. Although opposed to the war on religious grounds, the Witnesses were not consistent pacifists — they declared their willingness to fight in the battle of Armageddon — and draft boards routinely denied their requests for ministerial exemptions.

The Selective Service Act provided a maximum prison term of five years. This applied not only for refusal to serve but also for failure to register, which in World War I had been just a misdemeanor. In a few cases, objectors faced the World War I procedure of being forcibly inducted and then court-martialed, with much sterner penalties. The most severe case was that of Henry Weber, a conscientious objector who was married and the father of three children. He also belonged to the Socialist Labor Party, another Marxist splinter group. The army initially sentenced him to hang, then reconsidered, and changed that to life imprisonment. Only as the war drew to a close, after several appeals, was his sentence reduced to five years and a dishonorable discharge. Overall, the jailings of conscientious objectors during World War II, not counting those interned in civilian public service camps, ran at three times the World War I rate, even in proportion to the total drafted.<sup>28</sup>

If we somehow overlook Japanese-Americans and conscientious objectors, we still must appraise the State's respect for personal liberty during World War II in light of the virtual nonexistence of antiwar sentiment. After Pearl Harbor, Americans endorsed U.S. intervention with an eruption of patriotic unity unmatched in any previous war. The prewar isolationists universally abandoned their cause, closed up shop, and threw their hearts into the war. The country's organized peace movement disintegrated.<sup>29</sup> And on the extreme left, the Communist Party tried to outdo all others in its new-found American nationalism. In contrast, two powerful leftwing organizations, the Socialist Party and the Industrial Workers of the World, had opposed World War I.

Despite the Second World War's unprecedented popularity, the national government still went out of its way to conduct sedition trials, initiate denaturalizations and deportations, and practice censorship. Sometimes, as the case of the Japanese-Americans amply illustrates, it created disloyalty out of thin air, where none initially existed. In other instances, it would prosecute the same individuals in several different proceedings under several different laws, because of the paucity of eligible scapegoats. Relative to the amount of dissent, there was clearly more repression during the Second World War than during the First. But since many of the victims were viewed as pathetic rightists with odious ideas,

America's dominant liberals hardly noticed.

Repression of groups other than the Japanese-Americans during World War II required no new legislation. The prewar period provided all the necessary tools. A mass prosecution conducted under the Smith Act was to be the Roosevelt Administration's show trial. Attorney General Francis Biddle, facing constant prodding from F.D.R., indicted a heterogeneous assortment of two dozen alleged native fascists in July, 1942. The faulty indictment had to be rewritten twice, however, so that the actual trial did not begin for almost another two years. The defendants, dragged from all corners of the country to stand trial in Washington, D.C., now numbered thirty. Most of them had never met each other. They were not even all overtly anti-Jewish; all they had in common was a hatred of President Roosevelt.<sup>30</sup>

The most prominent defendant was Harvard-educated Laurence Dennis, a former diplomat and author of *The Coming American Fascism*. Dennis's book was more prediction than prescription, and when told of his indictment, he exclaimed, "My prophecy is coming true. This is fascism."<sup>31</sup> Viereck, the German publicist indicted before Pearl Harbor under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, was also among the defendants, and while he stood trial, his son died in action with U.S. forces in North Africa. Other defendants included Elizabeth Dilling, author of *The Red Network*, a book that charged many liberals with being Communists; Pelley of the Silver Shirts; and four leaders of the German-American Bund.

The government's indictment charged the defendants with participating in a fantastic international Nazi conspiracy, dating from 1933, to establish a fascist regime in the U.S. by subverting morale in the armed forces. The defendants had purportedly asserted, among other scurrilous and dangerous doctrines, that "President Roosevelt is reprehensible, a war-monger, liar, unscrupulous, and a pawn of the Jews, Communists and Plutocrats" and that "[t]he Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was deliberately invited by the public officials of the United States, in order to involve the United States in a foreign war." The indictment named as co-conspirators forty-two books and publications and thirty-five organizations, including the German-American Bund, the Silver Shirts, the German Embassy in the U.S., and the National Socialist Party of Germany. The first indictment had even named the America First Committee, but that organization did not appear in the final document.

The defendants engaged twenty-two different lawyers, two-thirds of whom were court appointed to represent the indigent. The trial quickly degenerated into a circus. The defendants and their lawyers

bickered among themselves, separately raised every conceivable objection, and regularly disrupted the proceedings. One lawyer concluded most of his objections with the exclamation "Your Honor, this is just another New Deal trick!" which invariably brought snickers from the jury. The presiding judge, in his efforts to maintain order, issued so many contempt citations that the cited lawyers and defendants formed a "contempt club," with badges. Some of the defendants wore masks to court and signs saying, "I am a Spy," until dissuaded by their lawyers. The judge finally kicked one lawyer off the case, while another resigned. The number of defendants fell by four, with one dying, two being severed from the case for illness, and one for unruly behavior.

After an eight-month marathon, and a trial record of 18,000 pages, the presiding judge died, and a mistrial was declared. The prosecution had still presented less than half its case, which failed to charge any overt acts, but relied solely on guilt by association and similarities between the defendants' prewar opinions and the Nazi "party line." The poorer defendants, having to either raise bail and support themselves in wartime Washington or remain in jail during the trial, suffered extreme hardships. The Justice Department pressed for a new trial for the next two years, until November of 1946, after the war was long over, when the courts at last dismissed the case, ruling that a retrial would be "a travesty of justice." Nevertheless, as Biddle coyly admits in his memoirs, "the propaganda had long since ceased." "In that sense, at least, the prosecution had accomplished the purpose the President had in mind."<sup>32</sup>

At the time that the mass sedition trial commenced, two of the defendants were already incarcerated without trial as dangerous enemy aliens, three more had suffered involuntary psychiatric commitment, and six were serving sentences arising out of other war-related prosecutions. Among the latter group were Viereck and Pelley. Viereck's indictment under the Foreign Agents Registration Act had resulted in a conviction, encouraging the government to use the act with telling effect upon several others who had been on the fringes of the isolationist movement. Pelley, in one of the first post-Pearl Harbor cases, had received a fifteen-year sentence, while his press was fined \$5000, for articles critical of the U.S. war effort. The national government had tried him under the sedition provisions of the Espionage Act, which had become operative with the declaration of war. All of this was on top of having his parole revoked in North Carolina.

Two other defendants in the mass sedition trial were leaders of the Friends of Progress, a group which had conducted a mock

impeachment of Roosevelt and then found themselves facing no fewer than four wartime prosecutions. In addition to being entangled in the mass sedition trial, they had been convicted under both the national Espionage Act and California's Subversive Organization Registration Law (the state conviction was overturned on appeal) and charged with criminal libel in California for critical remarks about General Douglas MacArthur.

In a second mass trial, this one using the Selective Service Act, the Justice Department charged twenty-four members of the German-American Bund with counseling draft evasion. The two mass trials had much in common, including several of the defendants and many of the prosecution witnesses. The major difference was that the mass trial of the German-Americans resulted in a conviction.<sup>33</sup>

In all, more than two hundred different persons went through such sedition prosecutions under either the Espionage Act, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the Smith Act, or the Selective Service Act during the course of the war. The largest number of them were, interestingly enough, blacks. The FBI arrested about one hundred Black Muslims and members of other more ephemeral black religious cults that identified with the Japanese as kindred victims of white oppression. Robert Jackson, for example, the founder of the Ethiopian Pacific League, who had told a Harlem audience that the Japanese "wanted to help you and give you back your culture," received ten years' imprisonment and a \$10,000 fine.<sup>34</sup>

After blacks, the German-American Bund provided the next largest number of sedition defendants. In addition, Biddle launched a crusade to revoke the citizenship of Bund members. This crusade had denaturalized forty-two by December 1940, three hundred suits were pending, and thousands of cases were under investigation. The courts, however, restrained the Justice Department, so that ultimately a total of only 180 Americans lost their citizenship.

Among them was Fritz Kuhn, the Bund leader jailed in New York before the war. His tale demonstrates the vindictive lengths to which the State carried its persecution of the Bund. Stripped of his citizenship, Kuhn was no sooner paroled by New York than he was put in a federal internment camp for enemy aliens. The U.S. deported him to Germany at the war's close, where the U.S. occupation government promptly arrested him again and finally sentenced him to ten years hard labor for associations with Hitler which Kuhn had, in fact, fabricated in order to increase his stature within the Bund. Kuhn was finally freed on appeal in 1950, and a year later, he died.

One clear difference between repression in the two world wars was the greater degree of centralization during the Second. The Roosevelt Administration, in conferences with state officials both before and after U.S. entry, reached an unpublicized gentleman's agreement that left state sedition laws nearly unenforced. Biddle, unlike Wilson's Attorney General during World War I, kept a tight reign on U.S. attorneys, who could not undertake sedition prosecutions without his approval. The national government also discouraged vigilantes and refused to revive any private loyalty organizations like the American Protective League.

Private violence and local repression did transpire, however. As in the prewar period, the Jehovah's Witnesses were the most frequent objects of mob attacks, being the only war opponents with any visibility. Mississippi arrested over fifty Witnesses for violating its new sedition law. Brutality against Witnesses did not recede until mid-1942, when the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division began to come to their aid. In one case, it secured a conviction of two West Virginia police officers for releasing several Witnesses into the eager hands of American Legionnaires, who had then forced the Witnesses to drink castor oil, tied them together with police department rope, and marched them out of town. The Supreme Court also succored the Witnesses. Although it upheld local peddlers' taxes, no matter how exorbitant, on the distribution of their literature, it overturned their Mississippi conviction and, in June 1943, reversed its previous mandatory flag-salute decision.

The Second World War also saw another upsurge in violence directed at racial minorities. The war boom and the market demand for labor, far more than the government's Fair Employment Practices Committee, opened up new economic opportunities for minorities. As blacks poured into industrial centers, north and south, racial antagonism intensified. Disorders first appeared on southern military posts, where white residents clashed with northern black soldiers, who did not proffer the customary subservience. But the most severe race riots occurred in the cities: Harlem; Philadelphia; Mobile, Alabama; El Paso and Port Arthur, Texas; Springfield, Massachusetts; Hubbard, Ohio. A two-day guerrilla war between blacks and whites in Detroit during the summer of 1943 left twenty-five blacks and nine whites dead, seven hundred of both races injured, and \$2 million property damage.<sup>35</sup> The riot only ceased when six thousand troops occupied the city. Two weeks later, during the famous zoot-suit riots in Los Angeles, white servicemen terrorized the city's Mexican-American sections for four days as the city police, the Military Police, and the Shore Patrol all looked the other way.<sup>36</sup> The

only factor which kept violence against Japanese-Americans at such a low ebb was their forcible removal.

As in World War I, the national government had an official propaganda agency. Roosevelt created the Office of Facts and Figures before Pearl Harbor and then replaced it in mid-1942 with the Office of War Information (OWI), under Elmer Davis from the *New York Times*. The OWI's first-year appropriation was nearly \$40 million, but, from the outset, it had to be more circumspect than its World War I counterpart, the Committee on Public Information. It was continuously beset with controversy, emanating both from within the agency and from Congressional critics. Congress cut off practically all funding for the OWI's domestic operations in 1943, but expanded its overseas activities.<sup>37</sup>

More robust was the Office of Censorship, created by the First War Powers Act. It examined all forms of communication entering or leaving the country — letters, cables, telephone calls, even films. It went so far as to suppress private letters that painted a gloomy picture of the war. By 1944, it had detained 500,000 pieces of mail, occupying 10,000 square feet of storage space. The Office also drew up an ostensibly voluntary Code of Wartime Practices that applied to press and radio news reporting.<sup>38</sup> The military engaged in its own independent censorship covering the news it released, the mail sent and received by U.S. troops, the dispatches of war correspondents, and all media within conquered territories. When the isolationist *Chicago Tribune* innocently published too many details about the Battle of Midway, the Justice Department tried to prosecute. The grand jury refused to indict, however.

The Post Office banned single issues of domestic publications it judged subversive and then used that as justification for revoking their second-class mailing privileges altogether just as freely as it had in the First World War. This affected over seventy publications, ranging from the Trotskyite *Militant* to the Christian Pacifist *Boise Valley Herald*. The most important publication denied use of the mails was Father James Coughlin's *Social Justice*, with 200,000 subscribers. Father Coughlin was a radio priest from Michigan and probably the most influential native radical rightist. Biddle was afraid that a sedition trial would make Coughlin a martyr, so he persuaded the Catholic hierarchy to silence Coughlin instead. *Social Justice*, meanwhile, ceased publication in the face of the postal ban.<sup>39</sup> The Post Office also took advantage of the war to mount a fresh assault on obscenity. It barred about sixty additional publications from the mails for this reason, including *Esquire* magazine.

The government did not rely solely upon postal censorship, as in

the previous war, to intimidate the domestic press. It confiscated outright publications put out by American citizens if it could even tenuously argue that they were financed by enemy funds. This is what befell all publications of the German-American Bund, as well as a few domestic Japanese newspapers. The Enemy Alien Property Division of the Treasury Department handled these seizures as part of its general takeover of enemy property.

Prosecutions for actual spying and treason, as opposed to sedition, made their first widespread appearance in this country during the Second World War. The national government convicted ninety-one persons of these offenses between 1938 and 1945, sixty-four of them U.S. citizens. Many of the sentences were blatantly excessive.

For instance, one of the earliest espionage prosecutions subsequent to Pearl Harbor ensnared one Max Stephen, an inconsequential Detroit tavern keeper who gave sanctuary to a German prisoner-of-war escaped from Canada. The State dusted off its until-then rarely used treason statute and sentenced Stephen to hang. Roosevelt commuted the sentence to life imprisonment.

The State dealt even more summarily with eight German saboteurs dropped off on U.S. shores by submarines in the summer of 1942. The Coast Guard and FBI quickly apprehended all eight. Since they had not yet committed sabotage, and since attempted sabotage was a minor felony, difficult to prove, the Roosevelt Administration decided against a civilian trial. In flagrant disregard of the Supreme Court's *Ex Parte Milligan* Civil War precedent, a military commission, even less bound by judicial safeguards than a court martial, tried the saboteurs in secret. Six were electrocuted within a month and a half of their apprehension, while the two who turned State's evidence received long sentences.<sup>40</sup>

In 1943, the U.S. secured treason indictments against eleven Americans making broadcasts from German, Italian, or Japanese radio stations. At the end of the war, when the government finally caught up with these renegade broadcasters, it convicted five. Probably the most egregious among these cases was that of Iva Ikuko Toguri d'Aquino. She was a native-born American of Japanese ancestry caught in Japan at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. She went to work for Radio Tokyo under duress, was only one of several women broadcasters known by the generic name "Tokyo Rose," and made mostly routine broadcasts devoid of political or military overtones. But she had the misfortune to be tried in California before an all-white jury, and was sentenced to 10 years and \$10,000. Not until the Presidency of Gerald Ford did she

receive a retroactive full pardon.<sup>41</sup>

Another of those broadcasters was Ezra Pound, the renowned poet. He had worked for Radio Rome. The government did not even bother formally to convict him. Instead, it incarcerated him without a trial in a mental hospital for thirteen years.<sup>42</sup>

Concomitant with the State's new attention to the crime of espionage was the birth of the U.S. intelligence community, with its ubiquitous influence upon policy. The number of FBI special agents swelled from 851 in 1939 to 5072 in 1944. The Bureau also moved into other countries, gaining responsibility for intelligence and counter-espionage in Latin America. To carry on covert actions elsewhere, Roosevelt created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in July 1941, with the flamboyant General William "Wild Bill" Donovan at its helm. The OSS originated from the Coordinator of Information's office, created five months prior to Pearl Harbor. It grew prodigiously during the war and afterwards blossomed into the Central Intelligence Agency.<sup>43</sup>

The military intelligence services expanded their activities as well. Their most notable operation was the worldwide interception, decoding, and analysis of radio communications. Conducted primarily by the army's Signal Security Agency, this electromagnetic eavesdropping contributed significantly to many Allied military victories. It also sometimes provided sensitive information about American citizens. It did not cease with the war's end, but rather beginning in 1952 fell under the auspices of the National Security Agency, today the U.S.'s largest and most secret intelligence agency.<sup>44</sup>

Concern for loyalty within the State apparatus itself reached new levels. In this one area, Congress pushed the Roosevelt Administration further than the administration wished to go. The Communist Party's enthusiasm for the war brought a rapprochement with the administration, symbolized by F.D.R.'s pardon of Browder, the party leader convicted before Pearl Harbor of passport fraud. Other Communists convicted under state law also received pardons. But the Dies Committee did not go along with this rapprochement and continued to attack the administration for harboring subversives. This induced the executive branch to augment its own loyalty program and lengthen the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations. As the war drew to a close, the House voted to convert the Committee on Un-American Activities from a special committee, requiring yearly renewal, to a permanent standing committee.

The one bright spot in the U.S. civil liberties record during

World War II was the courts. They ultimately upheld convictions against only about one-fourth of all the seditionists prosecuted. The Supreme Court, in particular, thwarted many civil liberties transgressions, beginning in 1943, when the tide of battle shifted toward the Allies. Even so, nearly all the Court's favorable decisions turned on narrow procedural grounds. Only in protecting such victims of the state governments as Jehovah's Witnesses did it strike down any repressive laws.

Thus, the Court overturned Viereck's first conviction under the Alien Registration Act, but when the Roosevelt Administration retried him under the same act, the Court let his second conviction stand. In *Hartzel v. U.S.*, it reversed the wartime Espionage Act conviction of a native fascist for distributing antiwar literature, and in *Keegan v. U.S.*, it reversed the mass Selective Service Act conviction of German-American Bund members, but it refused to review the Smith Act conviction of the Socialist Workers Party, and later, in 1951, it upheld that act's constitutionality. It blocked the deportation of Harry Bridges, and the denaturalization of both a Communist and a Bundist in the Schneiderman and Baumgartner cases, but it sustained the denaturalization of another Bund member in the Knauer case.

It reinstated *Esquire's* second-class mailing privileges, but it left the Post Office's power to exclude single issues of publications intact. It also approved FBI wiretapping in two 1942 decisions. It overruled the treason conviction of one German-American who had sheltered the U-boat saboteurs, but in a related case, it sustained a treason conviction for the first time in its history, and in *Ex Parte Quinn*, it certified the extralegal railroading of the saboteurs. It conceded that aliens had some constitutional rights in *Ex Parte Kuwate*, but it upheld the Federalist Alien Enemies Act in *Ludecke v. Watkins*. It ruled that the military should not have closed the civilian courts in Hawaii, but only two years after marital law there had already ended.<sup>45</sup>

On the most grievous civil liberties violation of the war, the internment of Japanese-American citizens, the Court refused to rule at all. It skirted the issue, finding in the Endo case, on the one hand, that the government could not detain citizens who had proven their loyalty (and this only on the day after the government had opened the relocation centers). On the other hand, in *Hirabayashi v. U.S.* and *Kormatsu v. U.S.*, the Court allowed the government to impose special curfews upon citizens of Japanese ancestry and to exclude them from certain areas.<sup>46</sup>

The Second World War is still today widely regarded as the U.S.

State's last "good war."<sup>47</sup> The partiality of establishment liberals for Franklin D. Roosevelt is notorious, but amazingly, even his Attorney General, Biddle, has a reputation as a staunch advocate of civil liberties. The internment of Japanese-Americans is treated as an anomaly within an otherwise commendable performance.

The internment of Japanese-Americans was not an anomaly. It was representative of a wartime administration that respected civil liberties only so far as political expediency required. The repression of others whose enthusiasm for American participation in the Second World War was even slightly suspect differed in scale, not in degree. Furthermore, the repressive instruments established during this period would again be put to effective use during the McCarthy Era and the Vietnam War. The Roosevelt Administration established virtually all the precedents for Cold War political harassment.

If this is what we can expect from a "good war," we can only tremble at the thought of what the next "bad war" might bring.

### Notes

1. The Revisionist interpretation of U.S. entry into World War II was presented in the immediate post-war period in Charles A. Beard, *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), and *President Roosevelt and the Coming of War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Reality* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948); George Morgenstern, *Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1947); William Henry Chamberlin, *America's Second Crusade* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1950); Frederic R. Sanborn, *Design for War: A Study of Secret Power Politics, 1937-1941* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1951); Charles Callan Tansill, *Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952); Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Its Aftermath* (Caldwell, ID: Caxton, 1953); and Robert A. Theobald, *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor: The Washington Contribution to the Japanese Attack* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1954).

After this initial outpouring, Revisionist scholarship fell dormant. The alleged reason — according to orthodox historiography — was that Revisionism had been discredited. In reality what happened was that the orthodox historians incorporated the salient features of the Revisionist account without admitting the fact. The early orthodox accounts of U.S. entry into World War II, such as Basil Rauch, *Roosevelt: From Munich to Pearl Harbor* (New York: Creative Age Press, 1950), endeavored to portray the U.S. government as genuinely surprised by the Pearl Harbor attack. But such later orthodox accounts as William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The World Crisis and American Foreign Policy*, 2v. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952-3), and Robert A. Divine, *The Reluctant*

*Belligerent: American Entry into the Second World War* (New York: John Wiley, 1965), in contrast did not dispute the Revisionist factual claim that the Roosevelt administration both strongly desired and fully anticipated U.S. involvement in World War II. They instead merely argued that U.S. involvement was a worthy goal, and some went so far as to criticize Roosevelt for not achieving that goal rapidly enough.

One of the few recent Revisionist works to challenge the strategic necessity of U.S. intervention into World War II is Bruce M. Russett, *No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry into World War II* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

2. On the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, see Warren F. Kimball, *The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1969). On the peacetime introduction of conscription, see John O'Sullivan, *From Voluntarism to Conscription: Congress and Selective Service, 1940-1945* (New York: Garland, 1982), which is the published version of a dissertation written ten years earlier. The official overview of prewar mobilization in general is Bureau of the Budget, *The United States at War: Development and Administration of the War Program by the Federal Government* (Washington: Government Printing Office, [1946]). The relevant sections of Paul A.C. Koistinen, *The Military Industrial Complex: Historical Perspectives* (New York: Praeger, 1980), offer a more critical survey.
3. Because so many authors have accepted the myth about the relative mildness of U.S. civil liberties' violations during World War II, the treatment of that subject is generally woeful. Even the highly competent and usually meticulous historian Harold M. Hyman, in his otherwise excellent overview of civil liberties in U.S. history, *To Try Men's Souls: Loyalty Tests in American History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), makes the glaring error on p. 329 of finding "only twenty-six" federal indictments under security statutes that "emerged from World War II." He is apparently counting just the mass sedition trial, in fact, just the initial indictment, and overlooks all the remaining 270 or so prosecutions for both sedition and espionage.

There are to my knowledge only three works, all devoted to broader subjects, that give reasonably complete pictures of State repression during World War II: 1 Robert Justin Goldstein's sprawling chronicle of U.S. civil liberties in the twentieth century, *Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present* (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1978). Goldstein tries to be comprehensive, but his work is a somewhat uncritical compilation based on secondary sources, with a heavy emphasis on labor violence, and it ignores such other forms of civil liberty violations as obscenity laws. 2 Geoffrey Perrett's account of domestic events during World War II, *Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph: The American People, 1939-1945* (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1973). Perrett always presents a provocative slant and forcefully overturns many myths about World War II, but he can sometimes be careless about details. 3 Leo P. Ribuffo's study of the prewar and wartime far right, *The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Great Depression to the Cold War* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983). It is Ribuffo who coined the term "Brown Scare," and I will have more to say about his work below.

Two other homefront accounts that look into civil liberties more brief-

ly or more selectively are Richard Polenberg, *War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945* (Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott, 1972), and John Morton Blum, *V Was For Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976). One article devoted specifically to this subject, Richard W. Steele, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy Critics," *Political Science Quarterly*, 94 (Spring 1979), 15-32, hardly scratches the surface. It is chiefly interesting for the trailing comment (pp. 33-5) by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who makes a pathetic attempt to salvage the civil liberties reputation of his presidential idol.

Thus, to get the full story, one must really piece it together from historical accounts of its component parts. A good place to start is with the *Annual Reports* of the American Civil Liberties Union, which have different titles, but which the *N.Y. Times* publishing house has compiled into convenient bound volumes. v. 3, July 1937-June 1944, and v. 4, July 1944-December 1950 (New York: Arno Press, 1970), cover the Second World War period. One should also examine *In Brief Authority* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), the memoirs of Francis Biddle, F.D.R.'s wartime Attorney General. That alone should be sufficient to deflate Biddle's exaggerated reputation as a civil libertarian.

4. On the prewar isolationists, see Wayne S. Cole's definitive *Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983). Cole fully exposes F.D.R.'s civil liberties transgressions during the contest with the isolationists. Cole's older *America First: The Battle against Intervention, 1940-1941* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953) is the basic work on the America First Committee. An analysis of the battle between isolationists and interventionists in Congress is David L. Porter, *The Seventy-Sixth Congress and World War II, 1939-1940* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979). John E. Wiltz, *In Search of Peace: The Senate Munitions Inquiry, 1934-36* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), covers the Nye Committee investigations.
5. Ribuffo's *Old Christian Right* is outstanding not only for its account of State repression, but also because it is one of the few really scholarly and objective studies of the World War II far right. It finally transcends the moral indignation, the pseudo-scientific reliance upon the concept of "extremism," and the amateurish psychologizing that cloud most of the literature on the subject. Geoffrey S. Smith, *To Save a Nation: American Countersubversive, the New Deal, and the Coming of World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), is an equally important work that achieves the same level of historical detachment. He shows how the far right changed from an anti-immigrant phenomenon at the end of World War I to an anti-Establishment one at the beginning of World War II, and in the process, turned the countersubversive propaganda techniques used so effectively by the State during the Red Scare against the State.

Similarly dispassionate on the German-American Bund is Sander A. Diamond, *The Nazi Movement In The United States, 1924-1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974). With useful facts on the same subject, but not at all dispassionate, is Leland V. Bell, *In Hitler's Shadow: The Anatomy of American Nazism* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1973). Two older studies, that lean toward the exposé approach, but that have information on organizations and individuals within the far right

- that more recent studies have not yet gotten to, are Donald S. Strong, *Organized Anti-Semitism In America: The Rise of Group Prejudice during the Decade, 1930-1940* (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941), and Morris Schonbach, "Native Fascism during the 1930s and 1940s: A Study of Its Roots, Its Growth, and Its Decline" (Ph.D. dissertation: University of California at Los Angeles, 1958).
6. The classic account of the growth of Communist influence during the popular-front era remains Eugene Lyons, *The Red Decade: The Stalinist Penetration of America* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1941). A more modern study is Earl Latham, *The Communist Controversy in Washington: From the New Deal to McCarthy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966). For the twists and turns in Communist Party policy, see Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, *The American Communist Party: A Critical History (1919-1957)* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), and Philip J. Jaffe, *The Rise and Fall of American Communism* (New York: Horizon Press, 1975).
  7. The Dies Committee and its predecessors are the subject of August Raymond Ogden, *The Dies Committee: A Study of the Special House Committee for Investigation of Un-American Activities, 1938-1944* (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1945), and Walter Goodman, *The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on Un-American Activities* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968). The Ogden book, although older and dryer, is more scholarly.
  8. It would be nice to have a book on passage and pre-Cold War enforcement of the Smith Act or one on all the World War II repressive legislation. Until then, we must be satisfied with the account of the Smith Act's passage contained in the first two chapters of Michal R. Belknap, *Cold War Justice: The Smith Act, the Communist Party, and American Civil Liberties* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977). Schonbach, "Native Fascism during the 1930s and 1940s," is one of the few works to give reasonably complete coverage to the other prewar security laws.
  9. The older works on the FBI, Fred J. Cook, *The FBI Nobody Knows* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), and Max Lowenthal, *The Federal Bureau of Investigation* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1950), are still useful for background. The Bureau's officially authorized history, Don Whitehead, *The FBI Story: A Report to the People* (New York: Random House, 1957), is less critical and far less informative. A better balanced defense of the Bureau that criticizes both the Cook and Lowenthal books is Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, *The F.B.I. in Our Open Society* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969).

We have recently found out a lot about the FBI's operations during the World War II period with the help of the Freedom of Information Act. Of the works incorporating this information, the most important is Kenneth O'Reilly, *Hoover and the Un-Americans: The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Menace* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983). It covers the FBI's relationship with the Dies Committee, and is also the first work to document the FBI's continued political surveillance of radicals through the twenties.

Other newer works on the FBI and political surveillance are Athan Theoharis, *Spying On Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978); Athan G. Theoharis, ed., *Beyond the Hiss Case: The FBI, Congress, and the*

*Cold War* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982); and Frank J. Donner, *The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980). Unfortunately, Theoharis and Donner, both being swept up unconsciously in the liberal Roosevelt cult, devote far too much energy to quibbling over whether the FBI went beyond F.D.R.'s prewar mandates in its domestic operations.

In a class by itself is Richard Gil Powers, *G-Men: Hoover's FBI in American Popular Culture* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983). This ambitious study links a judicious political history of the FBI with a far-ranging cultural history of American attitudes toward crime and law enforcement. The mass media is, of course, the bridge between the two, and Powers exposes Hoover's very astute manipulation of the media.

10. William R. Corson, *Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire* (New York: Dial, 1977), p. 69. Corson's book is a massive general history of the U.S. intelligence community with many details not found elsewhere. For instance, although the book was published before the incriminating documents were secured through the Freedom of Information Act, Corson reports the rumor that Assistant Attorney General William J. Donovan (later of OSS fame) informed Coolidge's Attorney General, Harlan Fisk Stone, about Hoover routinely violating the directive against political surveillance. Donovan's revelation, however, had no effect.
11. For a scholarly study of a prominent individual within the antiwar far right who was at the fringes of the isolationist movement and who was a defendant in not only the mass sedition trial but in other wartime sedition cases, see Niel M. Johnson, *George Sylvester Viereck: German-American Propagandist* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972). Johnson's book is hostile to its subject, but still reliable. For a sensationalist — almost hysterical — contemporary "exposé" of Nazi mail propaganda within the U.S. during World War II, see Henry Hoke, *Black Mail* (New York: Reader's Book Service, 1944).
12. The most thorough account of German espionage within the U.S. is Ladislav Farago, *The Game of the Foxes: The Untold Story of German Espionage in the United States and Great Britain during World War II* (New York: David McKay, 1971), although Farago has a journalistic tendency to exaggerate the overall importance of his subject. There is also some coverage of World War II espionage and treason prosecutions in two books by Nathaniel Weyl: *Treason: The Story of Disloyalty and Betrayal in American Wars* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1950) and *The Battle against Disloyalty* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1951). The titles and publication dates give away the McCarthyite bias of these highly colored and unreliable studies. They at least show no favoritism to either the extreme right or extreme left; Weyl heartily endorses government suppression of both.

Even that virtue eludes a recent work in the same disreputable category: Charles Higham, *American Swastika* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1985). Professing to be a history of Nazi penetration of the U.S. up to the present day, the book dredges up and seriously advances the long-discredited allegations about Nazi collusion with respectable isolationists. It is astonishing in this day and age to find a new book that actual-

ly bemoans the fact that Roosevelt could not get authority "allowing for the incarceration of known enemy collaborators without trial." Indeed, Higham makes this complaint on p. 31, with reference to the pre-Pearl Harbor period.

Another redeeming feature of Weyl's books is that they are not overly concerned with the somewhat arbitrary distinction between antiwar dissent and espionage. Most civil libertarians still treat espionage, at least during the Second World War, as beyond the pale. As a result, no serious scholar has yet approached World War II espionage prosecutions from a civil liberties perspective. Any historical accounts, like Farago's, focus on the spying and apprehension parts of the story and tell us little or nothing about the actual trials or the precise laws under which the prosecutions were conducted.

13. The best treatment of the Tyler Kent espionage case is contained in Richard J. Whalen's biography of the U.S. ambassador to England at the time, *The Founding Father: The Story of Joseph P. Kennedy* (New York: New American Library, 1964), pp. 309-20. An earlier brief for Kent is John Howland Snow, *The Case of Tyler Kent* (New York: Domestic and Foreign Affairs Press, 1946). Farago, writing more recently than Whalen, finds positive confirmation that the documents stolen by Kent finally did reach German intelligence. Farago, however, also repeats as true some fabrications against Kent concocted by Ambassador Kennedy but exposed by Whalen.
14. ACLU 1941 annual report, "Liberty's National Emergency: The Story of Civil Liberty in the Crisis Year, 1940-1941," p. 27. David R. Manwaring, *Render Unto Caesar: The Flag-Salute Controversy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), gives a full account of the war-engendered plight of the Jehovah's Witnesses.
15. Polenberg, *War and Society*, p. 59.
16. In contrast to Japanese-American internment, U.S. internment of "enemy" aliens during World War II is wide open for research. It only receives mention in passing from works on other subjects, and the government has still to release the documents on alien internment facilities within its World War II concentration camp system. Although the Justice Department was responsible for alien internment, the camps used for this purpose were run by the military as part of its POW system. For a brief wartime report, see J. Edgar Hoover, "Alien Enemy Control," *Iowa Law Review*, 29 (Mar 1944), 396-408. Virtually the only scholarly attempt to open up this subject is a recent journal article, John H. Culley, "Trouble at Lordsburg Internment Camp," *New Mexico Historical Review*, 60 (Jul 1985), 225-47. Culley investigates the suspicious shooting and killing of two Japanese "enemy" aliens at one of the camps.
17. Japanese-American internment, of course, has received an inordinate amount of scholarly attention. The best introduction to the subject is Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971). See also his collection of documents, *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans* (Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott, 1975). It has a useful text and bibliographic note.

Fuller treatments, in order of publication, are: Morton Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation* (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1949); Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhard, and Floyd W. Matson, *Prejudice, War and the Constitution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954); Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis, *The Great Betrayal: The Evacuation of the Japanese-Americans During World War II* (New York: Macmillan, 1969); Allan R. Bosworth, *America's Concentration Camps* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967); and Michi Weglyn, *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps* (New York: William Morrow, 1976). The tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson work is best on legalistic details, the Bosworth book is mainly journalistic, and the Weglyn study is the most wide-ranging in its coverage.

18. Perrett, *Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph*, pp. 219-220.
19. Blum, *V Was for Victory*, p. 160.
20. The economic cost of internment to Japanese-Americans is evaluated in Leonard Bloom and Ruth Reimer, *Removal and Return: The Socio-Economic Effect of the War on Japanese Americans* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949).
21. Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA*, p. 154.
22. Blum, *V Was for Victory*, p. 164.
23. Donald E. Collins, *Native American Aliens: Disloyalty and the Renunciation of Citizenship by Japanese Americans During World War II* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985).
24. Weglyn, *Years of Infamy*, reveals the U.S. pressure for similar policies with respect to Japanese residents in the Latin American countries.
25. On martial law in Hawaii, see J. Garner Anthony, *Hawaii Under Army Rule* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955).
26. ACLU Annual Report 1942-1943, *Freedom in Wartime*, pp. 30-32.
27. Edwin S. Corwin, *Total War and the Constitution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), p. 91.
28. The definitive study on World War II conscientious objectors is Mulford Q. Sibley and Philip E. Jacob, *Conscription of Conscience: The American State and the Conscientious Objector, 1940-47* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952). An examination of resistance to the draft is James J. Martin, "A Look at Conscription, Then and Now," in *Revisionist Viewpoints: Essays in a Dissident Historical Tradition* (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles Publisher, Inc., 1971). Martin suggests that resistance to the draft within the military, through AWOL, malingering, and other passive techniques, was substantial. So far, no scholar has given this suggestion the serious investigation that it deserves.
29. Lawrence S. Wittner, *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), shows the devastating impact the war hysteria had on the organized peace movement.
30. The best account of the mass sedition trial is Leo P. Ribuffo, "United States v. McWilliams: The Roosevelt Administration and the Far Right," in Michal R. Belknap, ed., *American Political Trials* (Newport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), pp. 201-32. Essentially the same account appears in Ribuffo's book, *The Old Christian Right*. Biddle's coy summation of the results of the trial is from p. 243 of *In Brief Authority*. The prosecuting attorney, O. John Rogge, updated and published the government's ludicrous case against the defendants in *The Official German Report: Nazi Penetration, 1924-1942; Pan-Arabism,*

- 1939–Today (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1961). The most prominent defendant and his lawyer meanwhile had published their own account (which reprints the entire government indictment): Lawrence Dennis and Maximilian St. George, *A Trial on Trial: The Great Sedition Trial of 1944* ([?]: National Civil Rights Committee, 1945). Eric Scott Royce, "FDR's Mass Sedition Trial," *New Libertarian Weekly*, 3 (30 Nov. 1975), 4–7, offers a competent summary.
31. As quoted in Perrett, *Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph*, p. 361. Ronald Radosh, *Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), devotes several chapters to Dennis and finds his reputation as a native fascist, to say the least, greatly exaggerated.
  32. Biddle, *In Brief Authority*, p. 243.
  33. Because it resulted in a conviction (albeit, one that was overturned by the Supreme Court), the mass trial of the German-American Bund members under the Selective Service Act deserves as much scholarly and journalistic attention as the mass sedition trial. But, alas, it has received very little.
  34. The only places that give much detail about the black antiwar religious cults and about the government prosecutions of their members are chapter twenty-two of Roi Oitley, *'New World A-Coming': Inside Black America* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), and pp. 103-5 of Neil A. Wynn, *The Afro-American and the Second World War* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975). Wynn's comments are based on more recent research, but he makes an unfounded distinction between prosecutions for sedition and for urging draft resistance. Washburn, *A Question of Sedition*, also discusses black seditionists on p. 172, and further reveals that, if not for Biddle, F.D.R. and J. Edgar Hoover probably would have shut down the entire black press during World War II.
  35. Two works on the wartime Detroit race riot are Alfred McClung Lee and Norman D. Humphrey, *Race Riot* (New York: Dryden, 1943), and Robert Shogan and Tom Craig, *The Detroit Race Riot: A Study in Violence* (Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1964).
  36. The best discussion of the zoot-suit riots in Los Angeles is contained in Blum's *V Was for Victory*. Mauncio Mazon, *The Zoot Suit Riots: The Psychology of Symbolic Annihilation* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), although a more recent book-length treatment, is marred by its psycho-historic approach, which views the riots as mainly symbolic. Mazon does, however, point out the important fact that the zoot-suit riots generated a fairly tame level of violence, especially relative to the wartime violence directed against blacks.
  37. Allan M. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), is a solid study of that agency. Blum's *V Was for Victory* also contains a lengthy section on the Office of War Information.
  38. Theodore Koop, *Weapon of Silence* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), is an older study of the Office of Censorship.
  39. Charles J. Tull, *Father Coughlin and the New Deal* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965). For a more general examination of postal censorship, consult the relevant section of Dorothy Ganfield Fowler, *Unmailable: Congress and the Post Office* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1977).

40. The case of the U-boat saboteurs is the subject of Eugene Rachlis, *They Came to Kill: The Story of Eight Nazi Saboteurs in America* (New York: Random House, 1961).
41. A Revisionist look at one of the renegade broadcaster cases is provided by James J. Martin, "The Framing of 'Tokyo Rose,'" in *The Saga of Hog Island: And Other Essays in Inconvenient History* (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1977); pp. 145-80.
42. Pound's incarceration is fully treated in E. Fuller Torrey, *The Roots of Treason: Ezra Pound and the Secrets of St. Elizabeth's* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984). Torrey, himself a psychiatrist, believes that Pound was sane — but still a bona fide traitor.
43. For the emergence of the intelligence community during World War II, see Corson's *The Armies Of Ignorance*. There are two good works on the CIA's forerunner: R. Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley: University of California, 1972), and Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: The O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A.* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
44. On the wartime roots of the National Security Agency, see James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace: A Report On America's Most Secret Agency*, rev. ed., (New York: Penguin Books, 1983).
45. For the ambivalent civil liberties role played by the Supreme Court and the Constitution, see Edwin S. Corwin, *Total War And The Constitution In Crisis Times, 1918-1969* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
46. Peter Irons, *Justice At War: The Story Of The Japanese-American Internment Cases* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), looks at the court cases that internment inspired, showing both that the government suppressed damaging documents and that ACLU lawyers, out of deference to F.D.R., were remiss in representing their Japanese-American clients.
47. The common notion of World War II as "The Good War" has most recently been reaffirmed in the title of a book by Studs Terkel: "*The Good War*": *An Oral History of World War Two* (New York: Pantheon, 1984).

## FURTHER READING ON THE U.S., WWII & CIVIL LIBERTIES

**311 YEARS OF INFAMY** by Michi Weglyn. This young Japanese-American woman describes the appalling conditions of the American WWII concentration camps, and the brutal treatment meted out to American citizens who happened to be of Japanese extraction. A real eye opener, especially for those who think only the Germans were capable of such deeds. Pb, 350pp, \$9.00

**322 REVISIONIST VIEWPOINTS** by Dr. James J. Martin. A noted libertarian professor candidly examines some of the Establishment's notions regarding WWII. Particularly good on "war crimes trials" and unpunished Allied atrocities. Pb, 248pp, \$6.50 (See no. 331)

**323 AMERICA'S SECOND CRUSADE** by William Henry Chamberlin. A cynical look at America's interventionist policies in two world wars. Dissects our "reasons" for interfering in Europe. Pb, 372pp, \$8.00

**331 THE SAGA OF HOG ISLAND AND OTHER ESSAYS IN INCONVENIENT HISTORY** by Dr. James J. Martin. Barnes' academic heir takes apart many of the myths surrounding WWII in his usual scathing and witty fashion. "The Framing of Tokyo Rose" is particularly good. Pb, 208pp, \$6.00 (See also nos. 322, 378 & 607.)

**359 THE CASE OF TYLER KENT** by John Howland Snow. Kent was an American decoding expert in the U.S. Embassy in London where he decoded a series of secret messages of FDR promising Churchill to get the U.S. into the war by any means. When Kent made this known he was tried by the British and incarcerated (although diplomatic immunity was supposed to have precluded such action, it was waived by Joseph Kennedy, the U.S. Ambassador to Britain.) Pb, 59pp, \$4.00

**385 NO CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER: A SKEPTICAL VIEW OF THE U.S. ENTRY INTO WORLD II** by Bruce M. Russett. A remarkable book by a liberal Yale political scientist who revises his own long-standing "orthodox" interpretation of American intervention in the war, concluding that such entry was **not necessary** to the survival and well-being of this country, and **cannot be justified** in any case. Each argument for intervention, both of the time and in retrospect, is examined and refuted. Pb, \$6.50

**608 PROPHETS ON THE RIGHT** by Ronald Radosh. Profiles of conservative critics of American globalism, including Senator Robert Taft, John T. Flynn, Lawrence Dennis and Charles A. Beard. Pb, 351pp, \$8.00

**616 A TRIAL ON TRIAL: THE GREAT SEDITION TRIAL OF 1944** by Lawrence Dennis and Maximilian St. George. A rousing, masterful account of the worst fiasco in the history of American jurisprudence. Roosevelt attempted to railroad 30-odd American non-interventionists on charges of sedition, by way of a public trial more reminiscent of a Soviet show trial than anything else. This book is must reading for an understanding of the mind-bending "rationale" used by various groups to this day to suppress inquiry and criticism, and to persecute and prosecute those who disagree with them. Pb, 502pp, \$12.00

## *Shattering the Icon of Abraham Lincoln*

SAM DICKSON

**T**he astonishing thing about this paper on Abraham Lincoln is that it is needed at all or is considered controversial. In my opinion, one does not have to be a scholar to ferret out obscure and suppressed facets of history to see Abraham Lincoln as he was.

My views on this subject are not unusual. They are those of the overwhelming majority of Southerners both immediately before, during and for decades after the War between the States. My views were also shared by many in the North and the West. Only the passage of time and the studious cultivation of the myth of Abraham Lincoln, coupled with his timely death (timely in the sense of being providential for his place in history) have caused Abraham Lincoln to be raised to the level of a sacred cow in American history.

Nevertheless, even contemporary events show that the place and role of Abraham Lincoln in American history are a subject which is very sensitive to the Establishment. When Professor M.E. Bradford of the University of Dallas was nominated by President Reagan to head the National Endowment for the Humanities, a storm of abuse and controversy exploded. Professor Bradford's sin was that he had the effrontery to criticize Abraham Lincoln. *The New York Times* launched the attack, followed by a host of other establishment liberal spokesmen and institutions and joined by so-called "neo-conservatives" such as George Will. Mr. Will excoriated Professor Bradford as "the nostalgic Confederate remnant of the Conservative movement" and made it clear that neo-conservatives have no use for any criticism of Abraham Lincoln.<sup>1</sup> Obviously, Professor Bradford touched a raw and sensitive nerve when he criticized a president who has been dead for over 120 years. One wonders after the lapse of so many years why this matter is such a vital, important and sensitive one.

Part of the reason for the importance of Abraham Lincoln in the

iconography of the left is explained by the Whig Theory of History which is shared by most leftists in one form or another. The Whig Theory of History holds that history, in particular the history of the English-speaking peoples, is the history of freedom broadening down from precedent to precedent as progress is made away from tradition, authority, monarchy, and aristocracy toward democracy and egalitarianism. The leftist adherents to the Whig Theory of History see Lincoln as part of a continuum running from Runnymede to Cromwell to the so-called Glorious Revolution to the American Revolution to Lincoln to Wilson to Roosevelt to Kennedy and beyond.

Of course, this Whig Theory of History is preposterous and fallacious and maintained only by a thoroughly dishonest editing of historical events. However, the leftists are correct in viewing Lincoln and the effect of his career on the course of the United States as moving America away from an aristocratic society founded upon traditions, authority and property and towards a mass democratic society founded upon universal suffrage, equality and unlimited government-mandated social experimentation. While it is not remarkable that leftists should admire Abraham Lincoln, it is noteworthy and surprising that the Lincoln Myth has been marketed to moderate and conservative Americans.

Part of the success enjoyed by the Lincoln Myth lies in the timeliness of his death. By dying through an assassination at the conclusion of the war and prior to the commencement of a bitter and cruel peace, Lincoln could be used by all factions in America and could be opposed by none. Hence, Radical Republicans used his death, as well as a contrived propaganda campaign alleging that Southern leaders, including Jefferson Davis, had plotted Lincoln's assassination, to inflame Northern opinion and to solidify their leadership of the North in a campaign of humiliation, robbery and persecution of the conquered and prostrate South and its vanquished leaders.<sup>2</sup> Southerners were likewise in no position to attack Lincoln. The South's situation after the war was similar to that of post-World War II Germany, that is to say, utterly defeated, prostrate, the victim of inflammatory lies about atrocities at Andersonville, *etc.* Hence, the only prudent course for Southerners was to promote those aspects of the Lincoln Myth (*e.g.*, his alleged kindness and magnanimity) so as to defuse Northern anger and work patiently for the amelioration of the condition of the South.

Having touched on the foregoing points, let us examine the real Abraham Lincoln and his true place in American history. I have selected the following areas of scrutiny: 1 Lincoln the man; 2 Lincoln

from the standpoint of American patriotism and nationalism; 3 Lincoln and the coming of the War; 4 Lincoln's conduct of the War; 5 Lincoln and his place in American history.

## 1. Lincoln The Man

The official image of Lincoln the man according to the Lincoln Myth runs as follows: a man of upright character and honesty, a man of peace and compassion for his Southern adversaries, and a Christian of sincere religious convictions.

All of the above articles of faith are demonstrably false.

Lincoln was a demagogic politician who maneuvered with consummate skill on all sides of many burning issues of the day. Thus, in the famous debates with Stephen Douglas his position on the question of Negro equality became several positions according to which area of Illinois was hosting the debate. His pronouncements ranged from denials of Negro equality and advocacy of an inferior and degraded state of civil rights for the Negro to affirmations of the equality of Negroes. This is not to say that Lincoln was without principle. It is my belief, which will be developed in this paper, that Lincoln was an abiding leftist but at the same time was a crafty and dissimulating politician who was willing shamelessly to try to fool all of the people, all of the time.

As to Lincoln's alleged sincere "Christian" religious convictions, it is well known to students of Lincoln that he was an atheist and free-thinker. While like any crafty politician Lincoln was willing to invoke the name of God to garner support, no great importance should be laid to this practice which is common in all democratic societies.

Also, Lincoln believed in omens, was often depressed by seeing blackbirds, and would interpret dreams that he had in ways that can only be described as superstitious. Lincoln's superstition is frequently confused with piety.

Lincoln's law partner, William Herndon, was deeply disturbed after Lincoln's death by popular portrayals of Lincoln as a Christian saint. As Dwight G. Anderson, author of a recent study of Abraham Lincoln, points out, Herndon knew that Lincoln had written an essay denying the divinity of the Bible. This essay or book of Lincoln's came to be referred to as the "infidel book." Herndon's lectures and writings on the subject of Lincoln's atheism provoked immediate defense of Lincoln as a devout Christian. However, as Herndon shrewdly pointed out, the fact of Lincoln's early atheism cannot be denied and Lincoln's political career would

have been vastly helped by some public revelation of a dramatic conversion to Christianity. No such conversion has ever been established. Long after the controversy over Lincoln's atheism or devotion to Christianity, a statement of Lincoln's was discovered which Lincoln issued in reply to accusations that he was not a Christian.<sup>3</sup> Lincoln admitted that he was not a member of any Christian church, but stated that he had not denied the truth of the scriptures and had not spoken with intentional disrespect of religion in general or of any particular Christian denomination. Lincoln's statement shows that Herndon was correct. The statement is artfully worded but does not indicate any conversion to Christianity and does not deny the assertions of Herndon that Lincoln had denied the divinity of the scriptures. Lincoln says only that he had not denied their truth. Lincoln is to be admired for his honesty in this statement in not concocting some vote-catching, born-again experience. Our admiration for his candor would be greater had he desisted from piously self-serving references to the Almighty in political speeches throughout his career.

## 2. Lincoln As Patriot And Nationalist

Regarding Lincoln's patriotism and devotion to the Union, he was devoted rather to the aggrandizement of his section and of his faction, which dominated that section. When broader national interests came into conflict with the interests of Lincoln and his faction, Lincoln took the side of his faction, as will be shown later in dealing with the Mexican-American War.

Lincoln's first term in the Illinois legislature coincided with the initial rumblings in Northern legislatures of the dangerous and divisive slavery issue. Responsible Americans of both sections recognized the danger posed to the American Union by the slavery issue and sought to head it off. One means of doing this was to have the legislatures of both sections pass identical resolutions expressing a national consensus on the slavery issue from a moderate point of view.

Stephen Douglas, a true American patriot, was among those instrumental in seeking to have the Illinois legislature pass this resolution. The resolution was overwhelmingly passed with only a tiny minority voting against it. Among the handful of opponents was a freshman member of the legislature, Abraham Lincoln.<sup>4</sup> Beginning with this incident, Douglas was to be a lifelong adversary of Lincoln.

Lincoln's position on the Illinois resolution seriously impeaches

those who try to make of Lincoln a white racist. The fact that Lincoln was willing to go that far early in his career indicates that he was committed to Negro equality at the inception of his career and was on the far left of contemporary American thought about the Negro and slavery issues. Furthermore, Lincoln's opposition to the resolution is strong evidence for his willingness to disrupt the Union in order to promote his own faction's success. Certainly, his position on the resolution has to be laid to his discredit in assessing his career.

This is not to say that Lincoln did not craftily dissemble his views on slavery and the Negro as a practical politician, realizing the limitations within which he strove to realize his ideals. For instance, in late 1854 Lincoln was furious when he learned that radical abolitionist Republicans meeting in Springfield had adopted fiery anti-slavery resolutions and formed a party state central committee, on which they took the liberty of placing Lincoln's name.

I have been perplexed some to understand how my name was placed in that committee. I was not consulted on the subject; nor was I apprised of the appointment until I discovered it by accident two or three weeks afterwards. I suppose that my opposition to the principle of slavery is as strong as that of any number of the Republican party; but I had also supposed that the *extent* [original emphasis] to which I feel authorized to carry that opposition practically was not at all satisfactory to that party.<sup>5</sup>

This letter shows that Lincoln was, in fact, a staunch opponent of slavery but that he recognized, better than some abolitionists sharing his views, that it was necessary to be careful in approaching their goal.

Lincoln's aggrandizement of his sectional and factional advantage at the expense of the nation as a whole is most clearly evidenced by his opposition to the war with Mexico. President James K. Polk, certainly one of the greatest American presidents, was responsible for almost doubling our national territory by means of the war with Mexico. Through his efforts and through the heroism in battle of many genuine American nationalists like Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, a whole empire was won, out of which would be carved many of our states, from Texas to California.

President Polk's war with Mexico was not universally popular, however, even in the America of the 1840's. (It is noteworthy that many modern Liberals consider the Mexican War to have been the worst and most immoral war in our history, preferring such wars as the War between the States, WWI and WWII as "moral" wars.)<sup>6</sup> Among Polk's opponents in the matter of the war was the freshman

congressman from Illinois, Abraham Lincoln. On January 12, 1848, Lincoln spoke in the House of Representatives defending the vote of his party a few days before in declaring "that the war with Mexico was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced by the President."<sup>7</sup> It was, in Carl Sandburg's words, a fiercely partisan speech, which led to strong criticism of Lincoln in Illinois. The result was that Abraham Lincoln was defeated for re-election to Congress due to his opposition to national expansion and to the war with Mexico.

It is also ironic to note that in his speech attacking President Polk Lincoln made two statements which can be cited against him in his own conduct in the War between the States. Lincoln stated:

Any people any where, being inclined and having the power, have the right to rise up and shake off the existing government and form a new one that suits them better... Any portion of such people that can, may revolutionize, and make their own, of so much of the territory as they inhabit. More than this, a majority of any portion of such people may revolutionize, putting down a minority, intermingled with, or near about them, who may oppose their movement.<sup>8</sup>

These remarks clearly can be cited to justify and condone the actions of the South in seceding from the Union in 1860 and 1861. To further the irony, Lincoln condemned President Polk's initiation of the War as unconstitutional on the grounds that Polk had sent American troops into battle without congressional authority,<sup>9</sup> but later, Lincoln would take far more dramatic steps to initiate war by executive fiat without prior congressional approval, as required by the Constitution, when it served his interests to do so in the secession crisis.

### 3. Lincoln and the Coming of The War

As we have noted previously, Lincoln in the inception of his public career in the Illinois State house took the radical position on slavery by opposing the resolutions intended to soothe public feelings in both sections.

The slavery issue continued to torment and divide the nation. However, it would be a mistake to focus, as do most Northern historians, solely upon the slavery issue as the cause of division between the two sections.

The North was already losing its Anglo-Saxon character and was rapidly changing with the inundation of non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants from Europe. Furthermore, the North was industrializing and her economic interests were in many respects directly

antithetical to those of the South. Hence the North desired the erection of a high tariff barrier to enable herself to sell her industrial products with a competitive advantage over imports from Europe. Likewise, most of the nation's foreign exchange was earned by exports from the South. The tariff issue was critical in the division of the nation and probably played the major role in determining the North upon a policy of aggression and conquest when the secession came.

Lincoln had always been a national Whig. His policies were those in favor of a central banking system, which he championed during his first term in the Illinois legislature.<sup>10</sup> The Bank of the United States which Andrew Jackson opposed was similar to our present day Federal Reserve System. Lincoln opposed resolutions in the Illinois legislature supporting President Andrew Jackson, who had vetoed the National Bank.<sup>11</sup> Lincoln also favored high tariffs, a strongly centralized government and internal improvements.<sup>12</sup> Lincoln himself had a direct personal reason to support such policies, since he derived a significant portion of his income from serving as attorney for the railroad interests.<sup>13</sup>

The estrangement and antagonism between the two sections gradually accelerated. In 1858 Lincoln made his famous "House Divided" Speech. In this speech, Lincoln declared:

A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this government cannot endure, permanently half slave and half free. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward until it shall become alike lawful in all the states, old as well as new — North as well as South.<sup>14</sup>

Entranced by the Lincoln cult, Americans are prone to read or hear the House Divided Speech with a tingling of the spine, impressed by its dramatic tone. Set in the context of developing regional antagonism, however, the speech seems to be that of an irresponsible demagogue. The Union had existed half slave and half free from its inception. There appears to be no logical reason why it could not have continued to have existed in that fashion, given responsible leadership and good will on both sides, until slavery was eliminated by the progress of technology. Certainly the delivery of such a speech was not responsible leadership, as it did much to infuriate and alarm the South. This especially was true with Lincoln's election, which the South saw as the election of a man who seemed to have declared himself on the side of those who intended to violate the constitutional rights and property rights of

Southerners and to interfere with their self-government. As is the case with many dramatic speeches, the speech has its thrilling aspects, but was utterly irresponsible and led to tragic results.

Lincoln's activity with regard to the developing sectional strife contrasts sharply with that of his major opponent Stephen A. Douglas. Douglas consistently sought the national advantage, having been a staunch supporter of President Polk in the war with Mexico. Douglas strived to promote reconciliation and cooperation between North and South, and to develop workable compromises that avoided dogmatic impasses on either side.<sup>15</sup>

Lincoln in the Lincoln-Douglas debates was his characteristic demagogic and unprincipled self. In northern Illinois, in which the German and other non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants now were playing a major and perhaps decisive role, Lincoln declared himself dramatically for Negro equality, raising his hands to the heavens and declaring: "In the right to eat the bread his own hands have earned he is the equal of Judge Douglas, or of myself, or any living man." However, in southern Illinois, where conservative and Southern sympathies ran strong, Lincoln declared himself opposed to granting Negroes civil rights and stated that they were in fact an inferior race.<sup>16</sup>

Likewise, in 1858 in the course of the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates, Lincoln wrote a meditation which was not used in his debates and which his admiring biographer Sandburg described as a "private affair between him and his conscience." This statement ran as follows:

Yet I have never failed — do not now fail — to remember that in the Republican cause there is a higher aim than that of mere office. I have not allowed myself to forget that the abolition of the slave trade by Great Britain was agitated a hundred years before it was a final success; that the measure had its open fire-eating opponents; its stealthy "don't care" opponents; its dollar and cent opponents; its inferior race opponents; its negro equality opponents; and its religious and good order opponents; that all these opponents got offices, and their adversaries got none. But I also remember that though they blazed like tallow candles for a century, at last they flickered in the socket, died out, stank in the dark for a brief season, and were remembered no more, even by the smell... I am proud, in my passing speck of time, to contribute an humble mite to that glorious consummation, which my own poor eyes may not last to see.<sup>17</sup>

With his election in 1860, the real test of Abraham Lincoln's leadership in his country began. State after state in the South withdrew from the Union, as it became obvious that the South was extremely agitated by his election. Lincoln had been elected with only

39% of the popular vote. Only the splintering of the moderate-to-conservative majority made possible the election of this President. No president since has ever been elected with so little popular support. Certainly no president has ever been placed in office over the determined opposition of so many of his fellow citizens.<sup>18</sup>

Had Stephen A. Douglas been elected, it is almost certain that secession and civil war would have been averted.

In his campaign Lincoln had avoided speaking on vital issues. In the words of Reinhart H. Luthin, one of Lincoln's better known biographers, "From his election to his inauguration Lincoln's handling, or rather lack of handling of the bedeviling secession crisis might be termed 'calculated inactivity' for he was to do nothing about it nor was he to provide much leadership, with the Republic tottering in the balance."<sup>19</sup>

Lincoln had long believed that Southern talk of secession was nothing but bluff. In 1856 he had stated in a speech in Galena, Illinois: "All this talk about the dissolution of the Union is humbug."<sup>20</sup> He grossly underestimated secessionist sentiment and overestimated pro-Union strength in the upper South and border slave regions.

After Lincoln's election, a conservative Senator, John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, proposed a compromise to head off secession by extending the Missouri Compromise line dividing slave states from free states all the way to the Pacific.<sup>21</sup> Lincoln rejected this compromise and marshalled his party against all other compromises with the South. Lincoln said as follows concerning this:

Let there be no compromise on the question of extending slavery. If there be, all our labor is lost, and, ere long must be done again. The dangerous ground — that into which some of our friends have a hankering to run — is Pop. Sov. [Popular Sovereignty]. Have none of it. Stand firm. The tug has to come, and better now, than any time hereafter.<sup>22</sup>

Lincoln also instructed his legislative spokesman from Illinois in Washington not to compromise with the South.<sup>23</sup>

Plas poured into Lincoln from all regions of the country imploring him to make some gesture to the South and give leadership at that critical time. However, as Luthin describes it, Lincoln continued his "sphinx-like silence" until his inauguration.<sup>24</sup>

The Lincoln cultists often quote a letter which Lincoln wrote during this period, to Alexander Hamilton Stephens of Georgia, who later would serve as Vice President of the Confederacy. In this letter, Lincoln is quoted as saying:

*For your eyes only*

Springfield, Ill. Dec. 22, 1860

Hon. A.H. Stephens

My Dear Sir

Your obliging answer to my short note is just received and for which please accept my thanks — I fully appreciate the present peril the country is in, and the weight of responsibility on me.

Do the people of the South really entertain fears that a Republican administration would *directly*, or *indirectly*, interfere with the slaves, or with them about their slaves? If they do I wish to assure you, as once a friend, and still, I hope, not as an enemy, that there is no cause for such fear —

The South would be in no more danger in this respect than it was in the days of Washington.

I suppose, however, this does not meet the case — You think slavery is right and ought to be extended while we think it is wrong and ought to be restricted — That I suppose is the rule — It certainly is the only substantial difference between us —

Yours very truly,  
A. Lincoln<sup>25</sup>

The interesting thing about this letter, which as I say is often quoted by Lincoln's admirers to show him in the official posture of the loving father holding out his hands to his erring Southern sons, is that the letter was never publicized and never received any attention in the South. The reason for this is that the preamble of the letter, which Lincoln's admirers delete in the quotation, forbade Stephens, a Unionist, upon his honor from showing it to anyone else, stating that the letter is for his eyes only.

Lincoln and Stephens had served together in Congress and knew each other very well. Lincoln, it may be anticipated, knew that Stephens would not make use of the letter in his efforts to keep Georgia (and thereby the South) in the Union in obedience to Lincoln's urgings.

The question then arises of why Lincoln wrote the letter at all. No one can answer that question with certainty but it would appear that Lincoln believed that he could entice Stephens into coming North and siding with the Union in the impending sectional war. This policy of Lincoln worked with his later Vice-President, Andrew Johnson, who had also served in Congress with Lincoln, representing eastern Tennessee, and who went North and supported the Union during the War.

Certainly any responsible American would agree that Lincoln should have moved energetically to try to deter the secession movement. The fact is that Lincoln did not. On his way to Washington Lincoln visited with a number of the so-called "war governors" in the North. These were men like Governor Andrew

G. Curtin of Pennsylvania who were in favor of coercing the South by armed force into remaining in the Union and thus remaining subject to the North's tariff laws.

While in Pennsylvania, Lincoln spoke at Independence Hall. He alluded to the Declaration of Independence and made clear that the Constitution was in conflict with the Declaration of Independence, and that it was his intention to reform the Constitution to bring it in line with the principles of the Declaration. Lincoln stated as follows:

I have never had a feeling politically that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declaration of Independence... if this country cannot be saved without giving up that principle [equality] I was about to say that I would rather be assassinated on this spot than to surrender it.<sup>26</sup>

These statements were not calculated to soothe suspicions of Southern conservatives; they also reflect Lincoln's innate radicalism and dissatisfaction with the American Constitution. His dissatisfaction with the limitations imposed on government and executive power by the Constitution were later to become evident in his precipitation of the war and his conduct of that war.

As Stephen Douglas pointed out in the United States Senate, as the secession crisis developed, there were three possible courses for the United States to take in dealing with the sectional crisis: 1 The Union could be saved by compromise and reconciliation between men of good will in both sections; 2 The South could be allowed to withdraw in peace and set up her own government independent of the North; 3 The South could be coerced by military force into remaining subject to the Union. According to Douglas, the best solution would have been one based on compromise and reconciliation. The next best would have been to allow the South to depart in peace. The worst was to resort to violent military force to coerce the South into the Union like a conquered province.<sup>27</sup>

In his inaugural address, Lincoln was ambiguous, making his famous gesture to the South in its conclusion but also containing passages stating that he would not recognize secession and would enforce the laws in all states. His original draft was much more warlike but Seward convinced him to soften it.<sup>28</sup>

Continuing efforts were made to negotiate a peaceful separation. Virginia sent three commissioners to meet with Lincoln shortly prior to Lincoln's attempt to resupply Fort Sumter, which led to the bombardment of Fort Sumter and the outbreak of the War. According to the Virginia commissioners, Lincoln equivocated as to whether he would resort to armed force to coerce the seceded states

back into the Union. Virginia at that point had not seceded but had placed her legislature in a state of continuous session to await further developments. The Virginia commissioners had made it clear that if the Lincoln administration resorted to armed force against the South, Virginia and the other states of the South which had not already seceded would also go out and join their seceded sisters.<sup>29</sup>

Lincoln equivocated with the commissioners. However, his greatest concern voiced to them was, "What about my tariff?"<sup>30</sup> This shows once again Lincoln's commitment to the huge vested industrial and financial interests of the North. The war in Lincoln's mind had to be fought to establish the supremacy of that financial oligarchy. The tariff under Lincoln was instated with a vigor and was raised to unparalleled heights.<sup>31</sup> This economic policy of anti-Southern tariffs and economic exploitation of the South was to be continued for almost eighty years after the war and was only abandoned in the face of the crisis of World War II.<sup>32</sup>

Lincoln after his inauguration temporarized and maneuvered. All proposals in the so-called "Peace Congress" failed, receiving no support from the administration. It was necessary to provoke the South into firing the first shot so as to rally Northern opinion, at that point strongly divided, behind a war to coerce the South. This was achieved by dispatching resupply ships to Fort Sumter, thus breaking his commitments and assurances to the South that he would not reinforce the Federal forts in the South.<sup>33</sup>

When the news of the planned resupply of Fort Sumter reached the South, the bombardment of the fort was begun. Lincoln then used the act of firing upon the American flag to rally Northern opinion to his cause and put up a public pretence that the situation in the South was merely that of a minority of conspirators preventing the expression of the true Union sentiments of the loyalist majorities in the South. Lincoln may have believed this himself, because he always overestimated his ability to divide the South and to provoke animosity between the social classes in the South. It would not be until the war had been raging for over a year that Lincoln would realize that this was not to be.

After the surrender of Fort Sumter, Lincoln issued an executive proclamation calling for 75,000 volunteers to form an army to invade the South. Virginia and the other remaining Southern states withdrew and the Confederacy assumed its basic geography.<sup>34</sup>

In 1848 during his efforts to oppose the war with Mexico, Lincoln had attacked President Polk upon the floor of the House for having sent units of the United States Army into a disputed border

region between Mexico and the United States. Lincoln said that the President's action violated the Constitution's requirement that only Congress could declare war. Lincoln's own action in raising an army by Executive Order was a far greater violation of these same provisions of the Constitution dealing with the declaration of war, than the alleged violations of President Polk which he had attacked. The "Executive Order Army" could be said to be the precursor of the whole litany of executive orders which have been a favorite device of presidents from the Roosevelt administration onward. The war governors, nevertheless, hastened to provide Lincoln with the militia units and volunteers which he needed to commence the hostilities and the war was on.

The efforts of true American patriots like Stephen A. Douglas to save the Union by conciliation and compromise had been successfully thwarted. Lincoln had achieved his opportunity to rededicate the nation to the radical principles of the Declaration of Independence and to get around the impediment of the Constitution.

#### 4. Lincoln's Conduct of the War

A civil war is usually marked by an intensity in feeling and an atrociousness of conduct which is often lacking in wars between rival powers. It is fair to say that the War between the States was waged by the Lincoln administration with a barbarity rarely equalled in any other war in American history.

Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus throughout the nation. He assumed the power to close newspapers and in fact closed hundreds of them in the North which dared criticize his policies. He arrested elected officials, including former members of Congress, who opposed him.<sup>35</sup>

Vice-President John C. Breckenridge, who finished second to Lincoln in electoral votes in the 1860 election, presided over the official election and swore in his successor, Hannibal Hamlin. Breckenridge, a Kentuckian, was opposed to disunion and to Lincoln. His criticism of Lincoln was censored and the Associated Press was barred from reporting his remarks. Breckenridge remained in Washington until after the First Battle of Manassas, hoping and working for peace.<sup>36</sup> He later became a Confederate general.

The first taste of what was to come in the South in the course of the war was seen in the border states. In Missouri, the Anglo-Saxon population was disarmed and the state was garrisoned with volunteer units of Germans who could be counted on to support the Lincoln administration. The Anglo-Saxon population of the whole western tier of counties in Missouri were deported from their homes

by General Ewing's General Order Number 11, which depopulated the region by forcibly evacuating the women and children on the shortest of notice, along with burning their houses and stealing their property. Among those experiencing this deportation and expropriation was the mother of later President Harry S. Truman. The memories of the sufferings she and her family had endured while she was a small child stayed with Mrs. Truman throughout her life. On one occasion the aspiring young politician told his mother that he had been invited to dinner at the house of a prominent family in Kansas City. His mother admonished him to turn the silver over and check the hallmark because, "It's probably ours." On another occasion, Truman showed his mother his new National Guard uniform only to be ordered out of the house because the pants were blue.

In Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri, Northern troops fired on pro-Southern demonstrators, dispersed legislatures, expelled elected officials and otherwise demonstrated that no respect for constitutional rights or liberties would be shown during the course of the war.

It is amazing that the Lincoln cultists have been able to shield Lincoln from the Northern atrocities committed during the war under his tenure as Commander-in-Chief of its armies. The standard line on this point, usually implied rather than stated, is that Lincoln sat in the White House exuding love for Southerners, in blissful ignorance of what Sherman, Ewing, Pope, Butler and others were doing. This, of course, is unworthy of belief and is an impossibility, given the widespread jubilant publicity in the North over the depredations of the Northern armies against the Southern people.<sup>37</sup>

General Ewing's General Order Number 11 in Missouri was merely a taste of what was to come throughout the South. The most famous and widely known example of Northern atrocities was the campaign of General William Tecumseh Sherman in Georgia. No portion of this country has ever felt the scourge of war like the State of Georgia experienced it.

The city of Atlanta, *after* its surrender, was burned to the ground, and only a handful of churches and a few outlying residences escaped the holocaust. More than 4,000 edifices were burned, which was approximately 92% of the city. Only 450 buildings of any sort escaped this ruthless burning, in a city which had a population of 14,000. Captain Daniel Oakey of the Second Massachusetts Volunteers recounted the burning of Atlanta as follows: "Sixty thousand of us witnessed the destruction of Atlanta, while our post band and that of the 33rd Massachusetts played

martial airs and operatic selections."<sup>38</sup> Like the bombing of Dresden, this massive destruction of civilian property was of no military importance. On November 15, 1864, the march of the Northern troops across Georgia from Atlanta to Savannah began. Sherman created a charred avenue over 40 miles wide, destroying all railroads, seizing all provisions, pillaging, plundering and burning. There was no military force available to obstruct his course.<sup>39</sup>

The devastation in Georgia was so complete that entire communities disappeared never to be heard of again. Perhaps the most dramatic of these occurred at the milltown of New Manchester on Sweetwater Creek in Douglas County, Georgia. The Union forces had occupied the town without a shot being fired on July 2, 1864. Most of the workers in the mill were women and were told to return to their homes. They were told that they would be taken out of the path of the advancing army. The mill was destroyed and the town was placed under guard. On July 8, the entire town, including the homes of the workers, was burned to the ground. Having destroyed the entire town, only the population remained, most of them women and children with a few men. The women and children were separated from the men and herded into wagons. The wagon train then set off for Marietta, Georgia, some 16 miles away. During the journey the women were forced to endure the sexual advances of the Union soldiers. In Marietta the group was joined by a similar group of deported women from Roswell, Georgia. On July 20, the entire group of women and children were shipped by train from Georgia to Louisville, Kentucky.<sup>40</sup> Not one woman or child is known to have returned to New Manchester. To the credit of the North, even in that section, there was strong opposition to the policy of deporting women and children.

Are we really to believe that Abraham Lincoln knew nothing of the depredations of Sherman's troops? The atrocious deeds of his troops were reported widely throughout the Northern press and extended over a period of many months, not ending until the final surrender of the Confederacy, by which time Sherman had similarly torched Columbia, South Carolina, and laid waste to parts of Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina. Sherman, besides his legendary "War is hell" comment, wrote his wife in Savannah, Georgia, of popular opinion of the Northern liberators: "They regard us just as the Romans did the Goths and the parallel is not unjust."<sup>41</sup>

However, one should not be too hasty in condemning Lincoln. Lincoln shared the democratic sensitivity to deportations which certainly justify his being included in the trinity of Lincoln, Wilson

and F.D.R. on the subject of deportations. Not all deportations were tolerated by the White House during the war. Thus for instance when General Grant ordered Jewish speculators expelled from Tennessee, Lincoln quickly issued a peremptory order to Grant, rescinding his order and rebuking him for having deported the Jewish speculators.<sup>42</sup> Like Wilson, F.D.R. and other ideological descendants of Lincoln, Lincoln knew where a democracy has to draw the line. After all, a distinction has to be made between Anglo-Saxon women and children, textile workers and farmers, and Jewish speculators.

Nor were the outrages of the Northern armies confined to the states of Georgia and South Carolina. In Virginia, for example, between July 18 and July 23, 1862, General John Pope issued four general orders providing that the Union army would as far as possible subsist upon the country, *i.e.*, steal food from the civilians. All villages and neighborhoods through which the Union forces marched would be placed "under contribution." Civilians living along the line of march would be punished if there were any injuries to railroads or other roads by bands of unknown guerillas. Also, Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr seized civilians as hostages so that they could be executed if any of his soldiers were killed by unknown persons. (One recalls the righteous indignation periodically vented at Germans for reprisals taken against civilians for guerilla actions of the "gallant resistance" in World War II.) Those refusing to take the oath of allegiance to the United States would be banished from their homes; if found at any point within the Federal lines or in the rear, they would be executed as spies. Anyone who communicated with the enemy was subject to the death penalty. As Hudson Strode points out in his marvelous biography of Jefferson Davis, a mother who sent her son a letter could be regarded as a spy.<sup>43</sup> Pope also proceeded to arm the recently-freed slaves against the whites. General McClellan deserves this country's admiration for denouncing Pope as "an upstart braggart" and a man who mistook brutality in war for power.<sup>44</sup>

President Jefferson Davis writing to General Robert E. Lee, reacted to Pope's orders as follows:

We find ourselves driven by our enemies in their steady progress towards a practice which we abhor and which we are vainly struggling to avoid. Some of the military authorities of the United States seem to suppose that better success will attend a savage war in which no quarter is to be given and no sex to be spared. For the present, we renounce the right of retaliation on the innocent and shall continue to treat the private enlisted soldiers of General Pope's army as prisoners of war;

but if, after notice to the government in Washington, these savage practices are continued, we shall be reluctantly forced to the last resort of accepting war on the terms chosen by our foes, until the outraged voice of the common humanity forces a respect for the recognized rules of war.

You are therefore instructed to communicate to the Commander in Chief of the Armies of the United States the contents of this letter — to the end that he may be notified of our intention not to consider any officers hereafter captured from General Pope's army as prisoners of war.<sup>45</sup>

General Lee also wrote to the United States government condemning Pope's practices and warning of the results they would lead to. While General Halleck refused to accept Lee's letter because of its insulting statements about the United States government, nevertheless Pope's orders were modified and von Steinwehr was reprimanded for the conduct of his troops.<sup>46</sup>

Like his ideological descendants, Wilson and F.D.R., Lincoln did not hesitate to cooperate with antagonistic ethnic groups against his own people. Thus the armies of the North were swelled with hundreds of thousands of mercenary soldiers from Europe, lured to the United States by a circular known as "the notorious Number 19" in the South. This circular from William H. Seward offered inducement in the form of pay and bounties to enlist in the service of the North, which already enjoyed an advantage in numbers of four times the White population of the South. The circular was evasive about service in the Army. Consul General John Bigelow in Paris organized a network of immigration agencies across Europe offering free land under the Homestead Act of 1862. After the war Bigelow stated that the tremendous success of recruiting of these foreign mercenaries accounted for the "mysterious repletion of our army during the four years of war."<sup>47</sup>

Large numbers of Irish and German mercenaries arrived to assist in the suppression of the South. According to the *New York Herald*, almost 150,000 immigrants were estimated to have joined the army early in the war. Admiral Porter estimated that a majority of the eighty thousand seamen were aliens. Ultimately, it is estimated that between 400,000 and 500,000 mercenary troops were enrolled in the Northern army to subjugate the South.<sup>48</sup>

Pope Pius IX wrote a personal letter to Jefferson Davis for the Confederacy to use in Ireland and in Catholic areas of Germany to stem the recruitment of such mercenary troops.<sup>49</sup> This letter was read in Catholic churches across Europe to discourage Union recruitment efforts.<sup>50</sup> Without the large influx of mercenaries, the primitive and wasteful military tactics of Grant would have sickened the

Northern public far sooner than it did.

Southern prisoners of war also seemed to have escaped Lincoln's much acclaimed magnanimity. The death rate of Southern prisoners in Northern prison camps was much higher than the rate of Northern prisoners in Southern P.O.W. camps. To this disparity must be added the fact that the North could not claim lack of food or medicine as a reason for the horrifying high death rate in the prisons. In fact, the North refused to permit the shipment of medicine or food to Union prisoners in Southern hands. Jefferson Davis offered to pay two or three times the market price for medicine in commodities such as cotton, tobacco or even gold for the exclusive use of Northern prisoners, to be dispensed by Northern surgeons. This offer was ignored by Lincoln. Finally, the Confederates offered to release 13,000 of the most desperate cases without an equivalent exchange by the Lincoln government. The Lincoln administration waited from August to October to collect the prisoners. After they were released, atrocity photographs of the men were circulated in the North to show how the typical prisoner in Southern hands was supposedly treated.<sup>51</sup>

Sherman used Southern prisoners of war to clear mine fields by marching them back and forth across land outside Savannah where mines were suspected. Southern prisoners were also herded in front of Northern emplacements under Confederate artillery fire so as to force Southerners to fire on their own men. Thus in the siege of Charleston, 50 Confederate officers were placed in a holding pen in front of Fort Wagner on Morris Island, so as to expose them to the fire of Confederate batteries shelling the Northern positions. On June 23, 1864, an order was issued to this effect from the office of the Commissary-General of Prisoners in Washington, D.C.<sup>52</sup> Once again, the idea that Lincoln was ignorant of the atrocious conditions under which Southern prisoners were held or the misuse of such prisoners is not tenable.

There is a French saying: the more things change, the more they remain the same. A book that has gotten fairly widespread distribution in the United States in the last year, called *The Long Surrender*, is worth reading because it shows us that we Americans are no more moral than foreign peoples. We have committed the same kind of war crimes that other people have committed. During the height of the hullabaloo raised over the Bitburg visit by Reagan, I learned of the disrespect shown to the Southern war dead in the course of the war. Among things cited by Burke Davis in *The Long Surrender* was the fact that after the Battle of Sharpsburg in Maryland, the Northerners announced that they would not permit

anyone to accord Christian burials to the Southern soldiers of war — they ordered the bodies to be left out to rot and to decompose. Only after the rot had gotten to the point where the public's health was being endangered were the rotted remains scooped together and buried in unmarked common ground.<sup>53</sup>

Likewise after the war — of course, this can't be laid to Lincoln's account since he too was dead — the North posted soldiers at military cemeteries to prevent Southern women from putting flowers on the graves of their deceased husbands, fathers, sons and brothers.<sup>54</sup>

When Richmond fell another interesting little tidbit of American history occurred. Lincoln's subordinates ordered that the Episcopal churches, in which it is the custom to pray for the leader of the country, were to pray for Abraham Lincoln in conquered areas of the South. If they refused to pray for Abraham Lincoln, Northern troops were to take the priest away from the altar, thrust him out of the church, close the church and turn the church over to Northern denominations.

Another development in the course of the war which shows something of the barbarity with which it was waged is the famous incident involving Benjamin Butler in New Orleans. General Butler was one of the most ruthless and cruel Northern generals. When he occupied New Orleans he embarked upon a course of insult and abuse toward the civilian population. There were hardly any males of military age left in New Orleans. They had all been sent off to the army, so that the women were deprived of their sons, husbands and fathers to protect them. It was apparently inconceivable to Butler that these women would not welcome their Northern conquerors under the circumstances of the war and he took umbrage at the fact that one Southern lady spat at a Northern soldier who persisted in making advances toward her. When Butler heard of this he issued his Order Number 28 which read as follows:

As the officers and soldiers of the United States have been subject to repeated insults from the women, calling themselves "ladies" of New Orleans in return for the most scrupulous non-interference and courtesy on our part [it is to be noted that there were Negro troops among the occupying army] it is ordered that hereafter when any female shall, by word, gesture or movement insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation.<sup>55</sup>

This in essence was a "right to rape" order which he issued to his troops and he undoubtedly, given his personality, was gratified by the effect it worked upon the civilian population. I assume that he

was also astonished at the outrage that it aroused around the world, because the order redounded to the great discredit of the United States. Palmerston, the British Prime Minister, wrote to Charles Francis Adams, the U.S. Minister in London the following concerning Butler's order:

I will venture to say that no example can be found in the history of civilized nations till the publication of this order of a general guilty in cold blood of so infamous an act as deliberately to hand over the female inhabitants of a conquered city to the unbridled license of an unrestrained soldiery.<sup>55</sup>

Later he said to the English Parliament: "It is a proclamation to which I do not scruple to attach the epithet 'infamous.' Any Englishman must blush to think that such an act has been committed by one belonging to the Anglo-Saxon race."

Likewise the French Minister in Washington, Mercier, who was concerned because so many of the women in New Orleans were of French extraction, issued strong remonstrances from the French government. Finally, Lincoln relieved Butler of his command — but not because of Butler's treatment of the civilians of New Orleans; not because Butler and his brother were believed to be selling supplies through the black market to the Confederates; not because Butler ordered a civilian hanged: Lincoln did not remove Butler for these reasons. It was when Butler began confiscating foreign property and all of the foreign consuls united and objected to his behavior in a unanimous letter to Washington that Butler was removed. Lincoln's reaction to the complaints was to give Butler the assignment of Commander of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina and Commissioner of Prisoner-of-War Exchanges.<sup>56</sup> What Lincoln expected of prisoner of war exchanges can be gauged from this appointment.

When Lincoln appointed Butler he also warned Butler that if he were captured, "He [Jeff Davis] has a price on your head and will hang you for sure." This was the man Lincoln expected would be able to ensure humane treatment for prisoners of war and their exchange. The Confederate commissioner at first refused to meet with Butler. A few months after Butler's appointment, Grant ordered all further exchanges to cease.

Lincoln's depredations in the course of the war were not confined, however, to the South. As mentioned above Lincoln also interfered with the functioning of constitutional government in the North by arresting elected representatives of the people and holding them for military trial.<sup>57</sup> By Executive Order he closed down

hundreds of newspapers in the North which criticized the war. He abolished the writ of habeas corpus and is estimated to have held as many as 20,000 civilians in detention without trial.<sup>58</sup> The suffering of the North, while not as horrific as that of the South, especially since the Northern civilian population at large escaped its severity, was none the less very real. The battle losses were far in excess of anyone's expectations.<sup>59</sup>

In this regard it is worth noting the famous letter to Lidia P. Bixby which Lincoln cultists love to cite. The text of the famous letter is as follows:

Dear Madam:

I have been shown in the files of the War Department a statement of the Adjutant General of Massachusetts, that you are the mother of five sons who have died gloriously on the field of battle.

I feel how weak and frivolous must be any words of mine which could attempt to beguile you from the grief of a loss overwhelming. But I cannot refrain from tendering to you the consolation that may be found in the thanks of the Republic they died to save.

I pray our Heavenly Father may assuage the anguish of your bereavement, and leave you only the cherished memory of the loved and lost, and the solemn pride that must be yours, to have laid so costly a sacrifice on the altar of Freedom.

Yours, sincerely and respectfully,  
A Lincoln<sup>60</sup>

This letter received much publicity in the North, calculated as it was to touch the heart of any reader.

Those of us who are not Lincoln admirers may see in it a sterling example of the humbug and hypocrisy that is an inescapable part of any democracy. Lincoln's own son, Robert Todd Lincoln, was of military age and was also a resident of Massachusetts during the bloodletting of the War between the States. Unlike Mrs. Bixby's sons, however, Abraham Lincoln's son fought the war at Andover and Harvard. Only in the closing months of the War did young Robert finally see military service. His service was confined to serving on General Grant's staff where he enjoyed a bird's eye view of the war's conclusion with the rank of Captain and Assistant Adjutant General.<sup>61</sup>

But Lincoln's behavior in sheltering his son from the war at the same time he was consigning the sons of so many Northern mothers to battle contrasts sharply with the behavior of Robert E. Lee and other Southern leaders. Most of the sons of Southern leaders fought in the war. There was a famous example in one battle in which Lee was riding by an artillery unit. It was a hot day and

the men had stripped themselves of their uniforms. They were blackened by the smoke from the cannons. As Lee rode by, one private, black with powder, ran out of the unit and spoke to the General. Lee said: "Well, my man, what can I do for you?" The artilleryman replied to him, "Why, General, don't you know me?" It was Robert E. ("Rob") Lee, Jr., Lee's son and namesake in the thick of battle. Another of Lee's sons, William Fitzhugh Lee, would be captured about the middle of the war, and Custis Lee would later be taken prisoner by the North in the closing days of the war.<sup>62</sup>

Finally, most Americans accept as an article of faith that had Lincoln lived he would have conducted a policy of magnanimity toward the South during Reconstruction. In view of the methods by which he provoked the war and the methods by which he waged the war, such is mere supposition. There are various statements of Lincoln's that are cited (that he was going to treat them as if they had never left, and all of that) but since Lincoln spoke out of both sides of his mouth, not too much credit can be laid to such remarks.

For example, Lincoln indicated that he was in favor of Negro suffrage in Louisiana, which would have placed the white Louisianans in a politically untenable position. He was upset when the Unionist-dominated legislature of the Reconstruction government did not grant suffrage to Negroes and he expressed a desire that Negro suffrage be granted.<sup>63</sup> Indeed, after Lincoln's last cabinet meeting Attorney General Joshua Speed, an advocate of Negro suffrage, told Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase that Lincoln "never seemed so near our views."<sup>64</sup> Of course, after Lincoln's assassination, Negroes were given the right to vote and they were manipulated by Northern carpetbaggers into passing harsh laws against the formerly rebellious, white, Southern population.

## 5. Lincoln and His Place in American History

What then is the proper place of Abraham Lincoln in American history and why they should we as Revisionists question Abraham Lincoln?

The proper place of Abraham Lincoln in American history is as part of the liberal trinity of F.D.R., Wilson and Lincoln. He had the same values they had. He advanced the country toward unlimited government as they did. He was willing to use foreigners and minority groups against his own people. He was willing to have a selective "democratic" conscience when it came to subjects like deportations. He properly ought to be considered as a major liberal force, as someone who moved the country toward the left and

toward the situation which exists today. He successfully defeated the South. The labors of the South for its freedom were all in vain. Seventy-five percent of the white male population of military age served in the Southern armies but could not overcome the disparity in numbers of the North's mercenaries.<sup>65</sup> The cherished dream of Southern independence was not to be. Lincoln should be seen as an example of the amazing inability of Americans to assess their history objectively because while some things may be little known, certainly everyone has heard of General Sherman's March to the Sea. We cannot exonerate Abraham Lincoln from this atrocity. Yet somehow the question is never even asked by Americans — if Lincoln was so wonderful and magnanimous and kind and good, why did the March to the Sea take place?

The Lincoln myth exemplifies the lack of historical sense and objectivity of Americans, the ability to accept "official" history even in the face of obvious facts.

### Notes

1. See, for example, Eric Foner, "Lincoln, Bradford and the Conservatives," *The New York Times*, February 13, 1981.
2. Burke Davis, *The Long Surrender* (New York: Random House, 1985), pp. 108-09, 203.
3. Dwight G. Anderson, *Abraham Lincoln: The Question for Immortality* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), p. 66. Ward Hill Lamon, one of Lincoln's closest friends, wrote: "He perceived no reason for changing his convictions, but he did perceive many good and cogent reasons for not making them public."
4. Edgar Lee Masters, *Lincoln, the Man* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1931), pp. 40-3; Robert W. Johansen, *Stephen A. Douglas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 54-5.
5. Reinhard H. Luthin, *The Real Abraham Lincoln* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 178.
6. David L. Hoggan, *The Myth of the New History* (Torrance, California: Institute for Historical Review, 1985), p. 72 *et. seq.*
7. Carl Sandburg, *Abraham Lincoln* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926), Volume 1, p. 367. Sangamon Edition (referred herein as "SE").
8. Sandburg, Vol. I, p. 369 SE.
9. Masters, pp. 97-8.
10. Johansen, p. 53.
11. Masters, p. 81.
12. Masters, p. 82.
13. Dee Alexander Brown, *Hear the Lonesome Whistle Blow: Railroads in the West* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1977), pp. 10-12. This book also details the Republicans' use of the railroads as a political tool and weapon during and after the War between the States.
14. Sandburg, Vol. 2, pp. 103-04 SE.

15. Johansen, see general chapters XXIX and XXX.
16. Sandburg, Vol. 2, p. 159 SE.
17. Carl Sandburg, *Reader's Digest Illustrated Edition Abraham Lincoln: The Prairie Years and the War Years* (Pleasantville, New York: The Reader's Digest Association, 1970), p. 136. ("RD")
18. Luthin, p. 238. It is worth pointing out that Lincoln got the same percentage of the vote as Fremont received in 1856 while the combined Douglas-Breckenridge slates increased the Democratic popular vote. This does not include Bell, who got nearly one third of Lincoln's popular vote total. The Douglas-Breckenridge vote increased from 45% (1.8 million) to 47% (2.2 million).
19. Luthin's chapter 16 outlines this nicely.
20. Luthin, p. 242.
21. *loc. cit.*
22. *loc. cit.*
23. *op. cit.*, p. 243.
24. *loc. cit.* Lincoln "pondered over patronage" while the Union dissolved.
25. Alexander Hamilton Stephens, *A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States, Its Causes, Character, Conduct and Results* (New York: National Publishing Company, 1868), Volume II, p. 266.
26. Sandburg, Vol. 3, p. 73 SE; Masters, p. 380.
27. Johanssen, p. 850.
28. Hudson Strode, *Jefferson Davis, Confederate President* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1959), p. 8.
29. C.R. Vaughan, D.D., Editor, *Discussions by Robert Dabney, D.D., LL.D.*, Volume IV (Harrisburg, Virginia: Sprinkle Publications, 1979), pp. 87-100, quoting the memoirs of Colonel John B. Baldwin, a member of the Virginia Peace Commission.
30. Vaughan, p. 94.
31. M.E. Bradford, *Remembering Who We Are: Observations of a Southern Conservative* (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1985), p. 147. Lincoln raised the tariff from 18.84% to 47.56%. The tariff stayed above 40% in all but two years from Lincoln's administration to the election of Woodrow Wilson. The policy amounted to a brutally effective policy of treating the South as a colonial possession transferring wealth from the South to the Northern plutocrats.
32. Ellis Gibbs Arnal, *The Shore Dimly Seen* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1946), pp. 165-185. Ellis Arnall was Governor of Georgia from 1943 to 1947. A staunch New Deal Democrat, he was one of the most liberal governors ever elected in this history of the State. An example of what Wilmot Robertson styled an "old believer" liberal, he also appears to be that rarest of all creatures — an honest Southern liberal whose belief in multi-racialism does not include the usual hatred for his own people and region. The chapter of the book referred to in this footnote is a concise and convincing summary of the Northern exploitation of its Southern colony after the War for Southern Independence.
33. Strode, *Jefferson Davis, Confederate President*, pp. 28-31; John Shipley Tilley, *The Coming of the Glory* (New York: Stratford House, 1949), pp. 58-9. See also Masters, pp. 390-96.
34. What kind of war did Lincoln expect? The largest single field army in the Mexican War was 11,000. After calling out the 75,000 militia,

- Lincoln on May 3, 1861 authorized enlistment of 82,000 additional soldiers. On July 4, 1861 he asked for 400,000 volunteers. The First Battle of Manassas was not fought until July 21, 1861. What did Lincoln plan to do with over half a million troops? Ludwell H. Johnson, *Division and Reunion: America 1848-77* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), p. 89.
35. Bradford, pp. 149-150; Masters pp. 422-23. The mayor of Washington, D.C., Congressman Vallandigham of Ohio and a large portion of the Maryland legislature were jailed.
  36. Davis, pp. 69-70.
  37. It is worth noting that Dr. Goebbels did not overlook the Northern campaign techniques. German propaganda in the Second World War cited Union conduct as an example of what Europe could expect if the Americans were to begin their crusading on a broad scale. Evidently the Nazis felt the Lincoln government would be a model for the Roosevelt government. An example of this propaganda is printed in the English language version of *Signal*.
  38. Joseph T. Derry, A.M., edited by General Clements A. Evans, *Georgia: Confederate Military History* (Secaucus, New Jersey: The Blue and Gray Press), Volume IV, p. 360.
  39. Derry, pp. 360-69; Masters, pp. 455-62. See also F.J.P. Veale, *The Veale File, Volume I: Advance to Barbarism* (Torrance, California: Institute for Historical Review, 1979), p. 122: "Sherman only executed the most dramatic and devastating example of the strategy that was laid down by President Lincoln himself... That Lincoln determined the basic lines of Northern military strategy has been well established in such books as Collin R. Ballard's *The Military Genius of Abraham Lincoln* and T. Harry Williams' *Lincoln and His Generals*. Grant only efficiently applied Lincoln's military policy in the field..."
  40. *Atlanta Journal Constitution, Atlanta Weekly Magazine*, April 3, 1983, p. 22.
  41. Strode, *Jefferson Davis, Confederate President*, p. 125.
  42. Sandburg, Vol. 4, p. 176. *The New York Times* comment on this incident is revealing as well: "The order, to be sure, was promptly set aside by the President but the affront to the Jews conveyed by its issue was not so easily effaced. A committee of Jews took it upon themselves to *thank* [emphasis in original] President Lincoln at Washington for so promptly annulling the odious order. Against the conduct of this committee the bulk of Jews vehemently protest. They say that they have no thanks for an act of simple and imperative justice — but grounds for deep and just complaint against the Government, that General Grant has not been dismissed from the service."
  43. Strode, pp. 289-90.
  44. *op. cit.*, p. 290.
  45. *op. cit.*, pp. 290-91.
  46. *op. cit.*, p. 291.
  47. *op. cit.*, p. 500.
  48. *op. cit.*, pp. 500-501.
  49. *op. cit.*, p. 501.
  50. There is an Irish song of the era that goes:

"Hey, boys, do take my advice,

"To America I'd have you not to be coming,  
 "For there's nothin' here but war,  
 "Where the murderin' cannon roar,  
 "And I wish I was back in dear ole Erin."

The song refers to "Mr. Lincoln's war" and being handed a gun upon arrival at the pier.

51. Strode, pp. 111-13.
52. *Confederate Veteran Magazine*, January-February, 1986, p. 7.
53. Davis, pp. 191-92.
54. *Ibid.*
55. Robert Werlich, "*Beast*" Butler: *The Incredible Career of Union Major General Benjamin F. Butler* (Washington, D.C.: The Quaker Press, 1962), p. 39.
56. Werlich, pp. 89-90.
57. Masters, pp. 422-23.
58. Johnson, p. 125.
59. General Henry Halleck, General in Chief of the Union Armies, wrote to Sherman in 1864: "It seems little better than murder to give important commands to men such as Banks, Butler, McClelland, Sigel and Lew. Wallace, and yet it seems impossible to prevent it." (Quoted in Johnson, p. 90.) Lincoln's search for a politically "right" general continued.
60. Sandburg, Vol. 5, pp. 665-69 SE.
61. Sandburg, pp. 548-49 RD.
62. Clifford Dowdy, *Lee* (New York: Bonanza Books, 1965), p. 295.
63. Stephen B. Oates, *Abraham Lincoln: The Man Behind the Myths* (New York: New American Library, 1984), p. 143. Oates is a liberal who mustered plenty of information about Lincoln's radicalism.
64. Oates, p. 145.
65. Cost of the war to the South: approximately 100,000 battle deaths, 200,000 disease deaths, 230,000 wounded of 850,000 in service. Approximately 62% casualties for the entire war. It has been estimated that 75% of all Southern white males of military age served in the Confederate armies. (Johnson)

## *The Persecution of P.G. Wodehouse*

ROBERT A. HALL, JR.

**T**he noted Anglo-American humorist Pelham Grenville Wodehouse (1881–1975) led, up to 1940, a life which was professionally very active and successful, but devoid of striking or soul-shaking experiences.<sup>1</sup> In that year, however, there occurred an event which changed the course of his life very drastically for the next six years, and cast a lasting, though gradually diminishing, shadow over the rest of his existence until his death on February 14, 1975. He and his wife were living semi-permanently at Le Touquet, in France. The town was captured by the Germans on May 22, 1940, and on July 21, he, with the other male aliens in Le Touquet, were sent off to internment-centers, first at Huy in Belgium and then at Tost in Upper Silesia. His internment lasted until June 21, 1941, on which date he was released (solely because he was almost sixty) and was sent to Berlin, where he was joined by his wife (who had been detained in France).

Up to this point, nothing untoward had happened except the detainment itself. Soon after arriving in Berlin, however, he undertook to write and record five talks describing his experiences as British Civilian Prisoner no. 796. The talks were intended to reassure his American friends that he was well, and to give a humorous description of his experience as an internee. They were made for broadcasting to the United States, with which Germany

was, at the time, not at war. They were, nevertheless, also broadcast later (without Wodehouse's having been consulted) to England. Their actual content was simply a straightforward narrative, wholly unpolitical (as can be seen by reading their actual texts<sup>2</sup>). The German authorities must have been quite insensitive to Wodehouse's brand of humor, because the over-all effect of the talks was to show what fools his SS jailers and the other army-men were. We are told<sup>3</sup> that the American army used the Wodehouse talks, later during the war, as prize examples of subtle anti-German propaganda.

In England, however, the fact of his having made the broadcasts aroused a storm of indignation, much of it whipped up artificially by the British Broadcasting Corporation and the newspapers. In the B.B.C.'s defense, it must be said that its directors at first objected, but were ordered by the Government to undertake the slander-campaign against Wodehouse.<sup>4</sup> The British public was in a state of rage against Germany because of the pounding England had been taking from the air, and were all too ready to have a scapegoat on whom to vent their anger. As Jasen says:

Comparatively few people actually heard the talks, but the mere knowledge that they had been given on the German radio was enough to whip the British press into a frenzy of hate and vituperation. Without checking the facts and without giving the astonished public a hint of what Plum [*i.e.* Wodehouse] had said in his broadcasts, the papers reviled him and accused him — placing him on a par with the arch-traitor known as Lord Haw-Haw.<sup>5</sup>

After the saturation-bombing of Berlin began in 1943, Wodehouse and his wife were permitted to move to Paris, where they remained until 1947. Two British officers, Major Malcolm Muggeridge and Major E.J.P. Cussen, were sent to interview Wodehouse. Although both reported that there was no evidence that he had intentionally given any aid to the enemy, nevertheless, Wodehouse and his wife were subjected to a certain amount of harassment by both the British and the French authorities. Some of his English enemies (such as a certain Quintin Hogg, later Lord Hailsham) demanded that he brought back to England and tried for treason.<sup>6</sup>

Wodehouse and his wife left France in 1947 for the United States, where he remained for the rest of his life. Even after his arrival in America, he was harassed, this time by the United States Treasury, with preposterous claims for allegedly unpaid income-taxes, dating as far back as 1923. The case dragged out for over two and a half years, and was finally decided in his favor on three out of four counts.<sup>7</sup>

The accusations made against Wodehouse have, in the last forty years, all been refuted, although uninformed persons still repeat them on occasion, either with the general assertion that "somehow Wodehouse blotted his copy-book during the war," or with more specific, though completely unfounded, statements.<sup>8</sup> The best way of dealing with these falsehoods is to enumerate them, one by one, together with the truth, in parallel columns. This I shall do in three sections, dealing with his aim in broadcasting his talks over the German radio, his personal character, and his actions.<sup>9</sup>

## I. Wodehouse's Broadcasting

### The Lies

1. Wodehouse broadcast for the Nazis.
2. He broadcast Nazi propaganda.
3. He was comparable to William Joyce ("Lord Haw-Haw").
4. He was comparable to Charles A. Lindbergh, in aiding the enemies of democracy.
5. Wodehouse was a slacker, having fought in neither war.

### The Truth

Wodehouse broadcast for himself, to send word of his experience to his friends in America.

He sent only information about his personal experiences, with absolutely no pro-German propaganda.

Joyce's aim was to persuade Britain to cease fighting Germany; Wodehouse made no reference to any such concerns.

Lindbergh's position was based on political and military considerations; Wodehouse was notoriously unpolitical.

He had applied to enter the British navy in 1914 and had been rejected because of poor eyesight; in 1939, he was too old.

## II. Personal Character

1. Wodehouse was a rich idler and a playboy.

No professional writer ever worked harder than Wodehouse to earn his pay; his critics were confusing him with his characters, such as Bertie Wooster and the Drones Club.<sup>10</sup>

2. He was an income-tax dodger.

He had been harassed during the 1930's by both the British and the American authorities, with claims which were later dismissed in large part.<sup>11</sup>

3. He expressed sympathy for Nazism.

He was almost completely uninterested in politics, and in 1939 had satirized the British Fascist Sir Oswald Mosley in the character of Roderick Spode.<sup>12</sup>

4. He was anti-Jewish.

He was in no wise anti-Jewish (or, for that matter, anti-any-group).<sup>13</sup>

### III. His Actions

1. The Wodehouses lived in luxury, for free, at the Adlon in Berlin, as a reward for having made the broadcasts.

The Adlon was the only place where they were allowed to live, and Wodehouse had to pay for their lodging and food, in part from his German royalties and in part from the sale of some of Mrs. Wodehouse's jewelry.<sup>14</sup>

2. Wodehouse made false statements against Jews, Belgians, and French patriots.

He made no such statements; the allegations that he did so emanated from untrustworthy sources (especially the B.B.C.'s propagandists) and have been demonstrated to have been pure inventions.

The outcry against Wodehouse gradually died down, and was generally regarded as definitively ended when he was given a (much belated) knighthood in January, 1975, only a month before his death.<sup>15</sup> The government's dossier on Wodehouse was still kept secret, however, until Iain Sproat finally persuaded the authorities to make the documents available to him in 1980. Nothing was found in them to warrant the attack to which Wodehouse had been subjected both during and after the war.

Why, then, was he persecuted in this way? Primarily because, from various points of view, he was a "sitting duck," a very

convenient target for governmental propaganda at a time when popular emotions were strongest and most irrational. Very few people in England had actually heard the Berlin broadcasts, and at the same time very many were ready to believe any propaganda, without verification, against anyone who was alleged to be traitorously aiding the Nazis. Being in Germany, Wodehouse did not know of the current emotional state of the British public, and, even if he had known, he was in no position to defend himself.

The same motive may well have been at work in the United States Treasury Department's post-war harassment of Wodehouse. As is well known,<sup>16</sup> during and after Henry Morgenthau, Jr.'s tenure of the Secretaryship of the Treasury, that department was very extensively involved in determining American foreign policy, and was extensively staffed with fanatically anti-German personnel. The decision to press untenable claims against Wodehouse may have emanated from such elements in the Treasury, on the basis of his undeserved reputation for having "collaborated" with the Nazis.<sup>17</sup> The validity of this hypothesis can, of course, not be determined until such information as is still extant in the Treasury files is made available to the public.

The basic moral of the "Wodehouse case" is, not that it is undesirable to refrain from "hating in the plural," but that persons with such an out-look should be more aware than he was of the readiness of others to yield to emotionally based mass-hatreds or to exploit them for political purposes. Persons of the Wodehouse type should also be cautious about engaging in activities which can be maliciously misinterpreted and used as pretexts for hostility and persecution.

### Notes

1. There are good summaries of his life-history in several biographies, e.g. David A. Jasen, *P.G. Wodehouse, A Portrait of a Master* (New York: Mason and Lipscomb, 1974; new, revised edition, New York: Continuum, 1981); Benny Green: *P.G. Wodehouse, A Literary Biography* (London: Pavilion Books and New York: The Rutledge Press, 1981); Frances Donaldson: *P.G. Wodehouse, A Biography* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, and New York: Alfred Knopf, 1981).
2. Reproduced in their entirety in Iain Sproat: *Wodehouse at War* (London: Milner and New Haven [Conn.]: Ticknor and Fields, 1981), pp. 108-28.
3. Richard J. Voorhees: *P.G. Wodehouse* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1966), p. 41, ascribing this information to Malcolm Muggeridge. The same story is told by R.B.D. French: *P.G. Wodehouse* (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1966; New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967), p. 116, but without mention of Muggeridge.

4. Cf. the accounts given in almost all biographies of Wodehouse, e.g. Jasen's (*op. cit.*, pp. 181-82), or Lady Donaldson's (*op. cit.*, pp. 218-21).
5. *Op. cit.*, p. 180.
6. Cf. Jasen, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-87; Lady Donaldson, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-245.
7. He wrote to his friend William Townend (*Performing Flea*, letter of May 22, 1945): "They have now gone back to 1925 and claim that I made no return that year or in 1924. I have absolutely no means of proving that I did, but I must have done. I was in America both years and left for England, and you can't get on a boat at New York unless you have paid your income tax."
8. In his *Wodehouse at War*, which is the best and the most detailed account of the entire sorry mess, Iain Sproat states (p. 31) that a certain senior politician, whom he does not name, declared as late as 1980 "Oh, yes, I know all about the Wodehouse case. The man was an out-and-out traitor. He was anti-Churchill. He broadcast propaganda for the Nazis."
9. To save space, I have not given detailed footnote references for each item separately; they are all dealt with in detail in the sources mentioned in the preceding notes, especially the books by Jasen, Sproat, and Lady Donaldson.
10. As pointed out specifically by Wodehouse's friend Denis Mackail, whom Jasen (*op. cit.*, p. 193) cites as having contrasted the accusation made by the journalist William Connor ("Cassandra") that Wodehouse was a "play-boy" with the fact that the latter was actually "the most industrious author I have ever known."
11. Lady Donaldson emphasizes this point by dedicating to it an entire chapter dealing with his troubles from 1932 to 1939, and entitling it "Income Tax" (Chapter 6, pp. 135-53).
12. In *The Code of the Woosters* (1939), Spode is a highly offensive, aggressive, over-bearing, gorilla-like character, the leader of the British "Black Shorts," a clear satire on Mussolini and Hitler.
13. Cf. my article "Was Wodehouse Anti-Jewish?" in my *Papers on Wodehouse* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Linguistica, 1985), with a definitely negative response to the question in the title. It is reported that when, after the war, Wodehouse was urged to declare that he hated the Nazis, he replied, "I don't hate in the plural." He was very much aware that there are too many individual differences among the members of any group to justify judging it *en masse*. As Edmund Burke said, in his *Second Speech on Conciliation with America* (1775), "I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against an whole people." Such attitudes are not popular, however, at a time when mass-hatreds are being aroused and exploited by politicians during and after a war.
14. Mrs. Wodehouse was by no means popular at the Adlon, because of her flamboyant, irresponsible behavior (cf. Lady Donaldson's account of Ethel Wodehouse's actions, pp. 234-235).
15. He is reported to have said, concerning the knighthood, "I think it's sort of a graceful act on the part of the government — sort of their way of saying that's that."
16. For Morgenthau's role in taking the United States' foreign policy out of the hands of the State Department, and in establishing such agencies

as the War Refugee Board, cf. John Morton Blum: *Roosevelt and Morgenthau* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), pp. 520-33; or any biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt (e.g., most recently, Ted Morgan: *F.D.R.: A Biography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), pp. 703-05).

17. Sproat (*op. cit.*, pp. 104-05) ascribes the long delay in releasing the Home Office's dossier on Wodehouse to two factors: a desire to protect the name of some man who travelled with Wodehouse from Tost to Berlin, and an intent on the part of bureaucrats to cover up their own or their colleagues' errors for as long as possible. We may wonder whether, perhaps, a third factor may have been the efforts of anti-Germany elements in the British bureaucracy, similar to those in the United States Treasury, to keep Wodehouse's name blackened for as long as they could.

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## *Book Reviews*

**ORWELL: THE WAR COMMENTARIES**, Edited and with an introduction by W.J. West. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986, 253 pp., \$18.95.

*Reviewed by Jeff Rigenbach*

George Orwell, too, had feet of clay. This will come as no surprise to some, of course. There are at least a few who know already, and a much smaller number who have long known, that no human being ever lives fully up to the standards and expectations of another — not even when the actions on which he or she is to be judged are severely restricted to a narrow and circumscribed realm, like the realm of literature or the realm of philosophy or, as in the present case, the realm of intellectual integrity.

One problem with expecting intellectual integrity from someone is that intellectual integrity is by no means universally recognized as a thing to be desired. At bottom, intellectual integrity means consistency of thought. And consistency of thought has had its prominent detractors for more than a century.

"A foolish consistency," Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote in 1841, "is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do."

"If you are bound to your past hour," Max Stirner wrote three years later, "if you must babble today because you babbled yesterday, if you cannot transform yourself each instant, you feel yourself fettered to slavery and benumbed." "If I am required to be consistent," Stirner complained, "would I not be bound today and henceforth to my will of yesterday?... My creature — to wit, a particular expression of (my) will — would have become my commander.... Because I was a fool yesterday I must remain such my life long."

"Do I contradict myself?" Walt Whitman asked in 1855. "Very

well, then, I contradict myself; I am large — I contain multitudes.”

“The question is,” Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty declared in 1872, “which is to be master” — words, or the human beings who invent and use them?

“Consistency,” said Oscar Wilde, “is the last refuge of the unimaginative.”

Still, most of us — especially those idealistic youngsters among us who are most susceptible to Orwell’s peculiar charm and therefore most likely to adopt him as a kind of secular saint — persist in seeing virtue in “practicing what you preach.”

Those who know Orwell best, however, know that it is not at all clear what ideas we should expect him to have practiced, because it is not at all clear what ideas he held. Those who knew him in life agree that he had a quality of great earnestness and sincerity about him, and this quality certainly comes through for most of us in his best writing. But if you look at Orwell’s *œuvre* as a coherent whole, you soon find yourself uncertain as to exactly what he did believe.

This uncertainty is only complicated further by the fact that Orwell expressed himself so often through the mode of fiction. It is much more difficult to be confident as to just what a writer is trying to tell you if he dramatizes his message in a story rather than putting it before you straightforwardly in expository prose. This is why, today, both conservative cold warriors like Norman Podhoretz and democratic socialist peace advocates like Irving Howe claim with equal certainty that if Orwell were alive today he would be on their side.

Even in his journalism, however, Orwell is hard to pin down. As his friend and biographer George Woodcock writes, “he was mainly concerned with the implementation of those fairly general ideas which he brought together under the heading of ‘decency,’ ideas like brotherhood, fair play and honest dealing which he had absorbed from writers like Dickens.”

“What concerned him much more deeply than political programs,” Woodcock continues, “were...general principles of conduct, particularly conduct affecting other men.” To Orwell, “it was important to tell the truth. It was important to preserve the objectivity of history. It was important, above all, to create a world in which every man’s right to self-respect would be jealously preserved.”

“It was when he talked to me about the state,” Woodcock recalls, “that Orwell seemed particularly confused. On one side he was still influenced by the traditions of the sahib class into which he had been born, traditions of dedicated public service coupled with the

wielding of unchallenged authority. But he also cultivated an anti-authoritarian strain of thought that was never far from the surface in his reactions to established government. So there were occasions when he would speak...of extensive and disciplined nationalization of industries, of state control over wide sectors of social life. But at other times — and here I felt his real inclinations were emerging — he seemed to envisage a decentralized society...with a great deal of room for individual initiative. Similarly, he would argue that authors should be state-supported, and at other times appear to contradict himself by maintaining that the less a writer had to do with any organized body, the better for him and his work.”

Of course, Woodcock is speaking here of Orwell's conversation, not his published work. But as he makes clear in his classic study *The Crystal Spirit* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), from which the foregoing quotations have been extracted, it was in Orwell's conversation that his work, especially his journalism, originated.

One would have a conversation with Orwell during the 1940s, Woodcock writes, “and then, a week or two later, one would find that this conversation had become part of his writing and formed the basis for one of his highly readable essays.... I think it was this close relationship between his talk and his writing that enabled Orwell to be at once such a prolific and such a generally successful journalist. Once an idea had taken shape and even a degree of polish in conversation, it was a fairly simple matter to write it down. Some of Orwell's articles, as he admitted rather shamefacedly, were actually typed out immediately and published in their first draft, without any substantial revision.”

Still, it is his less definite, more ambiguous novels that reach the widest audience and win Orwell most of his most fervent disciples. To the young reader who has just discovered *Nineteen Eighty-four* and *Animal Farm*, it seems obvious that Orwell is a crusader for truth, individual liberty and the use of the English language — or any language — to express truth and convey beauty rather than to subvert thought and perpetuate tyranny. And for such a reader, the biggest revelation of *Orwell: The War Commentaries* is likely to be the news that this fighter for truth and justice spent a good part of World War II as a propagandist for the British government, using the English language to mislead and to preserve the undeserved loyalty of a foreign people, a people long oppressed by the British government, a people whose freedom from British domination was a cause he had long given many readers and friends plenty of reason to believe that he fervently supported.

The people in question were the people of India, and Orwell's job

was to research, write, and in a few cases to deliver on the air, weekly radio "commentaries"—news summaries would be a more accurate term — on how the war was going up to the time of broadcast. The summaries were written for the Indian section of the Eastern Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and were beamed into India from December 1941 through mid-March 1943.

As has been noted, Orwell often worked out the ideas for his more topical writing in conversation. Also, like many other great writers, he tended to write not just for the eye and the intellect, but also for what might be called "the mind's ear." He wrote, that is, with attention to the sound and rhythm, as well as the sense, of his sentences. Orwell was, therefore, a natural for the medium of radio.

But why was he given this particular assignment by the BBC? Radio was, of course, the television of the 1940s. Television itself existed at that time. The BBC itself had pioneered regularly scheduled television broadcasting in the 1930s. But too few people owned television sets at the outset of World War II for the technology to have much potential as a source of information for the general population, and the war temporarily halted the process by which the manufacture of sets and their placement in homes had been steadily accelerating. For almost everyone alive at the time, the fastest way to learn of events that had just taken place halfway around the world was to listen to the radio.

This is not to say that radio did for World War II what television did for the Vietnam War. Listeners in the early 1940s were not able to hear the battles of the war as they occurred. The news they received from their radio sets was often several days old and was often based on reports which broadcasters had no way of checking. Nevertheless, radio represented a major improvement over the newspapers on which people had had to rely for information during World War I. Thanks to radio, civilian populations during World War II were better informed than civilian populations had ever before been during wartime.

They were also better proselytized. The Axis powers had realized early on that radio could facilitate the dissemination of propaganda as well as the dissemination of "straight news." Aiming broadcasts into enemy territory had much more potential than dropping leaflets from the air.

Among the Axis broadcasts aimed at undermining the British war effort during 1941 and 1942 was a series directed at India from Berlin and masterminded by the exiled Indian nationalist, Subhas Chandra Bose. It was these broadcasts which Orwell was specifically assigned to counter.

India was a major source of military manpower for the Allies, particularly in its African campaigns. It was also something of a powder keg — a country in which an already strong nationalist movement was commanding more and more public support. The British could ill afford to fight a civil war in India at a time when the battle against the Axis powers was already severely taxing its resources. Nor did the British want to risk losing or even weakening their control of India at such a crucial moment. The major figures in the Indian nationalist movement — men like Gandhi and Nehru — were committed to non-violence, and an independent India under their leadership might therefore be neutral in the war. This would deny the Allies access to an important source of troop strength.

All these same considerations made Axis propagandists eager to make what they could of the Indian situation by encouraging the more militant nationalists. Not only could they create problems for the Allies by helping to bring about independence for India, they might also create some solutions for themselves. India, was, for example, rich in certain natural resources which were crucial to the war effort, but which the Axis powers sorely lacked. The most notable of these was rubber — a commodity whose scarcity in Germany led the Reich to invest vast resources in the development of synthetic substitutes. And even if an independent India were neutral in the war, it might well look favorably on trade with nations that had aided its quest for freedom from the British.

For this reason, the German government was happy, early in the 1941, to provide sanctuary to Bose, a major leader of the more militant Indian nationalists and a recent escapee from imprisonment by the British. By the end of that year, the Reich was providing Bose with more than sanctuary. It was financing both his Berlin-based Free India Radio news service and his plan to build an "Indian Army of Liberation in the West" by retraining Indian prisoners of war then being held in Germany and Italy. This special fighting force was to be used eventually to liberate India from British control. The idea for such an Army of Liberation may seem fanciful to some readers today, but in fact it grew to a size of some 3500 men before the Allied victory ended its existence.

Much of this historical background information is to be found in the Introduction, the Appendix and the notes which W.J. West had provided for *Orwell: The War Commentaries*. (The Appendix, which is especially helpful, includes the text of several of Bose's broadcasts over Free India Radio.) But for much of it, I was forced to turn to other sources, including West's earlier volume, *Orwell:*

*The Lost Writings* (New York: Arbor House, 1985), a collection of mostly literary scripts Orwell wrote for the BBC during the same period. (Both volumes are compiled from materials recently uncovered by West in the BBC archives.) Time and again, the reader of *The War Commentaries* is referred to the earlier volume for supplementary information. On occasion, he is referred to the earlier volume even for essential information — information without which it would be impossible to assess the importance, the truthfulness or the purpose of Orwell's news summaries. This may be an effective strategy for selling two books instead of one, or for saving the publisher money on the price of paper for the second volume, but it is an annoyance and a disservice to the serious reader.

Nor is this the only fault the serious reader will find with this book. There are also a few curious, apparent lapses of scholarship. At one point, for example, when Orwell refers in a news summary dated 4 April 1942 to the "paid Indian mouthpieces" of the Japanese, West notes that this is "one of Orwell's very rare references to his main opponent, Subhas Chandra Bose and his supporters." In fact, however, Subhas Chandra Bose did not move his operations to Japan, or begin working closely with the Japanese on common goals, until nearly a year later. Orwell's reference was probably to another Bose, Rashbehari Bose, a militant Indian nationalist who had made his home in Japan since around the time of World War I.

The most important failure of West's book, however, lies not with its editor's scholarship, but in the fundamentally uninteresting character of its contents. Pieces that were written to be read aloud on radio and then forgotten are seldom effective in printed form, especially if they are, as in the present case, for example, highly repetitive. A radio writer cannot assume that the audience this week was also listening the week before, and he certainly cannot assume that all his listeners have tuned in faithfully every week from the beginning of his broadcasts. Therefore, he repeats certain essential items of information week after week, script after script, so that those who have just tuned in can understand what is being said. In a book, such endless repetition is deadening. One can only bear being told about the potential importance to the Japanese of the Burma Road as a supply route so many times before the impulse to skip and skim becomes irresistible.

Moreover, these pieces contain almost no political analysis — no "commentary," in the strict sense of that word. The analytical content of all 49 pieces collected here, if put together, would

scarcely fill one page. In part, this may be the result of censorship. Each of Orwell's scripts had to be submitted to a censor before being broadcast. Also, analysis seems not to have been a part of Orwell's job in preparing these scripts. They appear to have been intended primarily as news reports. They are "slanted," of course, in the sense that they obviously regard the Allied cause with favor. But their slant becomes evident more through simple sloganeering than through any kind of thoughtful discussion of issues.

Orwell writes, for example, that the war is an effort by "the free nations of the world" to "put an end to Fascist aggression." One wonders if the Soviet Union qualified in those days as one of "the free nations of the world." We know that Orwell and other BBC propagandists were under explicit pressure to soft pedal or avoid any criticism of the Stalin regime, which only a short time before, during the period of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact, had been a favorite target of official criticism by the British. West quotes at length from an official memorandum that established guidelines for writers like Orwell on this issue. It delineates important "differences" between the Soviet and German styles of dictatorship which supposedly justify cooperating with the one and working indefatigably for the destruction of the other. This memo is curiously reminiscent of more recent attempts by certain conservatives to explain why we should fight to the death against "totalitarian" regimes but be willing to ally ourselves with "authoritarian" regimes, no matter how repressive they may be.

In other scripts Orwell writes of the virtual unanimity of public support for the Allied cause. He informs his listeners that opposition by Americans "to the idea of being involved in a war abroad, and specially in Europe," which had been common before the United States entered the war, "has entirely disappeared," and that "the ordinary people" of England "would welcome greater sacrifices" if they would aid the war effort. As West notes, these comments bear a certain resemblance to the government broadcasts in *Nineteen Eighty-four*, with their incessant talk of the happiness with which the common people accept sacrifice as the price of Oceania's victory against whatever nation is its enemy of the moment.

It is well known that the World War II-era BBC was Orwell's model for the satanic Ministry of Truth in *Nineteen Eighty-four*. Why did Orwell consent to do the work of an institution which he regarded as having within it the seed of so monstrous an evil? As George Woodcock explains it, Orwell was "a thorough English patriot, dedicated to defending the people and the countryside of

England even if he had little use for most of its existing institutions." Also, Woodcock writes, "he believed that the left-wing libertarian socialism which he had adopted in 1936 could only survive if the Nazis were defeated." W.J. West concurs with this image of Orwell and adds that while he "believed passionately that India ought to be given her freedom at the earliest possible moment," he "also saw clearly that there were far greater dangers for the Indian people in domination by a non-English-speaking totalitarian power than in the mere continuation of British rule for a few more years, or even until the war ended."

Orwell told George Woodcock in 1942 that "I doubt whether I shall stay in this job much longer, but while here I consider that I have kept our propaganda slightly less disgusting than it might otherwise have been." He resigned the following year, and took a job as literary editor of a left-wing London paper, *The Tribune*. The work he had done for the BBC, as this collection makes clear, was by no means "disgusting." It was, however, consistently mundane and virtually without intellectual content. Orwell completists and serious students of World War II propaganda will want to own this book. Most general readers, however, will probably want to pass it by. It won't afford them much entertainment or edification, and it may well undermine any delusions they have about the purity of heart and the intellectual integrity of the author of *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-four*.

**TAKING SIDES: AMERICA'S SECRET RELATIONS WITH A MILITANT ISRAEL** by Stephen Green. New York: William Morrow and Co., 1984.

*Reviewed by Robert Atelier*

**T**his excellent, heavily-documented and footnoted book should indeed, as the blurb on the inside dust-jacket promises, "cause major reassessments in the published literature in this field, at least as far as mainstream sources are concerned." Mr. Green has waded through an ocean of official (American) sources — filing over a hundred Freedom of Information Act requests — and has been personally responsible for the de-classification of many documents important to historians of the very strange relationship between Israel and the United States 1948–1967. (A companion volume — hopefully out very soon — will continue tracing the history of this relationship up to the present day.) The documents reproduced in

facsimile and plain text in the appendix to the book are a goldmine in themselves, well worth the price of the book alone.

The text of the book itself, then, can almost be considered a bonus. Stephen Green thoughtfully (but thoroughly) debunks many of the shibboleths of Israeli-American relations, such as the "accidental" nature of the bombing of the United States Ship *Liberty*, the myth of "Poor defenseless Israel surrounded by her overwhelming enemies," the related "miracle" victory of 1948 (which some religious leaders in the United States have set much stock in), and, perhaps most frightening of all, the blind eye turned by the American government to Israeli attempts to obtain nuclear material and atomic weapons technology. Perhaps none of this is new to the readers of *JHR*, but *Taking Sides* is able to shed new light on these matters through its use of formerly-classified sources.

If I have any bones to pick with the author, it is with his attempt to distinguish between the "bad" militaristic wing of the Zionist movement who have been encouraged by the U.S. (despite many a Zionist kick in the teeth to Uncle Sam!), and the "more humanistic" elements in the Israeli government. (Little is said about the non-government underground resistance to Israeli militarism.) Stephen Green's book itself tends to show how the Moshe Sharets of Israel have tended, willingly or unwillingly, to act as window dressing — ineffective, ignored, and discarded when their criticism or noncooperation with militaristic plans becomes too inconvenient.

Other than that, a good and thoughtful book, deserving more than the "anti-Semitic" and "Pro-P.L.O." smears which, I suppose (alas!), are inevitable.

**IT HAPPENED IN OUR LIFETIME** by John Phillips. N.Y. and Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1985, copyright by Time, Inc., 277 pp., illustrated with 445 black & white photos, \$24.95, ISBN 0-316-70609-4.

*Reviewed by H. Keith Thompson*

**I**n 1985 John Phillips published his *It Happened In Our Lifetime: A Memoir in Words and Pictures*. The former *Life* magazine photo-journalist reports on his many assignments from 1936 into the post-war period.

As is, I suppose, to be expected with any establishment mass-media journalist or photo-journalist, Phillips is consistently anti-Nazi, and anti-German. Nevertheless, he does some small service

by pointing out that there were large and articulate German minorities in Romania, and especially in that Frankensteinian-crafted country, Czechoslovakia, a significant plurality of whom advocated *Anschluss* by the Reich.

For example, perhaps it's too much to expect him to know that the German "Knödel" (dumplings) is the obvious parent of Czech "knödlike." It's also the less obvious parent of French "quenelle," which, like "quiche" (from German "Kuchen"), entered French via German-speaking Alsace. Phillips relates an idiotic story of his Czech driver's distress at the breakup of Czechoslovakia and the driver's even greater distress at being able to find no "knödliki" as the German troops arrived to the delight and for the liberation of the Sudeten natives. Phillips seems to confuse "Sudeten" with "Southern" and frequently makes that error. Nevertheless, a careful perusal of his photos makes it abundantly clear that the Sudeten Germans were in fact expressing their right of "self-determination" and achieving it when they were incorporated into the Reich. That right had been cynically, viciously, and brutally denied them by the Allies when they concocted "Czechoslovakia."

In another section of his book, "Retribution in Prague," Phillips does some grisly gloating and shows ghoulish photos he took of "war criminal" Dr. Josef Pfitzner's sentencing and hanging in the fall of 1945.

Pfitzner, a former professor of History at Prague's German University, as Phillips points out, had been deputy mayor of Prague during the war.

Pfitzner was accused of having affirmed that Prague was founded and built by Germans. The *Karlsuniversität* was in fact the first German University, older even than Heidelberg. The outcome of the "trial" was a foregone conclusion although Phillips seems to think it was a legal model. After defending himself (in Czech), Pfitzner, when taken to the gallows, moments before his judicial murder, cried out, "Ich sterbe für Deutschland" (I die for Germany).

Another Pfitzner, the composer Hans, left another German borderland, Alsace, when the Americans reconquered it for France in 1918. After the Second World War, the Americans having reconquered Alsace for France once again, the Allies put Hans Pfitzner into one of their concentration camps. He died not long after release. Yet Hans Pfitzner fared better than Josef Pfitzner in Prague.

Another composer, Mozart, was very popular in Prague. Mozart danced to his own *Deutsche Tänze* (German Dances) at the Breitenfeldhall in Prague. Prague and Vienna communicated

musically, and in so many ways, through the centuries.

Nothing is lost in History. All is recycled, including martyred history professors and mayors of Prague. And it may not be at all as Phillips saw it, when he snapped his prurient camera on the mutilated corpse of Prague's former deputy mayor.

So much in Europe, in the world, was recycled wrongly, largely due to evil, ignorant American intervention in two world wars.

Interestingly enough, one German source in Bohemia continues to flow, to bring currency to Czech coffers. Joachimsthal may no longer mine silver for dollars, but dollars flow to the Communist marketers of "*Pilsener Urquell*," that famous Bohemian beer, whose name means "Original Source of Pilsen." Its quality has declined, of course, since the days Bohemia was German. But at least the name remains. Blood flowed in Bohemia. The Gods recycle it and make their eternal cakes and "Knödel."

**RUSSIA AGAINST JAPAN, 1904-05: A NEW LOOK AT THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR** by J.N. Westwood. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1986, \$34.50 Hb.

*Reviewed by Samuel Edward Konkin III*

**E**ver wonder what a Revisionist book might read like if it were published by, and with the consent of, the Establishment? If such could happen, it would have to be about an obscure little war whose impact on modern ruling relations was considered unexceptional. Such a book was published this year by SUNY in Rockefeller-land, written by an Honorary Research Fellow at Birmingham University in Round-Table Rhodes country.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904 is nearly forgotten today; ask anyone for a quick list of the twentieth-century wars. Yet it was fought between the two major empires in Asia, decided not only the new balance of power in the East but also the West, and shifted the perception of modern warfare in the minds of those who would plan the strategies for World War I.

Conspiracy miners will find plenty of nuggets in Westwood's slim tome. Perfidious Albion is deeply involved *against* Russia only two years before the Triple Entente. Both Russian and Japanese court intrigue is covered. And even the finance-capitalists' loans to the belligerents are detailed.

Those *JHR* readers fascinated with the early political role of Zionism will find relevancy in the peace process, which happened

in the U.S.A. in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, with arch-imperialist Theodore Roosevelt acting as arbitrator. Even then, says Westwood,

[Russian statesman and Finance Minister Sergei] Witte also took care to conciliate the American Jewish community, which was influential and could determine the success of any further Russian attempts to raise loans on the American market. Displaying some courage and adaptability, Witte visited the Russian Jewish community where he defended Russian policies in the presence of people who had left Russia to escape the anti-Jewish discrimination and violence of Nicholas's government. As Witte was known to be opposed to governmental anti-semitism, his reception was not unfriendly.<sup>1</sup>

Sergei Witte was the key figure of the Russo-Japanese War in that he created the Russian situation in the Far East, lost control of it in the power struggles, watched the war destroy his efforts and then returned to favor just in time to clean up the mess by negotiating the peace.

The Russo-Japanese War was fought neither on Russian nor Japanese soil. It was the purest imperial war, fought by two now-dead empires. The Russian Empire had all the advantages except proximity; it lost through bureaucracy and decadence. In several battles when Russian troops attacked with high morale and valour they were ordered to retreat following a new strategic theory.

The situation in 1904 can be summed up fairly quickly. Witte had expanded the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria and established a Russian city at Harbin. The fiction of a private railway, Chinese Eastern (CER), covered the sovereignty lapse. The CER was linked to the Russo-Chinese Bank, by which Witte controlled Manchurian finance. Witte portrayed Russia as China's friend against Japan, who had beaten China in the war of 1894-5.

Pseudo-entrepreneurial groups, lead by A.M. Bezobrazov, won the Czar's ear, overruled Witte's cautious, well-worked-out plan, and had Russia expand southward to Port Arthur, the Liaotung Peninsula, and expand the CER branch to Port Arthur. Then the statist speculators moved into Korea, via the tried and true imperialist method.

After several false starts this group had set up its East Asian Development Company. Bezobrazov had frankly described this company as modelled on that of the old British East India Company, and its aim was to exploit a concession in Korea...<sup>2</sup>

Japan thought they had won Korea (a weak kingdom, supposedly independent) and Port Arthur in the Sino-Japanese

War. With the Europeans consolidating their "concessions" in China after the Boxer Rebellion (an anti-imperialist insurgency by "a secret society"), this further advance into what Japan regarded as its rightful sphere of influence was intolerable. In 1902, Japan signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in preparation for war against Russia. Since at least the Crimean War, Russia and Britain had been at odds. As Westwood says, "...in the British press and Parliament 'Russian scares' were as frequent in the nineteenth century as 'red scares' in the twentieth."<sup>3</sup>

The British Empire clearly assisted the Japanese during the war, particularly through their formidable international press control (which pressured the U.S. State to join the British alliance against the Central Powers only a decade later), and actually passed up cases of Russian ships accidentally firing on British trawlers to avoid conflict. Later, the Japanese would uphold the treaty to scoop up the German far-eastern colonies in World War I.

Both sides lied to their people and both suffered domestic political upheaval in return. The Russian State — on the advice of the rehabilitated Witte — gave in to the strikes and mutinies and created the Duma, opening power to the liberal bourgeoisie. But the Japanese, too, suffered "anti-peace riots" when their hardest-lining politician, eking out a fairly favourable settlement, fell drastically below the unrealistic expectations of the deluded populace.

The actual conduct of the war can be summarized simply (Woodward does a credible narrative of the detail). After two years of negotiation with both sides convinced of war's inevitability, the Japanese struck à la Pearl Harbor. In fact, as Pearl was the American Empire's westernmost naval outpost, Port Arthur was Russia's easternmost. The surprise attack was far less successful than Pearl Harbor was to be, but the Russians frittered away time in harbor, running their fleet out eventually, suffered losses, returned to port and suffered final destruction by the land artillery of the slowly encroaching Japanese forces.

The Japanese marched into the Liaotung Peninsula, drove the Russians back from Port Arthur to Mukden, and captured the Manchurian capital — all to heavy losses from *Banzai* charges. Port Arthur fell after a long siege. Unbelievably, at this point the Russians were stronger than ever, their reinforcements finally arriving over the railway, while the Japanese were drafting bottom-of-the-barrel, aged reserves and their officer corps was depleted to crisis levels.

The Russians did suffer a decisive defeat: on the sea. The Baltic Fleet sailed through the English Channel, under harassment, around the Cape of Good Hope (smaller ships passed through Suez) and

through the Indian Ocean. The French bent their neutrality to counteract the British and let the Russian ships rest and rendezvous in Madagascar. Germans supplied coaling ships to feed the voracious Russian boilers. (Kaiser Wilhelm supported his cousin the Tsar in Eastern expansion.) After that epic voyage around the globe, the Russian fleet attempted to run the Straits of Tsushima between Korea and Japan to rendezvous with the cruisers raiding out of Vladivostok and ran into the Japanese fleet under Naval Commander Admiral Togo.

Westwood makes a plausible case that the Russian fleet of Admiral Rozhdestvensky could have come out better with a few better breaks; nonetheless, Togo gambled on the classic "crossing the T" tactic and pulled it off. After several hours, and an attempt by some cruisers to break through to Vladivostok, all the Russian capital ships were sunk, surrendered or were scuttled.

(Historical coincidence: The Russian fleet's last safe port had been Cam Ranh Bay in Viet Nam, then French Indo-China. The Soviet fleet uses it again today.)

Both sides were racist; the Russian press portrayed the Japanese as "yellow monkeys" and the Japanese portrayed the Caucasians as subhuman barbarians. But other Asiatics, particularly the Indians suffering under the British imperial yoke, took heart at an Asian victory over Europeans. (The Japanese "Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" propaganda of World War II cashed in on the good will they reaped from this war.) But both sides were fairly careless with the lives of their own soldiers in battle. The Russian reserves mutined on their way home during the 1905 uprising.

Nicholas relieved General Kuropatkin after the fall of Port Arthur and the Battle of Mukden, rightly considering that the land war would swing over to them. But the naval disaster of May 1905 at Tsushima nearly toppled him and he agreed to Roosevelt's offer of arbitration. The Japanese, equally desperate, sought him out first, and accepted his "suggestion" of peace talks on June 10, two days before the Russians. Because it implied a loss of face, it was the first inkling the Japanese populace had that all was not going well. The Japanese ruling caste was willing to go for almost anything that left them intact and in control of Korea. Even though Witte was out-negotiating them, showing remarkable understanding of manipulation of the modern press by "generous leaks," Nicholas gave up the south end of Sakhalin Island to seal the deal without conceding any indemnities. The lack of monetary compensation left Japan deep in the debt of international finance.

Military buffs and wargamers will enjoy *Russia Against Japan*

not only for battle details but also for their impact on World War I. According to Westwood, the military historians studied this conflict for a decade, drawing correct — and erroneous — conclusions. Most of their publishing was lost through bad timing when the guns of August 1914 sounded. All the military protagonists of World War I studied the Russo-Japanese War; most of the Russian generals were veterans and the defeated General, Kuropatkin, “displayed the same quality of bureaucratic caution.”<sup>4</sup> Two of these generals, Samsonov and Rennenkampf, carried their feud to 1914 where Rennenkampf failed to rescue Samsonov at the Battle of Tannenberg, a major German victory.

Though the beloved British balance of power was maintained in the Far East, Russia and Japan maintained a healthy respect for each other for forty years. The Soviet policy continued the Imperial Russian; when Japan was clearly defeated, they moved into Korea back to their 39th parallel division of 1903, recaptured Sakhalin, and reestablished Manchurian control — only to lose it to Emperor Mao after 1949.

Japan preferred war with the U.S. to another round with Russia in 1941.

The war shifted European alliances. Britain was now ready to enter an *entente* with the weakened Russian Empire, especially after the Moroccan crisis of 1905 turned the German Empire into the new prime enemy. Bismarck’s plans to avoid a two-front hostile alliance failed.

Libertarians will enjoy the brief allusions to counter-economic activity of the always-enterprising Chinese on both sides of the war. Although the war was fought on Chinese (and Korean) territory, nobody consulted or cared what the Manchu court thought. The Manchus fell to Sun Yat-Sen’s bourgeois revolt six years later.

Foreshadowing World War I, the Russo-Japanese War ended with massive loss of human lives and economic treasure, loss of faith and “sacred honour,” and an insurgent, revolting populace anxious to reform or sweep away *ancien régimes*. The Russian State, fighting two senseless wars in a decade on foreign soil, for gains incomprehensible to those fighting and paying, reaped the whirlwind of revolution. And the Japanese State, learning all the wrong lessons in the war, collapsed in two mushroom clouds almost exactly forty years after the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed.


## Notes

1. *Op. cit.*, pp. 158-59.
2. *Op. cit.*, p. 13.
3. *Op. cit.*, p. 16.
4. *Op. cit.*, p. 135.

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## TAKING SIDES: AMERICA'S SECRET RELATIONS WITH A MILITANT ISRAEL

By Stephen Green



Why the Middle East is in such turmoil and why it will remain that way unless something radical is done or until World War Three breaks out there.

#618, Hb, 301pp, \$15.00

**AUSCHWITZ: TRUE TALES FROM A GROTESQUE LAND** by Sara Nomberg-Przytyk. Translated by Roslyn Hirsch. Edited by Eli Pfefferkorn and David H. Hirsch. Chapel Hill, NC and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985, xii + 185 pp., ISBN 0-8078-4160-9.

*Reviewed by Theodore J. O'Keefe*

**A**uschwitz: *True Tales from a Grotesque Land* is a collection of stories garnered by Sara Nomberg-Przytyk, allegedly during the year she spent at the Auschwitz concentration camp between January 1944 and January 1945. For the most part the tales she recounts are from the stock repertory of the Auschwitz "survivor": incredible brutality and callousness on the part of the Germans, noble endurance or brutish self-interest among the inmates, poignant romances, miraculous escapes, mass exterminations.

Some of these things Mrs. Nomberg-Przytyk claims to have witnessed; others she has at second or third hand. Dr. Mengele bulks larger than life, as usual, demonic and indefatigable, dispensing lethal injections, tormenting dwarves, and consigning the unfortunate to the gas chambers with his customary gusto. Ilse Koch appears, in a cameo role, as "commander of the camp," presiding over a ceremonial execution which is forestalled by a grisly suicide. Several well-known Auschwitz legends are recounted, including the end of the Gypsy camp; the death of a German NCO, shot by a Jewess with his own pistol; and the escape, recapture, and sad end of two star-crossed lovers.

A number of features of life at Auschwitz as told by the author have an incontestable basis in historical fact. She presents rather well the role of the prisoner hierarchy, which exercised considerable authority over every aspect of the inmates' existence, an authority which by all accounts the prisoner *Kapos* (foremen) and *Blockälteste* (barracks chiefs) often misused. The powerful Communist infrastructure in the camp is touched on (Mrs. Nomberg-Przytyk is anything but unsympathetic to the Communists). Her focus on the Germans' strenuous efforts to safeguard their charges' health in infirmaries, hospitals, and quarantine stations, as well as through preventive measures (baths and gas chambers for delousing inmates and their clothing) is in incongruous contrast to the supposed function of Auschwitz as an extermination center.

Nevertheless, the critical reader, particularly one with some

knowledge of Auschwitz, will have more than a few doubts as to the accuracy of Mrs. Nomberg-Przytyk's stories, even if he is a convinced Exterminationist. Does the author really imagine that Ilse Koch was at Auschwitz? (She was never anywhere near the place.) How could a Greek girl temporarily evade her fate by leaping from a second-story window after being led into the gas chamber, when all the buildings alleged to have housed gas chambers were either of one story or had underground gas chambers? Is it conceivable that Dr. Mengele had his cruel sport with a whole family of full-grown, 50 centimeter-tall midgets (that's less than 20 inches)?

Sara Nomberg-Przytyk's funny way with facts is clearly perturbing to the editors, David H. Hirsch, a professor of English at Brown, and Eli Pfefferkorn, director of research for the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council. In an "Editorial Afterword" the two make a labored analysis. They tell us: "It is one of the still unresolved problems of that body of writings called Holocaust literature that the events seem to overwhelm all attempts to impose formal order, either of literary history or literary criticism. The problem of ordering, categorizing, and interpreting is further exacerbated by the perverse efforts of so-called revisionist historians who deny everything, deny that the Nazis exterminated millions of Jews and others, thereby placing an additional burden on those who wish to study the ways in which imagination modifies memory and fiction vitalizes history."

Sorry, but this won't wash. Either Professor Hirsch has so restricted his scholarship to browsing amid the dry stubble of literary realism that he is incapable of analyzing imaginative literature, or he and his collaborator don't know what literary criticism and literary history are, in which case they might be advised to seek out a qualified scholar of, say, the Homeric question, an expert in Biblical exegesis, or a specialist in the composition and transmission of folk literature.

A third possibility, of course, is that Hirsch and Pfefferkorn are attempting to blur the boundaries between fiction and history relegating the less credible elements of Sara Nomberg-Przytyk's "tales" to the realm of literary fancy, or "dramatization," as they refer to it. It is difficult, after all, to distinguish between the allegedly literary efforts of Mrs. Nomberg-Przytyk and the accounts of such Auschwitz inmates as Filip Müller, whose *Eyewitness Auschwitz: Three Years in the Gas Chambers*, despite its supposed "simple, straightforward language," its lack of "embellishment" and "deviation" (according to Professor Yehuda Bauer's foreword), employs many of the same threadbare literary artifices as *Tales from*

*a Grotesque Land.*

It is instructive that the editors take refuge in a characteristic pronouncement of Holocaust Kabbalist and Nobel Prize winner Elie Wiesel, in reference to his own Holocaust writings: "Things are not that simple, Rebbe. Some events do take place but are not true; other are, although they never occurred" (*Legends of Our Time*, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968, p. viii).

Holocaust Revisionists will not likely be deterred from examining with a cold eye the literature of the concentration camps by such formulas as this. They will continue to wonder at such details as Filip Müller's crematory ovens, supposedly capable of completely disposing of nine corpses per hour, or at the miraculous escape of Sara Nomberg-Przytyk's Fela, who escapes death by hiding in the chimney of the hearse bringing her to the crematorium, and draw their own conclusions about a literature which increasingly seems devoid of either *Dichtung* or *Wahrheit*.

Students of the "Holocaust" will be thankful to the author and her editors for several passages that have the ring of truth, however, particularly that which concludes her book. Sara, who escaped from the Germans in the chaos of the last days of the war (she had been removed from Auschwitz to first one, then another camp in central Germany), makes her way back to the Polish city of Lublin in a freight train crammed with Poles. Keeping her own counsel in the car in which she sits surrounded by the Poles, she muses, "They could strangle me in this terrible car if they found out that I am a Red." Soon they arrive in Lublin, and *Auschwitz: True Tales from a Grotesque Land* closes with these two paragraphs:

At twelve noon the door suddenly slid open. We were in Lublin. I was the first one to leave. As I reached the street, I was greeted by a colorful Easter procession. There was a colorful crowd of women dressed in their native costumes, children, and elegant men. There was no room on the street. All of the balconies and windows were decorated with rugs, flowers, and pictures of the Holy Family.

So this is Poland. I understood the words of the Polish soldiers whom I met on the border: "Don't tell the people you meet that you are a Communist." The fight had not ended. A fight takes time. (p.161)

These ringing words will doubtless discomfit those Poles and Polish-Americans who imagine that there is room on the Holocaust bandwagon for them, too, as will the involvement of Mr. Pfefferkorn from the taxpayer-supported Holocaust Memorial Council. The fact that the team of Pfefferkorn, Hirsch, and Hirsch's wife Roslyn, who translated the book from the original

Polish, were supported at every step in the way by tax-exempt "philanthropy" (The Sigmund Strochlitz Foundation, The Brown Faculty Development Fund, the American Philosophical Society) will likely be of little solace either. Those from less favored ethnic and religious groups may console themselves with the observation that, even though the Holocaust bandwagon is full, there is plenty of room in the traces for willing drayhorses.

## HISTORICAL NEWS AND COMMENT

*Joseph Sobran and Historical Revisionism*

MARK WEBER

One of America's best conservative writers, Joseph Sobran, is currently under fire for his outspoken criticisms of Zionism and, in part, for an implied sympathy for historical Revisionism. Sobran writes a twice-weekly syndicated column that is distributed to about 70 newspapers in the United States. He is also a senior editor of *National Review* magazine.

Sobran's first "thoughtcrime" column, which vigorously defended President Reagan's decision to honor German soldiers buried at Bitburg, appeared in April 1985. In one essay he wrote: "Imputing diabolism to Hitler can be a strategy of pretending that his was a peculiar aberration. This allows us to evade the gross fact that communism has proved a far more potent and persistent evil than Nazism, which was a brief flare-up by comparison." Thus, he wrote, "it strikes me as misleading to speak of Hitler's crimes as 'the Holocaust.' This has been a century of holocausts. There is no 'the' holocaust. We are kidding ourselves if we talk as if there were anything 'unique' about what the Nazis did." Therefore, we "have no right to denounce 'the Holocaust' as long as we shut our eyes to the (communist) holocaust in progress."

In another column a few days later, Sobran wrote: "Along with those who care deeply about what Hitler did to the Jews, there are the Elmer Gantry's who inevitably attach themselves to every legitimate cause. In the '60s we were manipulated by people who used the memory of slave ships to extort moral deference and expressions of white guilt, which were parlayed into political power and — the bottom line — money. The same thing is now being done with Hitler's mass murders. If you don't condemn them in the prescribed ritual ways, the guilt-mongers will find a way to lump you with Hitler himself." Sobran jokingly added that, because of its obsession with one particular chapter of history, *The New York Times*, "really ought to change its name to Holocaust Update."

The Sobran columns that raised the most hackles appeared during April and May 1986. One raised an issue that hasn't been mentioned in the "respectable" American press for more than four decades. Sobran quoted from the Talmud to point out that, besides the legacy of Christian animosity towards Jews, there is also a little-

known but very real history of Jewish hostility against Christians. Unfortunately, Sobran wrote, the public gets "a false and distorted history, the sort of history one gets when one reads too many newspapers and not enough books."

Sobran came under especially vicious attack for a May 1986 column that included a few words of qualified praise for *Instauration*, Wilmot Robertson's hard-hitting monthly journal. Sobran called it "an often brilliant magazine, covering a beat nobody else will touch, and doing so with intelligence, wide-ranging observation and bitter wit." In its almost twelve years of publication, *Instauration* has frequently cast doubt on the Holocaust story and has run numerous sympathetic reports on the achievements and travails of the Institute for Historical Review.

In a column that appeared in early June, Sobran sought to answer his boisterous critics. He criticized the illegitimate way that critics of Israel or of the pro-Israel lobby are routinely silenced by branding them as "anti-Semitic." The mere threat of being so labelled is enough to intimidate almost all potential critics. The term "anti-Semite," Sobran wrote, "carries the whiff of Nazism and mass murder. 'It means,' as a friend of mine put it, 'that you ultimately approve of the gas chambers.'"

The self-appointed watchdogs of American cultural life are now busy trying to silence Joseph Sobran permanently. Leading the self-serving crusade is the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and the husband-wife team of Norman Podhoretz and Midge Decter. (Podhoretz edits the American Jewish Committee's monthly journal, *Commentary*, and Decter heads something called the Committee for the Free World.) *National Review* editor-founder William F. Buckley Jr., apparently alarmed that what Sobran wrote on his own would result in a loss of circulation and advertising revenue for his magazine, publicly repudiated his senior colleague for violating what Buckley accurately called "the structure of prevailing taboos."

Several Sobran critics have been particularly upset over his friendly words for *Instauration* because of the feisty journal's staunch refusal to bow before the Holocaust totem. In the words of *Newsweek* writer Jonathan Alter, for example, "*Instauration* denies the reality of the Holocaust — a classic [!?] anti-Semitic gambit." Alexander Cockburn, a regular contributor to the liberal weekly, *The Nation*, was riled at *Instauration*'s use of the term "Holohoax."

As the Sobran affair shows, public skepticism about the Holocaust is still far from being "acceptable." Nevertheless, Sobran's iconoclastic commentaries are a welcome indication that things may be changing, however, slowly, for the better.

*Critique of John S. Conway's Review of  
Walter Sanning's Dissolution of Eastern  
European Jewry, From The International  
History Review, August, 1985*

DAN DESJARDINS

**I**n the annals of anti-Revisionism, one does not often find Establishment academia types appraising Revisionist works directly. However, Dr. A.R. Butz has recently discovered just such an endeavor, involving, indeed, a book to which he wrote the preface: Walter Sanning's *The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry*. The deed was done by one John S. Conway, of the University of British Columbia, writing for *The International History Review*, VII, 3, August 1985, pp 450-51.

After a preamble in which Conway praises Sanning for avoiding sensationalism, (*i.e.*, refraining from the assertions that gas chambers never existed or that the Holocaust is mere Zionist propaganda), he launches into a reasonable summary of Sanning's demographic findings. Conway even acknowledges the extensive use of Jewish and Israeli sources in establishing Jewish population shifts into the Soviet Union, revealing that much of European Jewry avoided the German advance and did not reside within its sphere of occupation. However, Conway then deplores that these same documents are not used to establish Nazi crimes. The implied grievance would be that in using Jewish and Israeli documents, one ought to do so in a way which would most please Jewish and Israeli partisans, else one is not properly reciprocating for services rendered. I here proclaim a minor truth: if one trusts a source in instances, one is not obliged to endorse the entirety; and if one uses a source in instances, one is not obliged to use anything but what is relevant to the purposes at hand. In this regard, it was unwittingly apt that Conway chose to preface his complaint with the words "needless to say:" for that is it, exactly. By contrast to Sanning's half measures, Conway is prepared to demote the credibility of Sanning's entire thesis because the latter calls Operation Barbarossa (the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union) a "preventive aggression." I shall not argue that pre-Barbarossan Soviet

aggression against Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, and Eastern Poland might have established any sort of plausible trend, but instead ask that Mr. Conway take this up with fellow historians Toland, Irving, Diwald, and Franz-Willing — for their reputations are in question here also.

Mr. Conway readily admits that he is not a competent demographer, but is certain that if one were found, he “would expose many of the errors in this work.” I might ask: does Conway specifically know which data are in error and which are not; and if not, how does he “know” that there are “many” errors, or that there are errors at all? Still lacking the demographer’s expertise, Conway elaborates his suspicions to include “juggled figures” and “dubious conjectures about demographic trends, fertility patterns, death rates, emigration opportunities, and other equally unverifiable suppositions...” I am afraid that I am in the same predicament regarding Conway as Conway is regarding Sanning. There is one major difference, however. Whereas Sanning provides various data, tables, and background as the foundation of his conjectures, Conway’s suppositions are unverifiable on their face: no evidence, no contrary information, no examples by which to substantiate his accusations, no information whatsoever, other than his own bald assertions. Because of this, such generalizations cannot be investigated or refuted except in a general way. I will say only this: to the degree that Conway uses his claim of “dubiousness” as an inference that Sanning’s conjectures are false, he is liable to the fallacy of *argumentum ad ignorantiam*: the proposition that if a thing cannot be proven (*i.e.*, “unverifiable”), it is necessarily disproved. Both Dr. Butz, in his prefatory remarks to the text, and Sanning, its author, are aware that certain estimates “have no claim on absolute certainty” (p. 11). A similar intellectual honesty, however, might ask to know why Sanning’s “unverifiable suppositions” are necessarily dubious, while suppositions based on the same Jewish, Israeli and Allied sources by persons such as Poliakov, Reitlinger, or Dawidowicz do not suffer any such reservation. Whereas Conway is rather undemocratic in this regard, he is otherwise the perfect egalitarian: he implicitly suggests that Sanning’s suppositions are equivalently unverifiable, while in actuality they are equal only to the degree that Conway’s claims themselves cannot be verified because they remain mere innuendo, without a single example specified.

As with unmentioned Nazi crimes, Conway is similarly distressed that concentration camps such as Auschwitz, Chelmo, Maidanek, and Treblinka are not mentioned. The defense, I suspect (as Faurisson gives for not mentioning Babi Yar or the Sonder-

kommando), is that it is not a necessary part of the subject. But I give Conway credit in recognizing that it could have been. Sanning might have attempted to determine from concentration camp records the number of Jews interned throughout the German occupied countries. If this is possible, assuming the existence or accuracy of such records, I do not know. Admittedly, it would have been an interesting study to determine the numbers of Jews actually held in such camps versus the numbers which were present at the time of liberation. Still, Conway should be advised that this itself would not necessarily determine the cause of death for those who perished, or that death ought necessarily to be assumed for those who were missing.

Conway closes his review of Sanning with a final extended chastisement, which I quote:

This book is in fact no more than a perverse attempt to concoct a contrived analysis of the Jewish 'population changes' during the Second World War, which not only mendaciously exonerates the Nazis, but hypocritically seeks to create a distorted account of the Jewish experience which does without the Holocaust, without Hitler, without history at all.

Conway does not simply say that Sanning may have derived mistaken or faulty conjectures, but that his analysis was a wilful and perverse attempt at concoction. I think Conway was a bit injudicious. He is claiming no less than libel, and may be subject to same.

For Conway, it is obvious that no purpose dealing with the Jewish experience during World War II can be historical if certain features are missing, *i.e.*, concentration camps, "Holocaust," and Hitler. I must first register dismay that academia counts among its members persons with this low an opinion of the meaning of history. Secondly, it is unfortunate that this is the paltry level of intellect with which Revisionism must sometimes contend. Whereas Conway earlier refers to a misuse of alleged erudition disregarding Sanning's "unverifiable suppositions," I would have to say that this is certainly in contradistinction to Mr. Conway's disuse of same. For while Conway's complaint seems to focus on the impropriety of Sanning's analysis, *i.e.*, that it "exonerates" Nazis while "distorting" the experience of Jews, he reveals an ignominious and thoroughly unacademic criterion in his critique: not concern with truth for its own sake or the sake of history, but history primarily as a servant to politics and philosophy. Sanning reiterates his book's purpose on page 196:

The purpose of this analysis was not to investigate the content of truth in the "Holocaust" story, but to outline the extent and the direction of the Jewish population movement before, during and after World War Two.

This is certainly his right as a demographer, and reasonably so, as it is sharply delineated and restricted to the authors field of expertise. I would instead question that any account which attempts to elaborate Nazi crimes, the daily routine of concentration camps or the life and death of Adolf Hitler is within the reasonable scope of the intended analysis. It is not Sanning's demographic study which "distorts" accounts of the Jewish experience, but Conway's demands, which attempt to distort this specific purpose by insisting on a general one. Though Conway has elsewhere expressed appreciation that Sanning does not openly deny the Holocaust, this is not enough: full satisfaction demands Sanning proclaim its existence as a foundation to his study. This is not to say that this should be satisfactory to the purposes of a demographer — or a historian.

Sanning's book has amassed 24 tables, 453 references and footnotes quoting 98 publications and authors (almost entirely Allied, Zionist, and other "sympathetic" sources), with 205 pages of text. Conway has condemned the entirety by simply claiming "errors" (which supposedly will require the services of a demographer to expose), "juggled figures" and "dubious conjectures" (accusations unelaborated and without any example), "contrived analysis" (Conway's reciprocity here is 1.2 pages without reference or bibliography), and that Sanning's account is "without history at all." To say that there is "no history" if one's purpose is without Hitler or the "Holocaust" is to redefine history in a rather narrowminded, precarious and utterly Orwellian fashion. Whether this is a politicized definition, or one which is merely foolish, Conway has made of himself a person whose undocumented attacks defy serious treatment. His review of a work which he considers ahistorical is ironically performed in a manner which is anti-historical and non-analytic, an approach which carelessly substitutes dogma for integrity: assumptive, unsubstantive, and by his own accusation, hypocritical.

## Appendix

*In the interest of fairness we would like to reproduce John S. Conway's review so our readers can judge for themselves.*

### History, Hitler, and the Holocaust

JOHN S. CONWAY

EBERHARD JÄCKEL. *Hitler in History*. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1984. Pp. 115; GERALD FLEMING. *Hitler and the Final Solution*. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1984. Pp. 219; MALCOLM C. MACPHERSON. *The Blood of His Servants*. New York: The New York Times Book Co., Inc., 1984. Pp. 310; ISABELLA LEITNER. *Fragments of Isabella: A Memoir of Auschwitz*. New York: Crowell Publishers, 1978. Pp. 112; JAMES BENTLEY. *Martin Niemöller 1891-1984*. New York: Free Press, 1984. Pp. 253; SAUL S. FRIEDMAN. *The Oberammergau Passion Play: A Lance Against Civilization*. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984. Pp. 270; DAVID S. WYMAN, *The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust 1941-1945*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984. Pp. 445; WALTER N. SANNING. *The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry*. Torrance, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1983. Pp. 239.

As Archibald MacLeish once remarked, "We are deluged with facts but we have lost or are losing our human ability to feel them." He might well have continued: "It is possible to refuse full realization of unprecedented horror because we are unable to face the implications of these facts." Or as William Shawcross has recently written, "Few people want to believe tales of atrocities; resistance to them is a natural defence mechanism. And the more awful the speculations, the greater the resistance." Such was the case when the news of the annihilation of Europe's Jews first became known in the 1940s. The rational scepticism of the experts and the innocent incredulity of ordinary citizens could not embrace the rumours and reports seeping out of Nazi-controlled Europe. In subsequent decades, the same factors have widely affected the reception of the "Holocaust" as it is now called, so that witnesses, survivors, and historians alike still have an uphill battle to gain full acceptance for any objective and complete description of the

twentieth century's most portentous genocide. As a notorious recent trial in Toronto has shown, there are still some extremists who wish to disbelieve the accumulation of evidence, preferring to convince themselves that the Holocaust story is a deliberate post-war hoax, perpetuated by a world-wide conspiracy of Jews, Freemasons, and Bolsheviks and designed to bring into discredit the otherwise admirable German nation. This defiance of the available contemporary evidence about the Nazi state and its intentions, and of the vast researches of scholars during the past four decades on the extermination of the Jews, must be judged intellectually dishonest and obscene. "It is an appalling lie that the Holocaust did not happen; it is a monstrous truth that it did."

...

Finally, a piece of sophisticated Holocaust detail. Walter Sanning, one of the team who writes for the Institute for Historical Review in Torrance, California, avoids the kind of sensationalism exhibited in the recent Toronto trial. He does not assert that the gas chambers never existed, that the Holocaust is mere Zionist propaganda, or that the Nazis were basically respectable citizens. Instead, Sanning claims to have undertaken a detailed examination of the population statistics of eastern Europe, and in particular of the Jewish inhabitants, in order to show that the extermination figures attributed to the Nazis are greatly exaggerated, because there simply were not that many Jews — no more than 3.5 million — in all the areas controlled by the Germans. For example, Sanning claims that emigration and death had already, by 1939, reduced to 2.6 million the 3 million Jews in Poland in 1931, and that thereafter no fewer than 2.1 million Jews were deported by the Soviet Union to Siberia, including such notable figures as Menachem Begin. More escaped through other routes, leaving only 750,000 in German-controlled Poland by 1941. For obvious reasons, the Germans exaggerated the figures in order to justify their policies, while the Soviets have imposed a total silence. Sanning makes the further claim that the large number of Jews in Russian-controlled Poland in 1941 and other populations in the Ukraine, the Baltic countries and western Russia were forcibly deported early in 1941 to work in the relocated industries behind the Urals. Thus, only 720,000 Soviet Jews fell into German hands in 1941–2, mostly older people in any case liable to higher death rates through natural causes. But the vast majority must have survived the war, since the figures of Jews present after 1945 amount to nearly this total. The fate of the Jews deported by the Russians to Siberia was far worse (by implication than those under Nazi control). He quotes

extensively from Jewish and Israeli sources to prove how large the Jewish population in the Soviet Union had become by 1950, with a view to establishing that the eastern European Jewry had "dissolved" without any participation by the Germans. Needless to say, neither the same sources nor Nazi war-time documents are quoted about the Nazi crimes. Despite the warm endorsement of Sanning's statistical tabulations by A.R. Butz, Professor of Electrical Engineering, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, the credibility of his thesis is not enhanced by such absurd claims as that the German invasion of the Soviet Union was purely "preventive" in order to forestall a planned Soviet aggression. It will require the services of a competent demographer to expose many of the errors in this work. The potpourri of juggled figures, using dubious conjectures about demographic trends, fertility patterns, death rates, emigration opportunities, or other equally unverifiable suppositions, adds up to a misuse of alleged erudition. Naturally, Auschwitz, Chelmo, Maidanek, or Treblinka are not mentioned. This book is in fact no more than a perverse attempt to concoct a contrived analysis of the Jewish "population changes" during the Second World War, which not only mendaciously exonerates the Nazis, but hypocritically seeks to create a distorted account of the Jewish experience which does without the Holocaust, without Hitler, without history at all.

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#28 (journal format) Leon Degrelle cover photo; 33rd French SS Division "Charlemagne"; SS Heimwehr Danzig; SS Tatar Mountain Brigade; Legion "Niederlande"; Serbian Volunteers; Battle of Pomerania 1945.

#29 (journal format) Death March of the "Totenkopf" Division (American war-crimes); the Oder front 1945; 14th Ukrainian Division at the Battle of Brody; The Lynching of Fritz Kochlein; 34th Dutch "Landstorm Nederland."

#30 (Mag. format; all subsequent issues are in this format) Crushing of the Slovak military mutiny; the "Nordland" Div.; the "Batschka" Div.; Battle of the Ushomir Forest; the Lynching of Bernhard Siebken.

#31 Oradour; Norwegian volunteers; "Der Fuehrer" Rgt.; Eastern Front 1941-42; "Luetzow" Div.; last months of "Goetz von Berlichingen" Div.

#32 "Latvian" SS and the battle for Kurland; Cossack cavalry; and many bios including one of "Sepp" Dietrich.

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
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