A cell phone works only, if its signal is picked up by a nearby relay tower and if it stays for a minimum period of time within the range of this relay tower, so that a stable connection between the phone and the tower can be established and maintained. For this reason, it has been a problem for cell phone networks to maintain a stable connection to cell phones traveling in cars at high cruising speed of 70 mph (112 km/h) and more. It is also generally acknowledged that cell phones do not work when they are miles above a network, which is why they do not work in planes cruising at high altitude.

During the tragic events of September 11, 2001, many cell phone calls where made from the hijacked airplanes to various destinations on the ground. In particular United Airlines flight 93, which finally crashed in Pennsylvania, is of interest here, because so many phone calls were made from this plane, which were all successful, despite the plane’s altitude and high cruising speed. Introduced by a series of experiments with cell phones in air planes at various heights and backed-up by testimonies from experts and laymen, the following article investigates whether or not these phone calls were technically possible, and if not, how they could be explained.

January 23, 2003; 4:35 - 5:40 pm; Civic Airport, London, Ontario, Canada

Aircraft: Diamond DA20/C1 Katana two-seater; engine: 125 hp fiberglass/carbon fiber composite body & airframe; weight fully loaded: 1630 lbs

Cell phones: one Motorola model "120 CDMA" cell phone (A); two Motorola "i1000 plus" cell phones (B) (both fully charged at flight time)

The flight plan consisted of four ‘laps,’ elongated circuits (shaped like a paperclip) over London, Ontario, airspace. Each lap was about seven to eight miles long and two to three miles wide. Three calls were made on each of two straight legs in each lap. Calls alternated between cell phone A and cell phone B. A second i1000, intended for use at higher altitudes, slipped to the cockpit floor and could not be retrieved in those cramped quarters. A check of battery levels of the first i1000, however, showed that there had been no significant power drain on the unit.

After the third call, I decided that the cockpit was too noisy to hear the message system, so I changed my plan and called home (my wife), instead.

Calls to the business number were recorded by the message system. Two calls made it through. Of the 17 calls to the home number, only about ten calls got through. In three of these, we had a conversation (of sorts) and the rest were just white noise. (No record of which.)

In the preliminary test, only five of the 16 (attempted) calls resulted in any meaningful voice contact. In at least two of those calls, no connection whatever could be established with cell sites below. The composition of the Diamond Katana (manufactured right here in London, Ontario) makes it almost transparent to EM radiation at radio wavelengths and the results of this experiment are therefore optimal. Aircraft with metal skins will undoubtedly fare rather worse in the percentage of calls making it through.

The purpose of this experiment was to probe the effect of altitude on cell phone service and to iron out wrinkles in experimental procedure. In the first instance, it looks as though there might well be a decline in service with increasing altitude. The phenomenon must now be mapped more carefully.

As far as operating procedures is concerned, it is probably best to make calls to a number you know well, to be familiar with the various status messages on each cell phone display screen, and to have someone at the other end who can log the time of the call, as well as to summarize the content. (The cockpit in most light aircraft is so noisy that one cannot always hear a voice at the other end, although I did hear my wife talking somewhat clearly on two occasions.) Also, it is important to be very organized, having a special carrier case for cell phones, writing/recording materials, etc. The airspeed of the Katana was just a little fast for me to comfortably make the calls and stay organized at the same time. Two of the calls were made rather late in the current lap, even as we began to climb out to the next one. It would be better to have a separate person operating the cell phones. We also need a meaningful call classification system to fill the gaps between complete failure and an audible conversation.

All calls were handled by the Bell Mobility Network, which has some 25 cell sites operating in the London area. I have now located all the cell sites in London, Ontario, thanks to a very helpful set of maps provided by a local cell phone aficionado: www.arcx.com/sites/ . K. Dewdney

(with thanks to Corey Barrington, pilot with Empire Aviation)

Aircraft: Diamond Katana four-seater (Empire Aviation)

Cell phones: C1, C2, C3, C4 (See appendix for descriptions.)

Personnel: Corey Barrington (pilot); Darren Spicknell (operator - technician for Wireless Concepts, Inc); Kee Dewdney (director); Pat Dewdney (ground recorder)

Weather: unlimited ceiling, light scattered cloud at 3,000 and 25,000 feet, visibility 15 miles, wind 5 knots from NW, air temperature -12 C.

For this experiment, we flew a circular route, instead of the elongated oval. The circle centered on the downtown core and took us over most of the city suburbs. All locations below are referred to the city centre and are always about three miles distant from it.

At times specified by the director, the operator made a call to a specified number, stating the code number of the cell phone (1 to 4) and the altitude. The receiver recorded whatever was heard and the time the call was received. At the first three altitudes of 2000, 4000, and 6000 feet above ground each cell phone was used once. At 8000 feet above ground, only C2 and C3 were tried, C1 and C4 now being hors de combat.

For the results with timeline see table T2.

To the extent that the cell phones used in this experiment represent types in general use, it may be concluded that from this particular type of aircraft, cell phones become useless very quickly with increasing altitude. In particular, two of the cell phone types, the Mike and the Nokia, became useless above 2000 feet. Of the remaining two, the Audiovox worked intermittently up to 6000 feet but failed thereafter, while the BM analog cell phone worked once just over 7000 feet but failed consistently thereafter. We therefore conclude that ordinary cell phones, digital or analog, will fail to get through at or above 8000 feet above ground.

It should be noted that several of the calls rated here as "successes" were difficult for the Recorder to hear, witness description such as "breaking up" or "buzzy."

The four cell phones operated via four different cellular networks (cell sites). Because calls were made from a variety of positions for each network, it cannot be said that failures were the fault of cell site placement. The London, Ontario, region is richly supplied with cell sites belonging to five separate networks.

It may be noted in passing that this experiment was also conducted in a radio-transparent aircraft with carbon-fibre composite construction. Failure to make a call from such an aircraft with any particular brand of cell phone spells automatic failure for the same cell phone from a metal-clad aircraft flying at the same altitude. A metal skin attenuates all cell phone signals to a significant degree. It may safely be concluded that the operational ceiling for cell phones in aluminum skin aircraft (most passenger liners, for example) would be significantly lower than the ones reported here.

It may therefore safely be concluded that cell phone calls from passenger aircraft are physically impossible above 8000 feet above ground and statistically unlikely below it.

• C1 Motorola i95cl - Telus Mike Network - 800 Mhz IDEN
• C2 Motorola StarTac - Bell Mobility - 800 Mhz Analog
• C3 Audiovox 8300 - Telus PCS Network - 1.9 Ghz CDMA / 800 MHz
• C4 Nokia 6310i - Rogers AT&T - 1.9 Ghz GHz GSM. (Tri-Band - Has an 1.8 GHz and 900 Mhz GSM these are European frequencies)
• IDEN - Integrated Digital Enhanced Network
• CDMA - Code Division Multiple Access
• GSM - Global Systems for Mobile Communications

Power Levels: Power output of these handsets. The Nokia 6310i and Audiovox 8300 when in digital mode will output 0.2 Watts. When the Analog Motorola StarTac is operating it is at 0.6 Watts optimal. When and IF the Audiovox 8300 is in analog mode it will operate at 0.6 Watts (However, this is not normally the case - you will see wattage levels around 0.52 - 0.45 approximately)

Frequency: Both the Telus Mike (C1) and Motorola StarTac (C2) operate in the 800 MHz range. This will allow the signal to travel at a great distance. However, the IDEN (Mike) network has fewer site locations and is a newer Digital network. Most digital technologies operate on a "all or none" basis. When it has signal it will work well. As the signal fades, one hears no static, but some digital distortion just before the call drops.

Networks: Mike Network: Newer, all-digital network with modern antenna design, and fewer cell sites; Bell Mobility Analog: Older, analog network with less focused antenna design but many cell sites; Telus PCS: Newer, digital network with multiple frequencies, modern antenna design, and many cell sites; Rogers GSM: Our newest digital network with modern antenna design and many cell sites. (All data (courtesy of Darren Spicknell.)

A. K. Dewdney,
February 25th 2003

During the early months of the year 2003, the author conducted three experiments to determine whether and how well cell phones could be operated from aircraft. The first flight (Part One) was essentially a probe of the experimental situation, to acquire some primary data and to work out a simple, readily implemented protocol. The results of Part Two (Diamond Katana 4-seater) have already appeared in these pages. The results of Part Three (Cessna 172-R) appear immediately below.

Since this completes the suite of experiments, it is appropriate to summarize the findings and to draw some conclusions. The conclusions are based partly on the experiments and partly on two other sources. (See Appendix B at the end of the report.) Expert opinion and eyewitness testimony are acceptable not only in court, but in certain scientific inquiries where events are of short duration or experiments are too expensive or impossible to carry out. Of course, eyewitness accounts do not carry the same weight as expert opinions or actual experiments, but the eyewitness accounts quoted below seem to be both consistent and compelling.

Disclaimer: The companies hired to assist in this experiment, namely Empire Aviation and Cellular Solutions, both of London, Ontario, Canada, acted as disinterested commercial parties, with no stake in the outcome or even knowledge of the purpose of the tests.

The previous experiment, called Part Two, established a distinct trend of decreasing cell phone functionality with altitude. It was conducted in a four-seater Diamond Katana over the city of London (pop. 300,000), Ontario in Canada, an area richly supplied with some 35 cell sites distributed over an area of about 25 square miles. The flight path was an upward spiral, punctuated every 2000 feet (above ground) with a level circuit around the outskirts of the city. On each circuit a fixed number of cell phone calls were attempted by an expert operator employing a battery of well-charged phones broadly representative of those on the market both currently and in the year 2001.

(It should be remarked that not only is the cell phone technological base in Canada identical to its US counterpart, but Canadian communication technology is second to none, Canada being a world-leader in research and development.)

The purpose of Part Three was to test the effects of what might be called "Faraday attenuation" on the strength and success of calls. The presence of a metallic shell around some electronic devices can alter their behavior by its ability to attract and store electrons, especially electromagnetic waves. For this reason, the experimental craft was switched from the Katana, which is supposed to be relatively transparent to em radiation, to an aircraft with an aluminum skin, as below.

Aircraft: Cessna 172-R (2002) four-seater (Empire Aviation)

Cell phones: C1, C2, C3, C4, C5 (See Appendix A for descriptions.)

Personnel: Corey Barrington (pilot - Empire Aviation); Darren Spicknell (operator - technician for Wireless Concepts, Inc); Kee Dewdney (director); Pat Dewdney (ground recorder).

Weather: unlimited ceiling, light scattered cloud at 5,000, solid/broken 24,000 feet, visibility 12 miles, wind 11 knots from SSW, air temperature +19 C.

For this experiment, we flew the same circular route as we did in Part Two, The circle centered on the downtown core and took us over most of the city suburbs. All locations below are referred to the city centre and are always about two miles distant from it.

At times specified by the director, the operator made a call to a specified number, stating the code number of the cell phone (1 to 5) and the altitude. The ground recorder noted whatever was heard and the time the call was received. At the first two altitudes of 2000, 4000 above ground altitude (above ground) each cell phone was used once. At 6000 and 8000 feet above ground, each cell phone was used twice only C2, C3, and C5 were tried, C1 and C4 being hors de combat. For the results, see table T3, for the summary see the table on the bottom left.

Note: calls "tried" includes retired cell phones C1 and C4 above the altitude of 4000 feet where, in the opinion of the cell phone expert, they would have failed to get through, in any case. Failure to include them in the count would make the results at different altitudes non-comparable.

The results of this experiment may be compared to the results from Part Two where, instead of the Cessna, we used the Diamond Katana:

To make the results comparable, however, cell phone C5 was omitted from the calculations, since it was not used in the first experiment.

Since the (1.5 mm) skin of the Cessna appears to have made little difference to the outcome of the experiment, the data of Parts Two and Three may be combined, as follows, to produce more reliable figures for the battery of test phones that were used in the experiment:

The data from the first three altitudes appear to fit an inverse-linear model of attenuation. In other words, the probability of a call getting through varies inversely as the altitude, according to the formula:

Probability of success = k/altitude, where k is a constant

It will be noted that the values of k implied by these data, at least up to 6000 feet above ground are remarkably consistent. However, at 8000 feet the k-value falls precipitously, implying that a different regime may be in play.

The expected model of attenuation with distance is of course inverse squared, a natural consequence of the three dimensions that any uniform radiation must travel through. Inverse squared attenuation follows a slightly different pattern or formula:

Probability of success = k/altitude²

To estimate k, it seems reasonable to use the data from 4000 feet and 8000 feet as benchmarks for the calculation of the constant k (not the same constant as was used in the foregoing analysis, of course.)

At 4000 feet above ground the implied k-value if 7,040,000, while at 8000 feet, the implied k-value is 5,760,000. although here again the k-value appears to drop (indicating that the actual attenuation may be worse than inverse squared), we use an average of the two estimates, following our consistent practice of always giving the benefit of the doubt to the cell phones, so to speak.

Taking an average value of k = 6,400,000, we obtain the formula,

Probability of success = 6,400,000/altitude²

Using this formula, we can get a best-case estimate for the probability of cell phone success from a slow-moving light aircraft, as summarized in the following table.

Private pilots flying light aircraft are nowadays familiar with the fact that they may use their cell phones to make calls to the ground, at least if they are not higher than one or two thousand feet. Above that altitude, calls get rather iffy, sometimes working, sometimes not. The higher a pilot ascends, the less likely the call is to get through. At 8000 feet the pilot will not get through at all unless he or she happens to be using a cell phone with the same capabilities as C5 (See appendix A.) But even that cell phone begins to fail at 6000 feet.

Calls from 20,000 feet have barely a one-in-a-hundred chance of succeeding.

The results just arrived at apply only to light aircraft and are definitely optimal in the sense that cell phone calls from large, heavy-skinned, fast-moving jetliners are apt to be considerably worse.

It cannot be said that the Faraday attenuation experiment (Part Three) was complete, in the sense that the operator normally held the phone to his ear, seated in a normal position. This meant that the signals from the test phones were only partially attenuated because the operator was surrounded by windows that are themselves radio-transparent.

Although we cannot say yet to what degree the heavier aluminum skin on a Boeing 700-series aircraft would affect cell phone calls made from within the aircraft, they would not be without some effect as windows take up a much smaller solid angle at the cell phone antenna. Signals have a much smaller window area to escape through, in general.

As was shown above, the chance of a typical cell phone call from cruising altitude making it to ground and engaging a cell site there is less than one in a hundred. To calculate the probability that two such calls will succeed involves elementary probability theory. The resultant probability is the product of the two probabilities, taken separately. In other words, the probability that two callers will succeed is less than one in ten thousand. In the case of a hundred such calls, even if a large majority fail, the chance of, say 13 calls getting through can only be described as infinitesimal. In operational terms, this means "impossible."

At lower altitudes the probability of connection changes from impossible to varying degrees of "unlikely." But here, a different phenomenon asserts itself, a phenomenon that cannot be tested in a propeller-driven light aircraft. At 500 miles per hour, a low-flying aircraft passes over each cell in a very short time. For example if a cell (area serviced by a given cell site) were a mile in diameter, the aircraft would be in it for one to eight seconds. Before a cell phone call can go through, the device must complete an electronic "handshake" with the cell site servicing the call. This handshake can hardly be completed in eight seconds. When the aircraft comes into the next cell, the call must be "handed off" to the new cell site. This process also absorbs seconds of time. Together, the two requirements for a successful and continuous call would appear to absorb too much time for a speaking connection to be established. Sooner or later, the call is "dropped."

This assessment is borne out by both ear-witness testimony and by expert opinion, as found in Appendix B, below. Taking the consistency of theoretical prediction and expert opinion at face value, it seems fair to conclude that cell phone calls (at any altitude) from fast-flying aircraft are no more likely to get through than cell phone calls from high-flying slow aircraft.

A. K. Dewdney,
February 19th 2003

A. K. Dewdney, 19th April 2003

The author has not placed his university affiliations below his name, as the research described here was not conducted with any university facilities or supported by university-administered grants. He currently holds the titles of Professor Emeritus of Computer Science and Adjunct Professor of Biology at the University of Western Ontario, as well as Professor of Computer Science at the University of Waterloo.

• C1 - Motorola i95cl - Telus Mike Network - 800 Mhz IDEN
• C2 - Motorola StarTac - Bell Mobility - 800 Mhz Analog
• C3 - Audiovox 8300 - Telus PCS Network - 1.9 Ghz CDMA / 800 MHz
• C4 - Nokia 6310i - Rogers AT&T - 1.9 Ghz GHz GSM. (Tri-Band - Has an 1.8 GHz and 900 Mhz GSM these are European frequencies)
• C5 - Motorola Timeport 8767 - Bell Mobility - 800 MHz Analog (CDMA Tri-Mode 1.9 GHz CDMA / 800 Mhz CDMA)

Effective stage magic produces the illusion of an event that did not actually happen, at least not in the manner implied by the illusion.

The implied explanation is ‘magic,’ while the actual explanation, invariably more complicated, is quite different. Most members of the audience know that the implied explanation is wrong. They try to imagine how the effect was produced. Very few believe the ‘official’ explanation.

In other, blacker forms of magic, the manipulative element remains but the polarity of the audience is reversed. Most members of the audience ‘know’ that the implied explanation is correct and do not try to imagine how the effect was produced. Very few disbelieve it. If the events of September 11, 2001, were all part of an elaborate piece of stage magic, in effect, how could it have been arranged? This article explores one possibility. The name of the trick is ‘Ghost Riders in the Sky.’ It begins with a peek behind the curtain on that fateful day.

The morning of September 11 dawned bright and clear over Boston’s Logan Airport as crews arrived for the first flights of the day. The departure lounge for American Airlines Flight 11 was already filling with passengers when John Ogonowski, the pilot, and Thomas McGuinness, the first officer, arrived to board their Boeing 767 and begin the pre-flight check.

As they walked through the lounge, Ogonowski casually scanned the waiting passengers, a longtime habit. Nothing out of the ordinary.

In the cockpit, he and McGuinness worked through the long checklist and, when they came to engine start-up, the two giant General Electric turbofan engines roared into life. The weather reports were good all the way to Los Angeles. It would be a routine flight.

At 7:45 the flight crew closed the cabin doors and the 767 began to taxi out to the runway. Clearance came minutes later and, at 7:59, the engines opened to full throttle and the 767 became airborne. It climbed into clear blue skies, leveled at 25,000 feet, and headed west toward Los Angeles. Ogonowski called up the coordinates for Los Angeles on the flight control computer, then engaged the INS/autopilot system. A flight attendant brought coffee to the cockpit and stayed to chat briefly, before resuming her duties.

The flight continued normally until 8:27, nearly half an hour into the trip. At that point Ogonowski’s chest felt tight and he experienced difficulty breathing. Was it a heart attack? He glanced nervously at McGuinness, thinking that if the symptoms got worse, he should warn the co-pilot that he was having a medical problem. But McGuinness’ face was white and he appeared to be gasping for air. Then he vomited. "We have a situation," declared Ogonowski, trying desperately to think. There were shouts and screams coming from the passenger compartment behind the closed cockpit doors. His mind seemed to be clouding over and breathing was now impossible. He managed to say, "Call the flight attendants," before passing out. McGuinness’ head was already lolling to one side.

Back in the passenger area, the last flight attendant to lose consciousness, sank slowly to her knees before passing out in the aisle. The aircraft smelled of vomit and feces. Except for one or two passengers lying in the aisles, most remained in their seats. They appeared to have all fallen asleep, but they were dead. Everybody in the aircraft was dead.

Back in the cockpit, pilot and copilot sat dead in their seats, eyes staring blankly at the deep blue sky above the cockpit windows. The aircraft continued to fly normally, when suddenly the numbers on the inertial navigation system display changed. Instead of the coordinates for Los Angeles airspace, new numbers jumped into place. The aircraft banked steeply to the left and began a slow descent, adding another 100 mph to its airspeed.

In the distance, the New York skyline was growing steadily larger through the cockpit windows, though no one saw it. The aircraft, continuing to descend, headed for lower Manhattan.

By the time the 767 crossed the East River, it would have been all too clear where the aircraft was going. The World Trade Center Towers loomed steadily larger, dead ahead, through the cockpit windows. At 8:45, the Boeing 767 slammed into the North Tower. A huge ball of flame, burning jet fuel, blossomed from the southeast side of the North Tower. The passengers and crew of Flight 11, having been gassed, were now cremated, along with hundreds of office workers in the North Tower.

At 9:03, 18 minutes later, even as thousands of New Yorkers gaped upward in astonishment and dismay at the burning North Tower, another Boeing 767, approaching from the southwest, crashed into the South Tower. United Airlines Flight 175 had also departed from Boston Logan that morning at 8:15.

At 9:45 a third aircraft crashed into one corner of the Pentagon building. At 10:00 am, a fourth crashed in a field near Pittsburgh, apparently unable to complete its mission.

Within minutes of the first crash, major networks carried the developing story. Four apparent suicide attacks involving large passenger aircraft had just struck two of America’s most important landmarks. Asked for their impressions, people on the street described it as ‘unreal.’ The scale was unprecedented. The drama swept away the debris of ordinary life, shocking Americans into numbness, then anger.

In the days that followed, the story of four cells of Arab terrorists emerged with unprecedented speed. The names of the hijackers were revealed, along with their affiliation or ‘links’ to al Qaida and the dreaded Osama bin Laden. Soon, Bush would declare his "war on terrorism." Soon American forces would be heading for Afghanistan. Soon Israel would be re-invading the West Bank and Gaza.

The September attacks acquired, almost from the start, an apocalyptic dimension, as if the hijackers stood proxy for the Four Horsemen themselves. This analysis explores the possibility that the aircraft were hijacked not by persons physically present in the cockpit, but by a simple combination of two hi-tech methods. In such a case, there would be no Horsemen, only ‘ghost riders,’ recalling the American ballad Ghost Riders in the Sky.

The discrepancy between the account I have just given of the hijackings and the one reported in the media is obvious and, to many, highly improbable. How could anyone question such an open-and-shut case? There had been the decisive and amazingly rapid unfolding of the FBI investigation, wherein the domestic agency had pretty well solved a case involving 19 terrorists in just two days. (It took them several years to find one terrorist—the Unabomber.) There had also been the steady stream of timed press releases and Pentagon briefings, the disclosure of a war plan by the White House within days of the attacks. What could they be but the work of a well-prepared government? Besides, people who had only just begun adjusting to the ‘new reality’ would hardly be in a mood to exchange it for something far worse. Nevertheless, the ‘unreality’ of the attacks themselves would seem to join seamlessly with the unreality of the subsequent drama.

In a following section I will examine the technical feasibility of hijacking large commercial aircraft electronically, as described in the opening scenario. I do not claim that this is what actually what happened on September 11. But even less would I claim that the attacks were planned and carried out by ‘Arab terrorists.’

I claim only that the method described below amounts to one of several methods, albeit among the most efficient, for converting passenger aircraft into flying fuel bombs. I must therefore also claim that the rush to judgment following September 11 was, at best, foolhardy on the part of the Bush administration and, at worst, disastrous for America. In that event, the evidence compiled here points to elements within the power structure of the US government and it can only be concluded that the United States itself has been hijacked.

Before explaining how a hi-tech hijacking might be feasible, it would be appropriate to disclose some findings related to the attacks for clues they may contain that something quite different from hijackings by ‘Arab terrorists’ was in progress that day.

First and most important, no attack blamed on any recognized ‘terrorist’ group, whether Palestinian, Basque separatist, Irish nationalist, Tamil Tiger, Red Army brigade, or what have you, was ever carried out without the group responsible claiming responsibility. The whole point of the attack is to publicize a cause. The only exception to this rule in the history of terrorism is the mysterious Al Qaida, led by the equally mysterious Osama bin Laden. Robert Fisk, the well-known British reporter, gave voice to the same opinion:

In Fisk’s opinion, this was quite out of character for any terrorist organization. (MacIntyre, 2001)

If Al Qaida was responsible for the attacks, what possible reason would bin Laden have for not claiming responsibility? The White House claim that Al Qaida’s purpose was to inflict ‘nameless terror’ on America is deeply contradictory. The only other terrorist acts for which none of the ‘regular’ organizations took responsibility, namely, the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, as well as the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, were also blamed on Al Qaida. What reason would bin Laden have for imagining that the terror inflicted by Al Qaida on September 11 would be blamed on anyone but Al Qaida, let alone be ‘nameless?’ It simply fails to make sense. Worse yet, bin Laden has repeatedly denied involvement in the attacks. On September 11 bin Laden said:

Later, on September 28:

Nevertheless, the White House claimed to have ‘links’ between Al Qaida and the September 11 attacks, secret information that, for reasons of ‘national security,’ could not be disclosed to the public.

Another discrepancy in the September 11 attacks is apparent to anyone who has followed the history of ‘terrorism.’ The sheer size of the operation as outlined by the White House, the high degree of coordination involved, and the need for absolute secrecy, is not one, but two, orders of magnitude greater in scale than anything previously attempted by any terrorist group. Indeed, even the previous attacks blamed on Al Qaida were relatively simple operations involving the clandestine transport of explosive materials (by boat or car) to the target site. In the large-scale operation of September 11, the requirement of secrecy was especially important.

The scale of the operation, however it may have been achieved, was more suited to a large, well-organized intelligence agency, with as many as 50 field agents involved, each privy to one or more aspects of the plan. With such a large operation, leaks are inevitable. The two cited below both point to a very different source for the attacks.

According to Ha’aretz, Israel’s largest daily, two employees of Odigo, an Israel-based messaging service in one of the WTC towers, received email warnings of the attack two hours before impact on September 11. (Dror, 2001) The employees immediately informed the company, which cooperated with Israeli security services, as well as American law enforcement agencies, giving them the source of the message. No follow-up on this story has ever been made available, which leads one to believe that the message did not come from a ‘terrorist’ source: If such a source had been suspected, much less proved, the administration would not have hesitated to use the item in its ‘war on terrorism.’

An interesting report of another leak alleged:

It pointed to a threat that Mossad was planning a covert operation on US soil to turn public opinion against the Arabs. David Stern, an expert on Israeli intelligence operations, stated:

Stern also pointed out that the attacks "serve no Arab group or nation’s interest, but their timing came in the midst of international condemnation of Israel […]"

A highly suspicious occurrence was the airing of a videotape supposedly shot in Palestine on the day of the attacks. The video shows Palestinians celebrating something. The media claimed that the Palestinians were celebrating the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The only problem with the tapes is the time of day. Shadows thrown by the stands and buildings in the vicinity of the celebrants clearly show the local time to be approximately noon. At the time of the attacks, however, it was already 5:00 pm (daylight time) in Palestine. At that time of day (and year), the angle of the shadows would be at most 30 degrees from the horizontal and readily visible on the video as deep shadows.

Since the tape is unquestionably a fake, shot at some other time and on some other occasion of celebration, it must be asked how it got into the hands of the American media (via an ‘independent producer’) so quickly, unless it had been prepared in advance of the attacks. There is no other explanation for this anomaly.

Another difficulty arises in the matter of evidence discovered by FBI investigators in the parking lots of airports used by the hijackers. In more than one rental vehicle, field officers recovered copies of the Qur’an and aircraft flight manuals. In a context where the White House was stressing the ‘sophistication’ of the attackers, as well as the high state of organization and coordination necessary to carry them out, it would seem reasonable to assume that all operatives would have been extensively briefed on the importance of leaving no trace of themselves or their mission (in pursuit of ‘nameless terror’). Such a briefing would certainly include all personal possessions, religious documents, flight manuals, and so on. The rental vehicles would be left as clean as they were when they were rented. No Muslim, (especially, one supposes, a ‘fanatic’) would ever leave a Qur’an in a rented vehicle, especially if he knew he would not be returning to it.

Come to think of it, why would any terrorist organization with such a high level of competence rent cars in the first place? After all, it would be simpler (and no less reliable) to take a cab to the airport.

Again, there are very serious discrepancies between the facts as reported and on-the-ground realities.

Ziad Jarrah, the alleged pilot of United Airlines Flight 93 (which crashed in Pennsylvania), presents those who seek to understand the September 11 attacks with serious difficulties. As revealed in a CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) investigative report, first aired in November 2001, Jarrah was the playboy son of a wealthy family in Lebanon. (MacIntyre, 2001) The family was only nominally Muslim and Jarrah, if anything, more so. He loved to go dancing with other young people of his set in nightclubs and even had a steady girl friend, hardly practices of a believing Muslim, let alone a fanatical one. Linden MacIntyre, host and reporter, traveled to Lebanon to interview the Jarrah family, then to Hamburg, where he discussed Ziad’s behavior during the months leading up to September 11 with Jarrah’s landlady. The Jarrahs were completely mystified by their son’s alleged role in the hijackings. The landlady, who seemed rather fond of him, was also mystified.

Jarrah loved the good life but had one over-riding passion, to study aeronautical engineering and (probably) to learn how to fly. He went to Hamburg to study and it was there, according to his landlady, that he began making mysterious evening trips to Harburg, sometimes not returning until dawn. Harburg was the address of Mohammed Atta, one of the most notorious of the alleged hijackers, and the person who, MacIntyre opines, probably recruited Jarrah for a special mission. If this is true, although we do not know what Atta may have told Jarrah, June of 2000 finds him in Florida, taking flying lessons (light aircraft only) and discussing with his room-mate (also interviewed for the program) what it would be like to fly a large commercial aircraft.

Anyone with a reasonably active imagination can come up with several different stories that may have been fed to Jarrah (apart from the standard Al Qaida recruitment scenario) causing him to spend a few nights in Harburg or to take flying lessons in Florida. Such behaviour is easily induced by any reasonably competent field officer: A lovely and very cooperative lady in Harburg, as well as the promise of a position as private pilot to a wealthy Middle Eastern businessman currently living in Florida.

On September 9, just two days before the attacks, Jarrah telephoned his uncle in Lebanon. He sounded normal and reasonably happy, according to the uncle. He stated that he would be flying back to Lebanon in two weeks for a party which his family had planned. A new Mercedes awaited Jarrah, an anticipatory wedding gift which his father had purchased for him. MacIntyre professed no little puzzlement over the discrepancies:

I will return to the alleged hijackers in a later section.

The most important target of the September 11 attacks was undoubtedly the twin towers at the World Trade Center in lower Manhattan. These had been the target of a prior attempt at bombing in February, 1993. Among those charged with the bombing was Mohammed Salameh, a student who lived in Jersey City at the time.

On February 26, 1993, at 12:18 pm, a powerful explosion, originating in parking level ‘B’ beneath the WTC twin towers shook the buildings, killing seven people and trapping thousands of workers inside for hours, forcing them to breathe heavy smoke. Within a week, the FBI had arrested Mohammed A. Salameh, along with a friend, Nidal Ayyad, as prime suspects in the blast. Salameh had been traced through a fragment of metal found in the WTC parking garage. It bore the serial number of a Ford Econoline van belonging to a Ryder rental agency in Jersey City.

Salameh, it turned out, had certainly rented the van in question. Unlike most terrorists who rent vans to blow up large buildings, he reported the van stolen to Jersey City police on February 25 (the day before the blast). Unfortunately, he was unable to supply the license number, having left the rental documents in the stolen vehicle. He also reported the theft to the rental agency, attempting in the process to retrieve his $400 deposit on the vehicle. On the next day, even as everyone learned of the WTC bombing, Salameh again telephoned Ryder, obtaining the plate number and filing a second report to the police, this time with the correct number. On the face of things, the youth was behaving just like someone who had no idea that his missing van had been used in the World Trade Center bombing.

This case gets even stranger. Salameh and Ayyad attended a small mosque on the second floor of a building in downtown Jersey City. The Imam was Shaikh Omar Abdel-Rahman. The shaikh was also arrested and brought to trial in a separate, closed proceeding. A police search of the mosque revealed no hidden bomb-making or related material. A search of Salameh’s apartment had the same negative result.

Police did, however, discover bomb-related wiring, instruction sheets and traces of explosives in the apartment of a ‘friend’ of Salameh’s. On the day before the bombing, an acquaintance of Salameh’s in Jersey City, one Josie Hadas, had hired him to rent a van to move a certain cargo. Hadas, an Israeli citizen, was taken into custody by police, but was soon sent back to Israel and (apparently) cannot be found to this day. (IIIE, 2001)

The main source of damaging testimony at the trial was delivered by FBI informant Emad Salem, a former Egyptian army officer, who had become close to Shaikh Abdel Rahman and his circle of friends, infiltrating the group on behalf of the FBI. He testified that he had been involved in assisting with the bomb. The jury found the pair guilty of the blast, with Abdel-Rahman being tried in separate proceedings. The verdict was based on circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy; none of the suspects ever being placed by witnesses, or forensic evidence, at the scene of the crime. (Pringle, 1994)

After the trial, Salem disclosed a very different story:

Those who are unfamiliar with the activities of large intelligence operations should be aware that frame-ups and other ‘dirty tricks’ are part of regular operations. (Ostrovsky & Hoy, 1990) They are relatively easy to carry out, for the most part. For example, in the present case, Salameh could have been directed by Hadas to deliver the goods (innocuous items) to an address somewhere in Jersey City, where he would have to enter a building to report the delivery. While he was inside, the van would be stolen, then driven to another location to be prepared for its ultimate mission.

In most of the web sources (CNN, 2001) (WRH, 2001) (IIIEb, 2001) for passenger lists, the names of the hijackers did not appear. There are, of course, a number of reasons why we might not see the names of the hijackers. One is that the airlines all decided, in releasing the lists to the media, to delete the names of the hijackers from the lists so as not to dishonor the dead, reproducing the lists as consisting of ‘victims’ only. No statement to this effect appeared in conjunction with any of the lists. Another reason is that the hijackers may have used phony names. Yet the passengers are usually identified not only by name on the lists, but their place of residence and occupations are also included. None of the entries give ‘terrorist’ as occupation. It may be a bit of a stretch, but it is just possible that the hijackers’ names do not appear on the passenger lists because they were not aboard the aircraft in the first place.

Each of the Boeing aircraft involved in the September 11 attacks was equipped with the standard ‘black boxes,’ a flight data recorder (FDR) and a cockpit voice recorder (CVR). There is no known instance, prior to September 11, 2001, of a terrestrial airplane crash from which the essential flight and voice data were not ultimately recovered.

Only one of the eight black boxes was ever recovered, namely the CVR of United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed in rural Pennsylvania. According to ABC News:

Black boxes are built to withstand g-forces of up to 3400 Gs, generated by a deceleration of 108,800 f/sec/sec. An aircraft traveling at 500 mph that crashes into the ground or a building will have all motion arrested within one-tenth of a second, at the very least, yielding an average deceleration of at most 7,330 ft/sec/sec, about 7 percent of the rated maximum. Heat resistance for the units is 1100 degrees Celsius over a thirty minute period. Temperature would not have been a factor in the Pennsylvania crash, but even the fireball resulting from the WTC impacts had a temperature no greater than 1000 degrees Celsius. (NTSB, 2002) The heat lasted no longer than the jet fuel and temperatures may not have reached half that value in the insulated confines of the black box housings. In any event, the buildings each collapsed in less than half an hour from impact.

There can be little doubt that had the black boxes been recovered, they would have all the information necessary to confirm that hijackers did, indeed, commandeer the four aircraft on September 11. There have been no further reports in the media about the contents of the Flight 93 CVR. The FBI, which claimed that the tape had sounds of screams and shouts on it, has refused to release it. (Quinn, 2001) It might be added that the presence of such sounds on the CVR is perfectly consistent with what would be heard in and from the cockpit of Flight 93 in the few minutes following implementation of the hijacking method described below.

It has been standard policy for many years to intercept any aircraft within minutes of it being reported off course. The request is made by an air traffic control (ATC) operator as soon as he or she notices that an aircraft has deviated from its flight path. Failure to contact the pilot (which would have been the case under both the alternate scenario and under the White House interpretation) results in a request by ATC to the military (NORAD) to intercept the aircraft (FAA, 1998) (FAA, 2001). Interception is automatic, does not require approval by any authority higher than the FAA liaison official at NORAD, and takes anywhere from five to 15 minutes, depending on the initial separation of target aircraft and the nearest operational base. Upon arrival, the interceptor waggles its wings to elicit a response from the pilot of the off-course aircraft. The pilot is also instructed to make a visual check of the cockpit area.

New York and Washington are among the most heavily guarded places in the United States. For the first time in the history of this policy being implemented, no interceptors were sent up, in spite of the fact that not one but four aircraft were involved.

It would have taken approximately five minutes for any fighter from, Andrews Air force Base to intercept the aircraft that struck the Pentagon, for example. Aircraft were on standby on the morning of September 11, according to the official air force website, although the contents of the site were changed two days after the attacks to say that no aircraft were available that morning (a strange circumstance, considering the sensitivity of the area and the number of fighters stationed there). (Ruppert, 2002)

The air force had not five minutes, but more than an hour to carry out interceptions. [For this, see the next contribution in this issue, Editor]

The natural assumption of every single viewer of the September 11 attacks was that human beings were at the controls of the aircraft. What could they be but hijackers? Since they were also committing suicide, what could they be but terrorists? But what at first sight seems impossible sometimes turns out to be not only possible, but the actual explanation of events. Although I shall be using an in-principle argument, it must be recognized that the ‘devil is in the details’ and that certain features of the scheme I have worked out might have to be implemented in another way. About the main conclusion, however, there can be little doubt. The thing is do-able.

In a modern commercial airliner like the Boeing 757 or 767, all control signals from the pilot and co-pilot go through the flight control system (FCS) (Safford, 1975) (Spitzer, 1987). The heart of the system is a computer with three processors to ensure reliability of operation. Each processor is able to run separate versions of what is essentially the same software. Only one processor runs at a time, but the pilot can switch from one processor to another if he suspects a malfunction. Each processor, like any multi-mission computer, has an operating system.

If something goes wrong with the computers or with the flight control system generally, a manual override is initiated by the pilot. This allows the pilot to fly the aircraft manually -- unless he is dead.

The simplest possible scheme for converting a modern commercial airliner into a flying fuel bomb involves two elements: a) two small canisters of lethal gas hidden in the aircraft’s ventilation ducts and triggered either by a timer or by radio signal, b) a small information implant (three numbers) in the flight control system and a means to trigger it.

The agent of choice for part a) would probably be fast-acting sarin, a lethal nerve gas that, at the dose levels to be used in a hijacking, would incapacitate every human being in the aircraft within a minute of first breathing the gas. Should the oxygen masks all pop out of the ceiling, it would make no difference to the outcome. One breath of the deadly gas would be more than sufficient. The symptoms described in the alternative scenario are all typical of sarin poisoning. Sarin degrades chemically within a short time of use, being undetectable thereafter.

The information implant mentioned in part b) would be new coordinates (latitude, longitude and altitude) in a form used by the inertial navigation system (INS), which is part of the aircraft’s flight control system (FCS). The central problem of this analysis is to determine which of two ways of achieving this goal is most efficient. In what I call the ‘custom job,’ a pre-installed virus-like code implant in the flight control computer(s), triggered like the gas canisters (either by timer or by radio signal), sends new coordinates to the INS. No more than a few lines of code would be required: there would be a time/signal check followed by an instruction to replace the Los Angeles coordinates by the ones stored in memory location so-and-so. In the ‘installed base’ method (Vialls, 2001), the software already exists in the FCC operating system, awaiting its use (presumably) as a counter-hijacking facility. This software would be able to read the new coordinates directly by radio from the ground. It has proved impossible to document this possibility from reliable sources.

In the custom job, installation of the unfriendly software and hardware would be carried out on selected aircraft during routine maintenance periods. The agents carrying out the installation might pose as mechanics or even cabin cleaners. In the cockpit they would install the special software patch in all three FCS processors, if necessary. In a maintenance port of the plane’s air supply system, they would install two custom-made sarin gas canisters, each with its trigger. Such installations are actually the easy part of the overall operation, depending on how much ‘cooperation’ the organization receives. Although it would not be crucial, access to aircraft maintenance and location schedules would be very useful to the agents, giving them more time for installation on specific aircraft, instead of having to make the installation on additional aircraft, which might or might not be used.

The components of the FCS that concern us here are the flight control computer, the INS, and the autopilot. During most commercial flights, the pilot places the aircraft on autopilot, as guided by the INS. The autopilot manages the aircraft’s control surfaces to guarantee a smooth, level flight, automatically compensating for various forms of disturbance, such as turbulence and other factors. Autopilots have been around for over fifty years and have grown increasingly sophisticated with time. They do a superb job of what might be called ‘local control,’ keeping the aircraft on its present heading, altitude, and so on. However, autopilots have no idea where they’re going, so to speak. That information must come from the INS. The destination coordinates, stored in the FCC, may be called up by the pilot and sent to the INS. Routinely, commercial pilots engage the INS and autopilot together, the INS continually sending new directions to the autopilot to keep the aircraft on course.

Inertial navigation systems have been around for approximately thirty years and, like autopilots, have been the subject of tremendous development and sophistication. According to Edward Safford, dean of American avionics:

Present INS capabilities are even more sophisticated, positioning an aircraft over the center of a runway hundreds of miles from the point of insertion. Such accuracy is adequate to accommodate the precise three-dimensional coordinates of the impact sites of the WTC towers and the Pentagon.

The agency carrying out the attacks would, after clandestine installation of software implants of the kind outlined above, simply trigger the whole operation when it was determined that the target aircraft was flying in INS/autopilot mode. The gas canisters would then be triggered and after about five to ten minutes the software implant would feed the new coordinates to the INS. The flight would be managed smoothly, the direction being changed as soon as the new destination coordinates were in place. The changes in direction that took place on September 11 would be visible on ground radar (transponders or no transponders) as a ‘hard left’ or a ‘hard right.’ (This is precisely how Air Traffic Control personnel described the turns.) By inserting more than one set of coordinates, it would also be possible to program a more complicated flight, with several changes of direction.

However an electronic hijacking might be managed, the organization responsible would also be sure to add other elements to the basic plan, not only developing lists of ghost riders, but sending fake cell phone calls from some of the passengers. The following analysis focuses on Flight 93, from which more alleged cell phone calls were made than from the other three flights combined. It could be called the ‘Cell phone Flight.’ The calling operation would be no less complex and require no less planning than the virtual hijacking itself.

Any analysis of the cell phone and "airfone" calls from Flight 93 must begin with some basic, high-altitude cell phone facts. According to AT&T spokesperson Alexa Graf, cell phones are not designed for calls from the high altitudes at which most airliners normally operate. It was, in her opinion, a "fluke" that so many calls reached their destinations. (Harter 2001) In the opinion of a colleague of mine who has worked in the cell phone industry, it was a "miracle" that any of the calls got through from altitude. An aircraft, having a metal skin and fuselage, acts like a Faraday cage, tending to block or attenuate electromagnetic radiation. One can make a cell phone call from inside an aircraft while on the ground because the greatly weakened signal is still close enough to the nearest cell site (relay tower) to get picked up. Once above 10,000 feet, however, calls rarely get through, if ever.

Here is the statement of an experienced airline pilot:

People boarding aircraft for the last decade or so have all heard the warnings to turn off their cell phones for the duration of the flight. The reason for this has nothing to do with interference with aircraft radio equipment, which is all electronically shielded in any case. Instead, the FCC has requested that airlines make this rule, owing to the tendency for cell phone calls made from aircraft at lower altitudes to create ‘cascades’ that may lead to breakdown of cell site operations.

The cascade problem is more likely at altitudes of 10,000 feet or lower, where reaching a cell site, although still a touch-and-go matter, is more easily accomplished. However, because of its superior position, the cell phone may reach several cell sites at once. This can create problems, as software that determines which site is to handle the call makes its judgment based on the relative strength of calls. If the call is made from an overhead position, it may well not be able to distinguish relative strength at different cell sites. When this happens it is designed to close off the calling channel, selecting another channel in its place. But the same problem of deciding which cell site should handle the call also occurs on the new channel, so the new channel is closed, and so on. One by one, in a rapid cascade that would last only seconds, all the channels would be closed, leading to a network-wide breakdown. [Fraizer 2002]

Although it was practically impossible for any calls to get through early in the hijacking of the Cell phone Flight, when it was at or near cruising altitude, there would be no theoretical difficulty after its slow descent over Pennsylvania. But it was then just as unlikely that no cell phone network cascades would occur. On the morning of 9/11, no such cascades occurred. Two more elements of doubt thus weigh against the official account.

It must also be remarked that the alleged hijackers of the Cell phone Flight were remarkably lenient with their passengers, allowing some 13 calls. However, it would seem highly unlikely that hijackers would allow any phone calls for the simple reason that passengers could relay valuable positional and other information useful to authorities on the ground, thus putting the whole mission in jeopardy.

The following analysis of the actual calls is based on text assembled by four reporters of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. [Roddy et al. 2001] The calls were mostly rather brief and it must be borne in mind that, with the exception of two recorded messages, the persons called would not necessarily recollect the exact words which either they or the caller used.

Following a delay in its scheduled departure time of 8:01 am, Flight 93 reached its cruising altitude of approximately 30,000 feet about 40 minutes into the flight. At about this time the INS/autopilot would have been engaged. And at about this time, the aircraft was ‘hijacked,’ according to several cell phone calls.

CALL A1: A man claiming to be Tom Burnett called his wife Deena in San Ramon, CA around 9:20 to Deena’s best recollection:

Deena: "Are you alright?"

Caller: "No. I’m on United Flight 93 from Newark to San Francisco. The plane was hijacked. We are in the air. They’ve already knifed a guy. There is a bomb on board. Call the FBI."

CALL B: Just before 9:30 am, a man claiming to be Jeremy Glick called Lyz Glick, who was visiting in-laws in the Catskills of New York state. The phone was answered by Glick’s mother-in-law, JoAnne Makely:

JoAnne: "Jeremy. Thank God. We’re so worried."

Caller: "It’s bad news. Is Liz there?"

The caller went on to describe Arabic-looking hijackers wearing red headbands and carrying knives. One had told the passengers he had a bomb. The caller asked if it was true that planes had been crashed into the World Trade Center. She confirmed this. The caller mentioned that another passenger had heard the news on his/her cell phone.

CALL A2: The man claiming to be Tom Burnett called Deena Burnett again around 9:30 am. As Deena later described his call, "He didn’t sound frightened, but he was speaking faster than he normally would." He told her there were hijackers in the cockpit.

Deena: "A lot of planes have been hijacked, but they don’t know how many."

Caller: "You’ve got to be kidding."

Deena: "No."

Caller: "Were they commercial planes or airliners?"

Deena: "I don’t know."

Caller: "Okay. I’ve got to go."

CALL C: A man claiming to be Mark Brigham called Brigham’s sister-in-law, Cathy Hoglan, who was being visited by Brigham’s mother, Alice. Cathy took the call and handed the phone to Alice with the remark, "Alice, talk to Mark. He’s been hijacked."

Caller: "Mom? This is Mark Brigham." (Alice Brigham accounts for this strange announcement as due to her son being flustered.)

Caller: "I want you to know that I love you. I’m on a flight from Newark to San Francisco and there are three guys who have taken over the plane and they say they have a bomb."

Alice: "Who are these guys?"

Caller: (after a pause) "You believe me, don’t you?"

Caller: "Yes, Mark. I believe you. But who are these guys?"

(After another pause the line went dead.)

CALL D: A man claiming to be Todd Beamer on a United Airlines airfone had some trouble getting through to anyone but the Verizon customer service center, where the operator relayed the call to Verizon supervisor, Lisa Jefferson at 9:45 am. (Verizon is a large communications company that has the contract for airfones on United airlines equipment.) The man told Jefferson that the plane had been hijacked, that he could see three hijackers armed with knives, one of them claiming to have a bomb. He described how the passengers had been herded to the rear of the aircraft, guarded by the one with the bomb. He asked the supervisor to call the Beamer family on his behalf.

Caller: "Oh! We’re going down. [Pause] No. We’re okay. I think we’re turning around." (It was approximately around this time that the flight, then passing near Cleveland, made a hard left toward Washington, DC.)

CALL A3: The man claiming to be Tom Burnett called Deena Burnett again.

Deena: "They’re taking airplanes and hitting landmarks all up and down the east coast."

Caller: "Okay. We’re going to do something. I’ll call you back."

CALL F1: At 9:47, the answering machine of Lorne Lyles recorded a call that he thought was from his wife, CeeCee. The woman could be heard praying for herself, her family, and even for the souls of the hijackers.

CALL B (cont’d.): State police, talking to Jeremy Glick’s mother-in-law, asked her to relay a question to Jeremy. Did he know where his plane was? He didn’t know, but said they had changed direction.

Caller: "I need you to be happy and I will respect any decisions that you make."

He told Mrs. Makely that the passengers were about to take a vote on whether to take back the aircraft. Should they try?

Lyz: "Honey, you need to do it." They spoke of weapons. The caller joked.

Caller: "I have my butter knife from breakfast."

CALL G: About this time, Phil Bradshaw, husband of flight attendant Sandy Bradshaw, received a phone call from a woman who identified herself as his wife.

Caller: "Have you heard what’s going on? My flight has been hijacked. My flight has been hijacked by three guys with knives."

Phil asked her who was flying the plane.

Caller: "I don’t know who’s flying the plane or where we are. I see a river."

Bradshaw: "Be safe and come home soon."

The caller then explained that she had to go. She planned to prepare boiling water in the galley -- to pour on the hijackers.

CALL H: Sometime after 9:30, Fred Fiumano received a call from someone claiming to be his friend, Marion Britton. The caller was crying, stating that the plane had been hijacked and that two passengers had already been killed. Fiumano tried to console his friend, stating that the hijackers were probably going to take her for a ride. "You’ll be alright."

CALL I: Jack Grandcolas in San Rafael, CA, received a call from a woman claiming to be Lauren Catuzzi Grandcolas, his wife. The message, as recorded on his answering machine, was short:

Caller: "Sweetie, pick up the phone if you can hear me. (pause) Okay, I love you. There’s a little problem with the plane. I’m fine and comfortable for now […]"

She asked Jack to pass along her love for everyone, then passed the airfone to her seat-mate.

Caller: "Now you call your people."

CALL J: Esther Heymann received a call from a woman claiming to be her stepdaughter, Honor Elizabeth Wainio, also Grandcolas’ seat-mate.

Caller: "Mom, we’re being hijacked. I just called to say good bye."

Heymann: "Elizabeth, we don’t know how this is going to turn out. I’ve got my arms around you."

Wainio said she could feel them.

Heymann: "Let’s look out at that beautiful blue sky. Let’s be here in the moment. Let’s do some deep breathing together." (pause)

Caller: "It hurts me that it’s going to be so much harder for you than it is for me."

CALL A4: Once again, just before 10:00 am, Deena Burnett received a fourth phone call.

Caller: "A group of us are going to do something."

Deena: "No, Tom. Just sit down and don’t draw attention to yourself."

Caller: "Deena, if they’re going to crash the plane into the ground, we have to do something. We can’t wait for the authorities. We have to do something now."

Caller: "Pray. Just pray, Deena. We’re going to do something."