IV. FACTS II

This chapter explicate considerable facts pertaining to those developments in the Soviet sphere of influence, which support the ensuing proposed thesis.

A. Unusual Developments in the Soviet Sphere of Influence from 1943 to 1953

1. New Anti-Semitism

Since the October Revolution, the Soviet Union was in general a pro-Jewish nation. Many discriminations of the czarist regime were abolished: the Soviet Union treated, within the realm of its national policy, the Jews as equals amongst its other nationals. Although a number of Jewish schools and seven Jewish theatres were closed during renaturalization tendencies between 1936 and 1939, this can nevertheless not be classified as a new anti-Semitism [257]. However this attitude changed in 1943, in the middle of the war. Excerpts:

»Jews fought together with the other peoples of the USSR against the deadly fascism. But in 1943 another wave of anti-Semitism swept the country, more severe than during the era of the czar. The focal point of anti-Semitism was the occupied territories; from here anti-Semitism spread amongst the rows of the partisan movement, the Red Army and its rear guard. Discrimination of Jews in the army was becoming severe. Thousands of Jews, who had fought heroic battles, were not honoured due to their nationality. At the same time, pertinacious rumours had it that Jews didn't fight at the front, but idled about.«[258]

It is peculiar that anti-Semitism began in the German occupied areas, there where all Jews had been exterminated! Who can explain this?

2. Auschwitz

On January 27, 1945 Soviet troops reached Auschwitz. [259] The Soviet Union engaged an "Exceptional State Commission for the Assessment and Investigation of the Atrocities of the Fascist German Invaders and their Accomplices concerning the horrific deeds and crimes of the German Government in Auschwitz (Oswiezim)" [260] This commission interrogated and examined 2819 former inmates of the concentration camp Auschwitz and exploited German documents [261]. On May 6, 1945[262] the commission published a detailed report, stating:

»1. Through execution by firing squads and horrific torture, the Germans exterminated over four million nationals of the Soviet Union, of Poland, France, Belgium Holland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and of other countries in the concentration camp of Auschwitz.
2. German professors and physicians exercised vivisections on men, women and children in the camp…« [263]

There is no mentioning of gassing here, but of shootings and horrific torture. Gas chambers are mentioned in the next point and by witness reports, where it is stated that »…selected inmates were put into the gas chambers to be executed.« [264] The report is in itself contradictory, but it is the first immediate memorandum concerning Auschwitz. However, the reaction of the Soviet Union is odd.

  1. The numerous documents and protocols, which in accordance with the above findings must exist, were never published.
  2. The Soviet Union did not forward one single document to Israel during the Eichmann trial.[265]
  3. The subject of mass extermination of Jews is taboo in the Soviet Union. »Stalin only mentioned but once that the Nazi politics had the annihilation of the Jews in mind…«[266]

In the Soviet sphere of interest, further documents pertaining to the mass extermination have disappeared and/or prominent witnesses have been screened from the western public.

The Gerstein report, a report of the SS officer Kurt Gerstein on mass extermination in the camps of Belzec, Treblinka, Sobibor and Majdanek, which triggered Rolf Hochhut's drama called "Stellvertreter", contains various grave discrepancies. Gerstein probably committed suicide on July 25, 1945 in his prison cell in Paris. [267] Thus he cannot be questioned any more. But in order to throw light on the discrepancies, the interrogation protocols would help. The file Gerstein has disappeared. The French authorities supposedly sent it to Professor Gros to the French Embassy in London on November 10, 1945 so that it may be forwarded to the Polish delegation at the United Nations. Since then, there is no trace of the document. [268]

The are also strange sequels concerning Rudolf Höss, the commandant of Auschwitz. He was arrested in the vicinity of Flensburg. During the war criminal trials of Nürnberg, he was interrogated briefly as witness(!) and extradited to the Poles on May 25, 1946. Eleven months later, on April 2, 1947, the Polish High Court sentenced him to death. He was executed at Auschwitz fourteen days later.[269] He made his first testimony in Poland. Höss, supposedly a willing and coopertive prisoner,[270] is not presented to the international public. This is not comprehensible. His entire personal notes were published nine years later in Polish! [271]

On May 2, Berlin is totally occupied by Soviet troops.[272] Up until the advent of the Allies, on July 3rd and 4th 1945, they had complete control of Berlin [273] and as such, access to all documentary centres of the Third Reich. Thus the Soviet Union could easily have selected incriminating documents. Contemporary witnesses report that this was actually done:

»When the Russians occupied Berlin in 1945 they ransacked the official German archives, using more force than care: some material was sent to Russia, some destroyed and the rest was either disregarded or simply ignored.« [274]

It is hard to decipher whether there was any lack of care because one should know what the Russians were looking for and if they had found it. Of Goebbel's diaries, which were spread about the court of his ministry [275] his entries concerning February 14, 1942; the pages 9 to 36 are missing and they, as far as the context is concerned, indulge on the fate of the European Jews! [276]

3. The Establishment of the United Nations

On June 26, 1945 the UN was founded by 51 states in San Franzisco.[277] It's odd that one of the founding nations is Belorus. [278] It would have been more common sense, had the Baltic states, which were independent until 1940, been founding-members. But they were missing.

4. Partisans in Belorus after 1945

After liberation in 1944, a new partisan movement was established in Belorus of all places! Or was it the old movement? Excerpt:

»During the first years after the war, Soviet control was resented by the population of the those territories, which were annexed by the USSR in 1939 - 1940, lost to Germany and regained after victory. These areas, the Baltic Republics and the former Polish territory (Belorus and parts of western Ukraine)- were annexed by the Soviet Union after the war. Total deportation of the Polish undesirables followed. Discontented indigenous, who remained free in these areas, continued their sporadic guerilla actions against the Soviet agencies from secret hide-outs in the forests. The MWD/MGD was deeply involved in these combats against these "bandits" lasting into the 50's. They applied similar techniques as employed by the "Tscheka" during the civil war: the use of under-cover agents as MWD-partisans within the partisan groups. Both sides had tremendous losses during this exposition« [279]

5. Wallenberg and others

Raoul Wallenberg was attache at the Swedish Embassy in Budapest. He inherited this position due to the explicit wish of the government of the United States of America. His aim: to save as many Jews as possible from the deportation to Auschwitz. [280] When the Red Army reached Budapest, Wallenberg was apprehended on January 17, 1945. He was charged of burglary of Jewish property. Investigations proved the innocence of Wallenberg and the fact that he had saved 30,000 people from deportation. However, the government in Moscow demanded his extradition to the Soviet Union. He was transported to the Soviet Union on February 4, 1945. [281] Due to an intervention of the Swedish Embassy in Moscow, Stalin, in the summer of 1946, promised to take notice of Wallenberg's fate. On August 1947 the Soviet side stated that one could not find the Soviet officer, who had apprehended Wallenberg and had reported his capture to the Soviet authorities. [282] Wallenberg disappeared. Yet he is supposedly still alive, living under a pseudonym in Krasnojarsk due east from Nowosibrisk in Sibera [283]

Note: Because of the continuous reference to Wallenberg and of his deployment, he surely must have had the knowledge of the actual fate of the Jews in Auschwitz.

Wallenberg is not the only foreigner who disappeared in the Soviet Union after 1945. 600 to 700 French nationals were kept in the Soviet Union against their will, amongst them, inmates of the German concentration camps. They were deported to transit camps in the Soviet Union after liberation. Apparently, they had seen too much. [284]

Note: Since the middle of 1944, many inmates of Auschwitz were transferred to the German concentration camps. Höss reported of transport commandos of gypsies. Did the French receive too much information on this. What can they learn of the Soviet Union in a German concentration camp?

6. The Year 1948

The Year 1948 is distinguished because many of the following events happened or had their origin in this year.

a) The Jewish Antifascist League. This league was founded in the Soviet Union during the war. Their task was to theatre support for the Soviet Union, the Red Army and the population from the Jewish populace in the United States. [285] President of the league was S.M. Michoels, a renowned Jewish actor. Michoels visited the US in 1943 to rally public mental and financial support. It is said that the journey was very successful. On January 13, 1948 Michoels was murdered by members of the Russian Secret Service on a road in Minsk. The corpse was mutilated by a truck in order to feign an accident. [286] Stalin himself gave that order by telephone, so his daughter Swetlana, who was a coincidental witness. [287]

The league was prohibited in the fall of 1948 [288], its members were arrested, tortured and shot in 1952. [289] Which reproaches were made? In 1944 the committee directed a letter to Stalin asking that the depopulated Crimea be set aside for the Jews. It wanted to create an independent Jewish republic. [290] Stalin accused the league of severing the Crimea from the USSR. [291]

Note: is it not peculiar that in 1934, when many more millions of Jews existed in the Soviet Union than in 1944, they had but one autonomic region? [292] Now, after millions were murdered in the Soviet Union, another autonomic region is to be created, and that during the course of the war! The year 1944 seems important because in that year, Belorus was recaptured by the Soviets. Why should the Soviet Jews demand Crimea from the Soviet Union. Did they not already possess a homeland? It would have been more understandable, if Jews from the other European countries had made such a claim.

b) Foundation of the State of Israel. Due to a vote of the United Nations, the state of Israel was proclaimed on May 14, 1948. [293]

c) Destruction of Jewish facilities. During the second half of the year 1948, important Jewish facilities were prohibited or closed in the Soviet Union: [294]

Furthermore, Ilja Ehrenberg published anti-zionistic articles directed against ›a certain group of anti-patriotic theatre critics‹.

d) Prohibited areas were created. According to an ordinance of September 30, 1948 a list of prohibited areas for foreign diplomats was promulgated. [295]

e) Confined troops. In 1948 the Soviet Union commenced comprehensive investigations on German POWs and members belonging to certain troops were confined until further notice.

7. Slansky and others

On November 28, 1951 the Czech newspaper Rude Pravo reported the arrest of Slansky. Slansky was the General Secretary of the Czech Communist Party. He was sentenced to death exactly one year later. The blame: The Slansky group was a Zionistic conspiracy. [298] The details:

»Slansky, Geminder, Sling, Clementis etc. were never communists. They came from the well-situated, lower middle class, thus susceptive to all sorts of social upheavels. In their youth, they were ardent proponents of Trotzky. They were also Jewish chauvinists and cosmopoliticians using the Zionistic organisation for their low ends: illegal financial transactions and smuggle. They also cooperated with British and American agents, sought to disband Czechoslovakia from the Soviet hegemony, thus had ties to Tito and to Gromulka in Poland, just as they were informants for Benesch and Masaryk. Some of their highly treacherous connections originated in the former Spanish International Brigade. They attempted to hinder trade with the Soviet Union by asking much higher prices for merchandise going to the east, than western transactions would cost. Transactions with the west were theatred through masonic connections, as these lodges were widely open for Jews.« [299]

As the impeachment saw it:

»President Gottwald was to be liquidated by his personal physician. The Czech disengagement from the Soviet Union was the immediate concoction of American and British imperialism. These powers continuously received sensitive political and military information. Agents employed the Zionistic movement, thus mutating it to a proponent of western imperialism. Therefore all Jews were susceptible to western corruption, just as the former Red-Spanish combatants were. American and British ›fellow travellers‹, like the American Noel and Hermann Field as well as the British Labour member, Zillicus, just feigned leftist views. In reality, they were dangerous agents of the Secret Service and of the American central intelligence. Benesch was a western spy and a traitor. Tito, Gomulka and Rajk belonged to the same conspiracy. Furthermore, the Zionistic reproachment was also affective through Titos confidant, Pijade. Finally, the accused were anti-Soviet chauvinists, who not only fought against the Czech enlignment with the Soviet Union but sabotaged the economy as well.« [300]

Similar to all staged trials in Moscow, the accused confessed to nearly all points. They and the witnesses were mostly Jews.[301] For the sake of alterations in similar purges, not only "Westerners" but also "Moscowvites" were tried, i.e. persons who had lived for a longer period of time either in the West or in the Soviet Union. The result: no Jews existed in the Prague party secretariat and party presidency, all had been removed from high army and state positions. [302] An interesting aspect: The planing and development of the dispatchment of Slansky goes back to the year 1948 (!). In the end of August 1948 Shdanow, an influential, contemporary theorist, died. Quote:

»The day after Shdanow's death, Gottwald was called to a conference in the Crimea. In Russia, the Malenko group had gained power. Shdanow's men were all removed from central positions. When Gottwald returned to Prague, he was the new strong man. In a speech, where no names were yet mentioned, he summarily accused his opponents as Trotzkyists. ›From this time onward, Slansky was on the defensive.« [303]

Aside from Slansky and his followers, another powerful communist Jewish group was dissolved.

»Not at all less bloody, the purge in Rumania began a bit later. In May 1952, vice-president Vasile Luca and the minister of the interior, Theohari Georgescu, were dismissed from office and Ana Pauker was excluded from the Secretariate and Politbureau of the Party. In June, she had to rebuke the State Secretary. By these means the ›national communist‹ Gheorghiu-Dej succeeded in overruling the most important representatives of the "Moscowvite Branch". Luca, Georgescu and Ana Pauker, all of Jewish origin, were never heard of again.« [304]

These actions within the Czech and Rumanian Communist Party are singular, when compared to the other purges. Citation:

»The affair Luca - Georgescu - Pauker shows the difficulty in "getting set rules for a purge", if, for instance, all purgartory actions were a blue-print of the simple Titoistic schemes. The ›crimes‹ of which Luca, Pauker and Georgescu were accused by the Rumanian Central Committee have nothing in common with ›Titoism‹, old-fashioned ›nationalism‹, or ›anti-Sovietism‹. On the other hand, the Rumanian crisis shows an appalling similarity to the political crisis in Czechoslovakia, which led to the liquidation of Slansky and his followers. Ana Pauker is, as Slansky, of Jewish origin. By using them - as the Hungarian Luca (his real name being Laszlo Lukacs) from Siebenbürgen - as scapegoats, it is probable that the discontent of the population was to be steered into a cleverly concealed anti-Semitism or chauvinism. This is a hypothesis, which however should not be primarily discarded, especially since the Pauker affair coincided with an anti-Zionistic exhibition. In Czechoslovakia the affair Slansky lead to the arrest of more Zionists, even of an Israeli diplomat and of an extreme leftist Israeli journalist.« [305]

Such actions however, are not the sole work of Stalin. When Chruschtschow gained power, his methods were more subtle. The former method eliminated entire Jewish groups, while Chruschtschow concentrated on the elimination of Jewish individuals. Brzezinski:

»That's why Chruschtschow sought to secure unity and consistency with new methods. Malenko was able to ignore the political problem for the time being by allowing economic leniency. Chruschtschow, who enforced an economic ›neostalinism‹, had to deal with the problem directly. He apparently came up with a solution at the end of the year: he accentuated economic similarities and allowed restricted political autonomy, unthinkable in the era of Stalin. That led to the support of such communist leaders, who seemed to be acceptable within the population. Chruschtschow made it dearly clear that Jewish communists like Rakosi, Berman or Ana Pauker were, as far as he was concerned, a liability for the Party.« [306]

8. The Lawsuit against Physicians

On January 13, 1953 the Prawda printed an article to the effect that the most renowned physicians of the Kreml Hospital, who were personally responsible for Stalin and other high ranking members of the Party and of the Military, had deliberately maltreated their patients. [307] Of the nine physicians accused, six were Jews. [308] Amongst them was Professor Wowsi, the brother of the in 1948 executed Michoels. [309] The concept:

»Stalin personally engaged himself with the ›conspiracy of the physicians‹. His invented plot consisted of more than one act. Act One - the sentencing of the physicians after their total admission of guilt. Act Two - death by hanging. It is said that, just as in the old days, the execution was to take place on the Red Square in Moscow, the former execution site. Act Three - Pogroms of Jews throughout the country. Act Four - renowned Jewish culture functionaries plea that Stalin save the Jews from the pogrom by allowing them to leave the cities, resettling them in the countryside. Act Five - Mass deportation of the Jews "according to their own wish" to the eastern districts of the country. A member of the Central Committee of the Presidency of the Communist Party, the philosopher D. Tschesnokow wrote a book describing the grounds for the exodus. Originally, the book was intended for party functionaries. One just waited for the signal for the book to be published. The plea of the Jewish culture functionaries had already been formulated and signed in one act.« [310]

Stalin died on March 5, 1953. This stopped all plans. [311]

B. Important Aspects

1. Situation of the Jews

After Stalin's death in 1953, all Jews were removed from political, social and economic life. [312] Neither did Chruschtschow nor did his successors change this situation. The methods simply changed. The following headlines describe them:

A typical form of the omission of Jews can be seen in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia: [315]

1932 (1. Edition) 108 columns
1952 (2. Edition) 4 columns
1972 (3. Edition) 2 columns

One talks of decreed silence as far as Jews are concerned, thereby hindering the restitution of the Jewish organs and institutions destroyed by Stalin. [316] In 1971 not one Yiddish school, not one Yiddish classroom existed anymore [317] There are no Yiddish Publishing Houses, no agencies to distribute any books either. [318]

Jewish religious life was strongly suppressed. No cultural affects: robes or phyllacteries, necessities for daily prayer, were produced. [319] Synagogues were reduced to:

1956 : 450
1963 : 96
1969 : 62
1971 : a small handfull.[320]

Rabbies or culture officials had no successors and this situation was ascertained by trickery (Nonpermittance to live near the only school of religion). [321] Jews did not get any work, especially not at the two great universities of Moscow and Leningrad. [322] The colleges only accepted a marginal percentage, ranging from two to five percent. To those institutions instructing personelle for the defence industry, Jews had no access whatsoever. [323] In general, the past of each Jewish individual was screened, before work was granted. [324] In case of immigration, detailed particulars were demanded. Quote:

»Complete Questionaire returned to OWIR with all details of the applicant, his kin, curriculum vitae, places of work, earnings, etc.« [325]

Even the almighty KGB was prepared for this surveillance programme. The KGB was divided into main agencies. In 1969 a fifth agency was installed. It was to suppress political opposition and increase the surveillance of the population. [326] This branch had a marked structure: [327] see p. 118.

Only this fifth administrative branch had, by will of the supreme headquarters, a special department. Citation:

»A special Jewish Department was installed in 1971. Its goal was to intimidate Russian Jews, undermine public protest and discourage willing emigrants. Because this department was fairly new, there is little secured information concerning its organisation and field of work.« [328]

FIFTH AGENCY

 

 

Secretariate___________

__________Party committee

Jewish Department    

 

 

Central Control
of Regional
Settlement

 

 

Department for the Control
of National Minorities,
Clergy, State Criminals,
Intelligence, Sects, etc.

Note: the Soviet Union had the instruments to dispand contacts of Jews with the West. She could control anybody having connections to the outside.

Many Jews in the West were furious that the Soviet Union systematically refused comment on the mass murder through the National Socialists. It has already been stated that Stalin mentioned this but once. Places, where mass executions of Jews had taken place, had no memorials; here, Babi Jar plays a special role. [329] Referring to the above, the declaration of Ilja Ehrenburg seems odd:

»The graves, where the Hitlerites buried old women and small children, bind me to the Jews. In the past, I was bound to them by the streams of blood; later by the malicious weed germinated from a racist seed; by the consistency of prejudice and bias. When I held a speech in the radio on my seventieth birthday, I told my listeners I would always confirm that I am a Jew as long as anti-Semitism exists.« [330]

This is an odd, ambiguous circumscription of the fate of the Jews, its interpretation conceding to ambiguity, with no word whatsoever on Auschwitz. Thus, it is befitting that the Soviet Union did not support Israel with a single document during the Eichmann trial. [331]

Concrete impressions on the situation of the Jews in the Soviet Union were gathered by the American Jew, Prof.Dr. David W. Weiss, when he was invited to visit Russia in 1965. Citation:

»My report states that my first contact with the Jews in the Soviet Union was shocking. Thus I decided to investigate further than I had originally planned. I used up to eight to twelve hours daily in the Soviet Union to contact either Jews or the officials responsible for Jewish matters. During my stay in the USSR, I had talks - private talks with at least one hundred and fifty Jews of every age group and of every social status.« [332]
»Indeed, all Jews in the USSR with whom I spoke, - the young, the middle aged, the old - showed fear: the only reason being their Jewry.« [333]
»When I asked the Jews why they were so afraid, they all gave the same answer: they feared losing their job, their position or even their permit of residence in certain cities. It was fear of arrest, of deportation or even of much worse consequences as official reactions against them: simply because they were Jews.« [334]

During a visit to a synagogue, he writes:

»When I first entered a synagogue in Kiev in the late afternoon in order to participate in the afternoon prayer, a few old men responded to my greetings in the outer court of the synagogue. They seemed to be intimidated. When I entered the building, one man left his group, came up to me and asked me of my intentions.« [335]
»He signalled that I would be welcome, but only under the condition that I participate in the mass. I should by no means attempt to contact anybody. This man was - as I discovered later - the dean of

the Jewish Cultural Community in Kiev.« [336]

»One evening while waiting in the synagogue for the commencement of mass, two members of the Israeli Embassy in Moscow - being no doubt officially in Kiev - entered the synagogue. The dean of the Jewish Community demanded that the two men interrupt their parley with the older men who had immediately surrounded them, and to take a seat in the front of the synagogue beside me. When the two visitors refused, the dean began a malicious tirade, which lasted over half an hour. He insulted them personally, then all Israelis stating that they were all fascists, exploiters of the Arabs and of the Jewish proletarians, who cooperated with the Germans, etc. Without doubt, this man's function was to hinder all contacts between visitors and the Jewish population« [337]

Pertaining to Babi Jar:

»Following my arrival in Kiev, I asked my guide to bring me to Babi Jar, that place near Kiev where the Germans killed thousands of Jews in 1941, after they had occupied the city. The following debate occurred: ›When I first mentioned my wish, I was told that the place called Babi Jar did not exist.‹.« [338]

Because of his tenaciousness, he finally did get to Babi Jar. The quintessence of it all:

»I emphasize this occurance in order to show the profuse hesitation, whenever a visitor wants to see place of special Jewish interest. My interpretation was affirmed during my contacts with the officials of Intourist. Whenever and wherever I wanted to visit a place of especially Jewish interest, one always tried to discourage me - either I was told that the place did not exist, or - if I insisted - I was informed that the area was not free to the public, or in repair, or one had similar excuses.« [339]

His most important realization:

»I had the firm impression that Jews living in the Soviet Union had the feeling of being discarded. On the one hand, the government pressurizes all forms of Jewish religious and cultural aspirations, having one goal in mind: assimilation by force. On the other hand, Jews are relentlessly attacked as racists and as an ethnic group, thereby rendering assimilation impossible because they are omitted from all areas and forced into seclusion: Jews can't even find comfort in their Jewry, because all means which express Jewry are strongly prohibited.« [340]
»The second general conclusion is: the civilian officials in the USSR do their utmost - including those Jews, who officially represent the Jewish Community - to construct a barrier between the Jews of the Soviet Union and of foreign Jewish visitors.« [341]

The question arises: What' behind all this?

Finally, one last point: The use of Yiddish diminished rapidly in the Soviet Union. In 1926 72% of the Jews talked Yiddish, in 1959 20,8%. [342] The still available, meagre literature which was published in the Soviet Union in Yiddish was published in the ancient Hebrew alphabet. [343] Who, so one must ask himself, was capable of reading this ancient script? Maybe more Jews than thought possible. One must not forget the foregoing chapter where a N(ational)S(ocialist) directive stipulated that: »Aside from Yiddish, the Hebrew language is to be promoted, as this will support segregation.« Was this instruction copied by the Soviets?

2. Population Statistics

a) Belorus. This chapter deals with the population development of Belorus between 1939 and 1959 in general and with the Jewish development in the Soviet Union since 1939 in particular.

Official statistics of the Soviet Union must be regarded with great care since they could have been easily manipulated. The term "partiality of the statistics" [344] was used quite often, especially during the Stalinistic period. It is said that Stalin had "donned a giant lock onto the Soviet statistics" [345] One example is the falsification of the wheat harvest in the Soviet Union: [346]

According to a 1951 report:
crop yield in 1940 was 119 mill. tons
crop yield in 1950 was 124 mill. tons

According to a 1958 report:
crop yield in 1940 was 95,5 mill. tons
crop yield in 1950 was 81,5 mill. tons

Western officials mistrust the results of the 1939 census. Citation:

»Part of the deviation may be due to the fact that the derived number of individuals for the years 1939/40 was too great. The Soviet Union did have a census in 1937. The results were annulled because they contradicted expectations. The responsible officials of the bureau of statistics were fired. It would have been comprehensible, if the heads of the census bureau striving for a higher population number, had simply not amended possible duplicates. To which extent this falsification of the 1939 census led to, cannot be evaluated. At any rate, part of the total difference is explicable.«[347]

Two different official assertions concerning the number of people who lived in Belorus in 1939 exist.

1st. Report: The population of Belorus in 1939: 10,5 million people.[348]
2nd. Report: The population of Belorus in 1939: 8,91 million people.[349]

It is noteworthy that the second promulgation is respective to the »contemporary boundaries«. The Soviet Union returned part of the area around Bialystok to Poland in 1945. Nevertheless, the considerable difference in numbers, 10.5 and 8.91 million, still exists. The area of Belorus in 1939 was roughly 225 000 sq.km.[350] Today this area has 270,600 sq.km.[351] Accordingly, the difference is 17,400 sq.km. If one assumes an average population density of 43 persons per square kilometer for the region of Bialystok, then roughly 0,750 million people must have lived in the part returned to Poland.[352???] These numbers are plausible, since Bialystok had about 1,372 million inhabitants in 1941, and since half of the area went to Poland (in 1945).[353] Thus it can be concluded:

1st. Report (amended): The population of Belorus in 1939: 9,75 million people.

As shown, the official census reports of Belorus must be regarded with great care. We want to present another example of a dubious report. The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia (German edition of 1955) states that:

»According to the number of inhabitants, the Belorussian SSR ranks third amongst the Soviet Republics (preceded only by the Russian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR). In 1939, 10.5 million inhabitants were registered. The areas of Gomel and Grodno are the most densely populated, the areas of Polessje and Pinsk, the most thinly. Belorussians predominate. According to a census of 1926, the population in the eastern part of Belorus consisted of 80.6% Belorussians; 7.7% Russians; 8.2% Jews; 2% Poles; 0.7% Ukrainians and 0.8% of other ethnic groups. Belorussians make up to 80% in western Belorus. Following the Great Fatherland's War, the fraction of Belorussians increased as those Poles living in Belorus left for their homeland while those Belorussians living in Poland returned to Belorus.«[354]

These figures are contradictory. Not only that the number of 10.5 million inhabitants is mentioned, also contradictory is the increase in population of the Belorussians or White Russians. It is mentioned that the fraction of Belorussians reached 80%. According to the census [355] of 1959, that fraction was 81.1% Thus there can be no assumption of any increase. According to western intelligence, no (or a statistically insignificant number of) Belorussians were repatriated, only Ukrainians from Poland to the Soviet Union.[356]

The result of the next census of 1959 in the Soviet Union showed:

Population 1959 in Belorus: 8,055 million people. [357???]

In view of the aforementioned assumptions, a much higher number of individuals should have been expected. However, one may also assume that this number is much too high! To support this, special considerations of Belorus must be accounted for. After the Polish acquisition of Belorus became Russian again, the Soviets deported a large number of the inhabitants to the Urals or to Siberia. Their goal: to find a final solution for the "Polish Question". Indeed a very apart formulation. Concerning the extent:

»An exact number of the deportees cannot be established. The Soviet, historic literature omits every detail; the already mentioned Warsaw File, originating from one of the best military historian of today's Poland, assumes the number of deported in September 1939 to reach 800.000 to 900.000; the number of voluntary "emigrates of the Polish workers" reaching 50.000. This figure lies far below the number of victims of the Soviet "deportation policy". Literature on the emigration speaks of various numerals: which are no doubt closer to the truth. According to a very reliable Polish author, the exact calculation of the deportees lies around 1.2 million Poles. Another Polish author quotes a welfare action, initiated by the Polish Embassy in Moscow, and supposes the number of deportees at 1.5 million. Roman Buczek talks of 1.5 million deportees and arrested persons, of which only 52% had the Polish citizenship, 30% were Jews, 18 to 20% were Ukrainians and Belorussians.·«[358]

After 1945, further population displacements took place in Belorus:

»Kulischer figures that until December 1946, the date at which the agreed repatriation between Russia and Poland was to end, about one million Poles returned to Poland from the annexed eastern, former Polish territories, including those who, having passed the border, were already controlled and registered. According to the Polish Office for Statistics, about 500.000 Ukrainians were evacuated, so that the Soviet Union should have lost at least half a million inhabitants.«[359]

Because those people who were evacuated from Poland to the Soviet Union were Ukrainians, it is plausible they they were repatriated in the Ukraine. Thus the following calculation can be made:

1939:
1940/41:
1945/46:

8.9 Million
./. 1.5 Million
./. 1.0 Million

Result:

6.4 Million

The Soviet Union lost many persons during World War II, just as Belorus did. Between 1939 and 1959 the following population developments took place in the Soviet Union (in thousands):[360]

Country

1939

1959

USSR
Ukraine
Lithuania
Latvia
Estonia

190678
40469
2880
1885
1052

208826
41893
2713
2094
1196

Accordingly, during the period of 1939 - 1959 the population of the Soviet Union increased to nearly 10%. In areas directly involved in the war, the population increase remained substantially below this point. Thus, as far as Belorus is concerned, it is reasonable to expect a population of

6.5 million people.

As one can see, the numerical population of Belorus is mysterious. According to the above calculation, there is a surplus of 1.5 million people. It is difficult to reason that there should be no sufficient explanation for this peculiar behaviour on the part of the Soviet government. I think that the allegation of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, namely that the number of the Belorussian people did increase substantially, has a fundamental background. As far as I am concerned, it was the Jewish fraction which was concentrated here in Belorus, coming from the sphere of the National Socialist influence. It is feasible that at the time the encyclopaedia was published, one wanted to promulgate exact numbers when derived from a future census, and these remarks served as preparative prerequisites. Maybe the Jews from the Ukraine and the Baltic States were resettled here as well. Then the number 8.055 million wouldn't even deviate that much from the actual numerals. But this is speculation. What remains is an irregularity in the Soviet census. According to the judgement of an expert:

»A preceding, methodical examination is especially necessary, if one wants to evaluate the results of the latest census. A first balance of this census gives the impression that the root of the coefficients is the result of a prudent selection, just as was the case in content and expanse of a similar balance in the preliminaries of the 1939 census. This impression is enhanced by the method by which material is presented, e.g. that a numerical comparison with 1939 is made, which is short of one million as stated in the latest publication (in Narodnoje chosjajstwo SSSR w 1956 godu, p.18) and which deviates greatly with respect to the Ukraine and Belorus, while total agreement exists in the Russian SSR and other Soviet Republics. Furthermore, no explanations exist for these differences.«[361]

One should note that Belorus is mentioned again note the citation of much too low numbers. What's behind all this?

b) The Number of Jews in the Soviet Union. The examination of the development of the Jewish population in the Soviet Union is equally complicated. It seems to be quite simple. The number of Jews coincide with the consecutive census in:

1926:
1939:
1959:

2673000 Jews
3020000 Jews
2268000 Jews[362]

However, these numbers cannot be compared. The area of the Soviet Union was much smaller in 1939 than in 1959. It did not encompass the Baltic States and Bessarabia. Many Jews lived in those areas.[363???] If one adds their numbers to the census of 1939, then the following results:

Lithuania:
Latvia:
Estonia:
Bessarabia:

269600 Jews
93479 Jews
9000 Jews
290000 Jews

Sum:

662079 Jews

Thus the updated census of 1939 would read [364]:

1939: (updated): 3682 000 Jews.

That would mean that the number of Jews in the USSR did not increase but declined substantially:

1939 (updated):
1959:

3682 000 Jews
2268 000 Jews

Deficiency:

1414000 Jews

Based on the priniciples of Georges Wellers,[365] one must also consider the natural population growth. If one modifies Wellers' technique [366], then one would attain the following numbers for 1959:

3682000 + (1% × (3 + 14)) = 4307940 Jews
rounded up = 4308000 Jews.

Thus the deficiency increases even more:

1959 (expected):
1959 (counted):

4308 000 Jews
2268 000 Jews

Deficiency:

2040 000 Jews

Wellers' calculation however, omits one main aspect which must be indulged upon. His method also allows the calculation of the number of Jews who ought to live in the Soviet Union 12 years after 1959, in 1971.

2268000 + (1% × 12) = 2540160 Jews.

If one compares the rounded up expected and actual figures derived from the census of 1971, then one gets the following result:

1971 (expected):
1971 (counted):

2540 000 Jews
2151 000 Jews [367].

Deficiency:

389 000 Jews

Accordingly, the deficit count in 1971 resulted in 389 000 Jewish individuals. Where were they, and how did this come about? The answer is simple: assimilation! When did this assimilation take place - since 1959? Or earlier? Was the pressure to assimilate always equally strong? How were the Jews able to assimilate in the USSR. I have found various answers. Citation:

»According to Soviet law, every Soviet citizen can, at the age of 16, acquire a passport and determine his own nationality, independant of origin, family name, mother tongue and religion. Thus, anybody could become a Russian citizen (or any other national), even though he might not master the Russian language (because his family ties came from Usbekistan). Mother tongue and nationality need not be identical. It is more a matter of traditional ties (family influence) and of individual affiliation, which nationality one would tend to acquire.«[368]

»From the very beginning the definition of a Jewish nationality posed a problem: ›The nationality of the bearers of Soviet passports were identical to the parents' nationality, regardless of the place of birth and residence.... Should the bearer be the offspring of a mixed marriage, then he had the right to choose the nationality either of the father or of the mother upon receipt of the passport.‹ (Soviet Union Today 16th Issue., Book 3, 2.1.1971, p. 33) However, the definition Jewish National is by no means easy. Due to the czarist persecution, there was the tendency, especially in the better educated group, to rid oneself of the incriminating Jewish, favouring the Russian nationality. By renouncing their religion, the various classes integrated with the Russian populace without losing their Jewish citizenship. These Jews wanted and did not want autonomy, in actual fact they dissolved with their indigenous hosts.«[369]

»Jews in the Soviet Union are accepted as an ethnic group as well as a religious society, thus having a legal status. If both parents declared themselves as Jewish, then the offspring will automatically become Jew. It remains primarily the decision of the parents; the Soviet assimilation policy would prefer however that parents declare at the register office, if their children are to be Jewish or not.«[370]

»To put the lid on it, Jews are encouraged to accept the indigenous habits. Children from mixed marriages are, as a rule, no Jews. Eduard Kusnezow gives an example in his ›Diaries‹. Despite of his wish to be accepted as Jew, because his father was Jewish, he was always treated as a Russian.«[371]

These statements are confusing and contradicting. It is mentioned that either one is free to choose any nationality, or the father or the mother have that freedom of choice, or the parents can choose for their children. This contradiction may be due to the fact that certain rules were altered, or that they were interpreted differently in different regions. A report from Professor Weiss on a meeting with a Jew comments on this practice:

»He asked, "Do you know that I am a Jew?" We answered, "Yes, your name seems to be of Jewish origin". He told us that his spouse was not Jewish and that they had children. Then he told us that his children were born at a time when Soviet national policy dictated that children from mixed marriages, where one partner is Jewish, had to be declared as Jews in their passports and in other documents. His youngest child however, was born at a time when that law was amended and that children, whose one parent were Jewish, had the right to chose between the nationality of either the father or mother as soon as they became of age.«[372]

This observation from Weiss describes that time changes stipulations, another depicts regional differences in practice:

»And on the other hand, they are not accepted in the high society, even if they should be willing to cut all traditional bonds - no matter if they are secular or religious. Jews in the Soviet Union must make the painful experience that they will reach a point of no place to go and of no return.«[373]

Apparently, the Soviet Union executes various methods. Either a Jew can change his nationality quite readily or not at all. Maybe it's subject to the individual Jew, where he's from, how long he lived in the Soviet Union, which experiences he made. Who knows?

Finally one further aspect must be discussed. Quotation:

»In 1959, altogether 309 000 Greeks lived in the Soviet Union, 104 000 in the Ukraine, 73 000 in Georgia and 47 000 in the Russian SSR (13 000 in the municipality of Stawropol, 12 000 in Krasnodar). This index shows that the Greeks were registered in their homelands, where they lived since 1813. A total of 96 000 are not registered, 21 000 of which lived in the Russian SSR and 85 000 outside the area of registration. Other statistics mention 5000 Greeks in Armenia (Narodnoe chozjajstvo Armjanskoj SSR from 1964 g, Erevan 1965, p.6), so that 80 000 are still missing. These are probably the expelled Greeks from 1943. In 1939, altogether 186 000 Greeks lived in the USSR, 84 960 in Georgia. In 1959 they numbered 309 000, where 72 938 lived in Georgia.«[374]

If one considers that among those Jews deported "to the East", 13.435 came from Greece, it is feasible that they can be easily "declared" as Greeks. Is is not possible to »declare« German Jews as Germans? Can one not »promote« the assimilation of elder Jews, and hinder the assimilation of new arrivals? A visa in the passport is all the officials need to be informed that emigration is not possible, or that these people be kept away from vocations in Moscow, for example. Many of the described peculiarities can be explained through this procedure.

The Soviet Union had numerous means which would allow it "to hide" Jews who were expelled from Europe and transported to the USSR. Should one not consider that many Jews would be willing to forget their Jewry after their fateful survival, being all to willing to integrate with the indigenous?

3. The Partisans

The developement of the partisan activity was already discussed in an earlier chapter. Soviet reports on partisan movements within the Soviet Republics are very revealing. The Handbook of the Soviet Union (376) gives the following picture:

Estonia: No details.

Lithuania: Of the 2,365,000 people, according to the available census, 12,000 partisans and illegals are reported.

Russia: No census: only "ferocious partisan attacks in the western zones of Brjansk, Leningrad, Pskow" are mentioned (381).

Ukraine: No census. Various underground organisations are discussed. 4,300 groups adhearing to the communist party are mentioned, all of which could develop activity. (384).

Belorus: Medals and decorations were donated to 120.000 partisans and illegals (385). In 1970 Belorus´s population counted 9,003,000 people.

Belorus's dominant and astonishing role is evident. This may lead to the opinion that partisans of the Soviet Union were solely the partisans of Belorus. The missing involvement of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic is myterious. Although 40,000 people are mentioned, hardly any activity developed. Statements mentioning 4,300 party organisations are grafetti, being the product of statistic endeavours to which every party organistion succumbed in after the war. Definite sources concerning Russian activities are also missing.. The data referring to Lithuania and Latvia is conspicuous, because Riga, the capital city of Lithunania, had many Jews brought into the camps.

It`s amazing that of all the people of the Soviet Union, who had suffered most by being occupied by the country in 1939, as the Baltic States were, or by being annexed in 1940 should have delivered outstanding partisan warfare. Russsians and Ukrainians obviously refrained from partisan activity therefore, no partisan activity is mentioned in the handbook. Considering that the majority of the Belorussian population suffered deportation, 1,5 million people are mentioned, it is not logical that their relatives, friends and neighbors would engage themselves for the Soviet Union. That aspect is wholly incomprehensible. If the main bulk of White Russia`s population was displaced from west to east and its now vacant western part was used to resettle the deported Jews, then that could suggest an explanation.

Partisan activity was also planed outside of White Russia. That can well be demonstrated with the help of activities developed by the Soviet Government. On July 3, 1941 Moscow began to establish a "Central Partisan Squad". Named Central Partisan Movement-Squad early 1942, it operated under

  1. Marshall Woroschilow, Politbureau member and its commander-in-chief.
  2. Lieutenant General Ponomarenko, secretary of the Central Committee of Belorus, as chief of staff.

Ukranian Partisan Squad

  1. Chruschtschow Polibureau member and its commander-in-chief
  2. Strokatsch,as its chief of staff (later General Major)

Belorussian Partisan Squad

  1. Lt.General Ponomarenko, secretary of the Central Committe of White Russia, and here the leader of the partisan movement

Kuban Partisan Squad

  1. Iguatow, leader of the partiasan staff in the Kuban

Partisan activities were planned not only for Belorus, but for the Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Kuban Area as well. Concise actions led by Redelis are again initiated within Belorussia. Then he consolidates himself with the military actions performed by the partisan leader Federow in the Tschernigow area.[388] [389???] [390???] Tschernigow lies approximately 120 km south-east of Gomel, and is therefore not in Belorus but in the Ukranian Soviet Republic. In 1943, an odd thing happens: Federow receives orders to proceed west to the area of the Rokitno swamps. He marches 400 kilometers and establishes his headquartes south of Pinsk, which borders betweeen Belorus and the Ukraine. He places his activities exactly in those areas already under partisan control, thereby weakening the regional influence around Tschernogow. The transaction is incompehensible but has a simple explanation: The communist party of the Soviet Union was losing control over the partisans in Belorus, who began to operate and act independantly. Federow`s main assignment in that mission was to try to supervise and control these activities. According to statistics, a total nummer of 370,000 partisans operated in Belorus [391]. Of these, 35,000 were communists, 10,000 became communist members during the war and 100,000 were supposed to be comsomoles. Deductively, the majority of the partisans were not favouring the communists!

4. German POW‘s

The fate of the German POW´s shows uncanny details. Immediately after the war, numerous sentences against German POW´s were pronounced.[392]. In 1948, a new huge trial wave hit the POW`s. The Soviet procedure as derived from a quotation:

»Non-reputiable mistrust was the main motivation of the controlling power. If that power had dealt a fair play and proclaimed its motivations, then the mistrust might have waned. But the Soviet Government never mentioned names, only numbers and these came late, primarily after the Foreign Minister Conference in Moscow dated 1947, when repatriation of the POW´s was considered. The families of deceased prisoners didn't receive notice from Moscow and those returning home from Soviet detention camps were forbidden to take along any documents from these or from still living commrades. Under those conditions, it is obvious that the public opinion was convinced that the Kreml was hiding something. The impression that the Soviet Union not only wanted cheap labor but also tried to decimate German intelligence is nourished by methods like the long unlawful internment after the war, the so called "war crimes trials"of 1949/1950--with their own unique examination methods and collective accusations followed by collective condemnations. Being member of a specific Wehrmacht organisation automatically brought the offender behind bars i.e into Soviet concentration camps and worse, into the so-called "discretion camps".«[393]

Using the POW´s terminology, members of those Wehrmacht organisations which were collectively sentenced by the Soviet Union were known as "Confined Units". A list was published in the West. [394???] [395???]

»The list, excluding police units, the S.D.(security force) the field police and the secret field police (Sondereinheiten), whose members were automatically accused of war crimes, relies soley on the testimonies given by returning POWs and thus cannot qualify to be wholly free of fault. Twenty two divisions named from memory were not found in that list and upon examination, the list shows that some divisions never exsisted and others never participated in the eastern theatre of the war. It's beyond evaluation, whether the error lies within the released POWs or within the controlling power.«[396]

Although three army corps and one army unit appears on the list, the main particulars refer to the division level. Many divisions are named including divisions of the Waffen SS. Almost all army divisions of the Herresgruppe Mitte, which collapsed in Belorussia, are mentioned. Soldiers of these divisions were regrouped into exsisting units. In the previous chapter, many divisions were classified under the term "confined". Since army corps are made up of divisions, it is probable that the divisions of the Heeresgruppe Mitte fell under that category. In fact 13 of the 15 divisions mentioned belonging to the Heeresgruppe Mitte were noted as confined. The Heeresgruppe Mitte consisting of 108 Divisions, deployed forty six in Belorus. Seven Divisions were not deployed in the eastern front at all. The total number of Heeresgruppe Mitte`s division present in Belorus is significant.

In fact, a large number of the confined divisions were destroyed in the Iasi area. Here, camps containing Rumanian Jews from Podolia and Transistria might have been present. Many of the POWs were actually seen in captivity are missing. [397???][398] Careful assumptions account for about 96,000 persons. One wonders why the Soviet Union does not account for the fate of these people, considering that even their exact numbers are not mentioned. [401???] [400???]

The deportation of civilian captives represents another aspect of Soviet internment. Quotation:

»The lot of the POW´s equals the lot of the civilians deportated from eastern Germany within the Soviet Union. For a long time, nothing was heard of them. Wherever they might have been found, their camps undoubtedly represented detention camps. The justice of the Hague War Order Convention of 1907, protected normal POW´s but this did not apply for them. Before Stalins death, those civilians who returned to Germany stated that they were forbidden to tell anything.«[401]

The 1988 brings the following proclamation:

»Forty years have passed since WW II and yet 400,000 Germans are still missing in the Soviet Union. Only 15% of another 424.000 who tried to establish contact to the German or Soviet Red Cross tracing service, have been successfully discovered.«[402]

The book "Soweit die Füße Tragen" concerning the fate of the cartographer Danhorn, gives the following details:

»Nothing happend to Danhorn after his internment. The interrogaters didn`t spend much time on him. Questioned on how those Russian maps which fell into German hands, were translated so quickly and distributed within the German army, he offered explanations voluntarily.«[403]

What offence had Danhorn been guilty of, having spent most of his time as cartographer? Did his interrogaters spend little time on him because his "case" might have been too clear? All people who dealt with cartography vanished. Therefore, the decisive role applied to the maps of the Minsk vicinity, as stated in the beginning of this book, should be considered. Updated charts had to be produced first.

Generally speaking, a lot of questions do arise. Why were the troup units confined in 1948 (not 1945)? Why are there so many regular troups amongst them, which were especially detached in Belorus? Which motives did the Soviet Union have? The Soviet Union had the means to let all those who knew anything about Jewish camps in Belorus or any place else, be it soldier or civilian, disappear in the expanse of the country.

C. Travel Restrictions

In the Soviet Union free travel was nearly impossible. The area where each individual could move about was very limited within the country. In principle restrictions applied to all, namely to:

Aside from the few privileged persons, it was very difficult for a Soviet citizen to move. Citation:

»The so-called ›Propiska‹ plays an important role in the life of a Soviet citizen. Assume he lived in Puschkino (15 km from Moscow) and wanted to move to Moscow. That is just as impossible as travelling to America. They have a ›Propiska‹ for the countryside, but not for Moscow. It is even more difficult to move from other (adjoining) areas into the vicinity of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiew or Odessa. All these areas are restricted. Going from city to city is unbelievably difficult, e.g. going from Kiubyschew to Saratow. It commences with infinite questioning: Why are you moving, on what grounds, do you have relatives in that city, do you have a domicile, etc. If you don't submit sufficient information, you wouldn't get ›Propiska‹. For somebody living in the country - on a collective farm - the receipt of a ›Propiska‹ is illusionary. Even in the days of personal bondage, there was no such restraint, no such fixation of an individual to a piece of ground....«[404]

The propiska or passport was not only necessary when moving, but also a requirement for simply travelling from one place to another. Until 1974, many citizens, especially members of collective farms, were not in possession of passports. [405] In 1974 another ordinance appeared, stipulating that all Soviet citizens receive passports. [406] However the regulations were so diffuse that suspicion, whether this actually happened, is justified. [407] People wanting to travel couldn't, not with the new passport either. They had to be registered even if their journey was of short duration (under six weeks) [408]. The new ordinance can be summarized as follows:

»This alone does not imply that a member of a collective farm or any other Soviet citizen, for that matter, had de facto and de jure any freedom of movement. The foregoing paragraph of the annotation states that ›those citizens living in the country who had no right to receive passports in accordance with previous regulations, will get identification papers before receiving new passports for moving and for travelling less than one and a half months.‹ «[409]

But even the bearers of passports, so the ordinance, could not travel without certain restraint:

»Travellers of the USSR are subject to notification which implies either registration (if staying less than one and a half months) or reporting a temporary domicile. The report of a permanent residence must coincide with a notice of change of address.« [410]

Diplomats have the liberty of free movement in most countries of the world. But not so in the Soviet Union. In 1948 - note the year! - a decree was promulgated on September 30, 1948 which drastically reduced free movement for diplomats. [411] Foreigners were not allowed to trespass many random zones, all pertaining regions were catalogued. Todays valid catalogue contains a surprising fact: Belorus is not listed as a prohibited area! If one takes a closer look at the decree, then one notices that Belorus is nevertheless still unaccessable for diplomats. As fas as Moscow is concerned, more areas and roads are listed for diplomatic use:

»Administrative District of Moscow, accessable areas are:«

and then all permitted areas are described. For example: [412]

»from the Wolokolamsk Avenue: to Istra, Wolokolamsk, to the station Dubossekowo (via Wolokolamsk) and to the town of Terjajewo (via Maslennikowo);

from the Minsk Avenue: To Swernigorod (until Golizyno continuing to the Boronia settlement (to Modenowo continuing on the Moshaisk Avenue); from the avenue in the direction of Kaschira (Kaschirskoje schosse): to the aeroport Domodedowo and to the district of Kaschira, Osjory, Saraisk, Serebrjanye prudy;«

Apparently, it's impossible to get to Belorus from Moscow, all roads can only be passed at certain checkpoints. I must admit however, that I don't have any knowledge of the road system of the Soviet Union. But if the Minsk Avenue is only sporadically open for traffic, then it's hard to believe that one can reach Minsk by car. However, a car is necessary, if one does want to move about fairly freely in Belorus.

Since Stalin's death, tourism has expanded to an extent which would not have been deemed possible. [413] But how far can a tourist travel in the USSR? Which information does he get at all? One must consider the following principle hindernisses which applied to most tourists:

As far as travel by air or by train is concerned, these voyages are stately organized. More interesting is the fact that travelling by car is allowed. However, here restrictions are expecially intense.

»A foreign visitor travelling by car in the Soviet Union must pay for the duration, the route, the sight-seeing program, the room and board, and the tanking (gasoline vouchers!)before commencing the journey. The route is determined by Intourist or by another travel agency affiliated with Intourist. The trip must include those places, where branches of the Intourist agencies exist.«[417]

Any altenatives a tourist may take is prohibited because tanking and repair outside the set route is not guaranteed. As far as the minimal number of drivers is concerned, who would live by their friends or relatives and would not book at Intourist, getting a visa is the greatest obstacle.«[418]

Which automobile routes are permitted? Regard the following road map:[419]

Chart on page 142!

 

Titel:

INTOURIST ROUTES

Entry/Frontier Crossing Point

Transit Roads Customs

State Roads Locality

The route Brest - Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow which runs through Belorus is very salient. The means by which the Soviet Union controls this highly interesting road will now be illustrated.

The frontier crossing point at Brest is only opened from 7:00 until 21:00 hours.[420] There, clearance takes exactly one hour. Apparently this time is prescribed by the "higher charges".[421] Accordingly, travel through this frontier is extremely limited. Only 15 cars can be cleared on the one-track road at the border. Because Soviet cars are part of the traffic, less than 15 foreign cars can pass daily. Foreign cars on the transit Brest - Smolensk were controlled to an extent which is unbelievalbe by western standards. A West German journalist who took this road with his family, recalls:

»A bit later on, we reached the city exit which looked like a main highway in the direction of Minsk. We stopped and photographed the first highway sign signalling Minsk. We discovered that it was quite simple to decipher the Cyrillic alphabet, we became accustomed to it very quickly. After taking the photo, we were stopped at a sentry about two kilometers further on. My passport was confiscated and one of the officers disappeared in his tiny bureau. We were astounded. I followed. I noticed the officer telephoning, the opened passport was the theme of discussion. My interruptions were not understood and disregarded. After a five-minute parley my passport was returned to me, one said "good bye" and I was ushered to the door. I was not satisfied and began a verbal attack. I produced Maria's address from my pocket, showed him her telephone number and energetically demanded that the number be dialed. The police officer obeyed. I explained to Maria what happened and demanded an explanation. She talked with the officer who returned the receiver to me. Maria explained that I had done a prohibited act. I had told her of the highway sign. She mentioned that a bridge is crossing the road behind the sign - it is forbidden to shoot that motive, thus the delay.«[422]

In Minsk they became aquainted with some friends and decided to take a trip together:

»The next day we were delayed for nearly an hour. As we drove to the meeting point, our new friends had already gathered themselves at the street corner, husband Jarislow and his wife Luda with their child Dimitri, a friend and college aquaintance, Pjotr, was also present. With the exception of Jarislow, we all entered our van. Jarislow mentioned that he would follow within five minutes with his own car - a precautionary measure, but that his friend Pjotr knew the exact route. We were surprized. After about seven kilometers, at the city boundary we fealt an inclination. "We were being watched" said our driver's mate Pjotr. And sure enough: after another eight kilometers at a junction in view of a summer ski-jump, we were stopped by the military police. "Passport" was all the rude voice said. I handed him our three passports. He continued talking to me in Russian. "Do you speak German or English?" I asked in just a harsh tone, "I don't understand you." - but he doesn't understand me either. All other passengers in the van remained silent. Our controller then moved decisively to the rear of the van, opened the door rather roughly and asked - we sensed it - "who is Russian?"«[423]

Another example:

»About 40 kilometers behind Minsk - we're still discussing the abrupt end with our new friends - a lake with a man-made beach lies on the right side of the road. As we leave the pavement to reach that beach - we must travel about 200 meters on a side-road - another military policeman stands in front of us quite suddenly. He stops the car. Pointing to the lake accompanied with swimming motions, I signal our intentions. "Njet" is his short dry remark.«[424]

These episodes illustrate that the Soviet Union had constructed an omnipresent web to survey western auto tourists. This tourist surveyance lies in the hands of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department of the Second Main Bureau of the KGB.[425]

»Members of the Sixth Section are to implant sentries in Moscow, on camping sites, on gasoline stations, and along the routes preferred by the tourists. They must also monitor all foreigners travelling by plane or by train. This sector also entertains a communication system for the entire country, so that the Seventh Department can transmit photos and personal information of tourists very quickly.«[426]

Finally a word to the intricate surveillance system at the border of the Soviet Union which was set up to thwart any illegal emigration.

The Soviet Union has more than 200,000 border patrols.[427] Only especially reliable Russians are deployed, who must adhere to certain political stipulations as well.[428] The boundary is subdivided into three surveillance zones:[429???]

  1. Limited Entry Zone. It is about 30 kilometers wide and subject to special security provisions. Whoever does not live here, can only be in this area with a special permit of the security police.
  2. Prohibited Zone. This zone runs along the actual boundary. Its width is dependant upon the local topography. Its construction:
    »With the help of underground telephone lines along the border, the sentry can telephone the headquarters at any time. Telegraphy is reduced to a minimum, at least as far the the border patrols are concerned. Stationary frontier precautions include sentries, hide-outs, traps, larger and smaller patrols, observation points, passport controls and manoeuvers.«[430]
  3. Actual border fortifications. These consist of numerous 30 meter wide trace markers, where any fugitive would leave obvious marks.[431]

Such fortifications also exist at the boundaries of the countries allied to the Sovie Union, for example at the border of Poland. The border patrols are also supported by a third party:

»Furthermore, these areas are saturated with KGB agents and professional or occasional spies; the latter being mostly the inhabitants of the region who are relentlessly reminded to report not only actual border intrusions, but also any suspicious foreigners. Various voluntary commandos, mostly young people, school children and pioneers are also officially engaged. This is arranged by the local party- and comsomol organisations. If they are successful, then these volunteers are rewarded with money, presents or diplomas. The indigenes of the frontier are always reminded to uphold an intense vigil.«[433]

D. BELORUS

Little or no knowledge of the development of White Russia or Belorus, as it is also called, exists after 1945. The scarce information does show however, that the country's progress altered from the rest of Soviet Republics.

1. Exceptional Role of Belorus

According to observations of western expertise on Russia, Belorus is an unusual Soviet Republic. In 1964 a detailed account of the Delegation of the XXII Party Congress in Moscow appeared. This congress interested western observers because the report on this meeting mentioned the function of each and every delegate for the first time. [434] Results from the findings:

»If one compares the delegates of the fifteen different republics of the (Soviet)Union, then an interesting fact arises, namely a substantial variation of the personnel. The highest number of leading state and party functionaries came particularly from the delegates of Belorus. This already impressive number gains more significance if one relates it to the population percentage of Belorus and to the number of members of the (provincial) Communist Party as compared to the rest (of the USSR) and the entire Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Of the entire Russian population in 1962 (219,7 million), Belorus had 8,3 million or 3.8%; of the 8,872.516 CPSU members, 202.068 were Belorussians, or 2.3% (candidates for membership composed (2.8%), while the Belorussian delegates made up 24 high state functionaries (of 119; i.e. 20 %), and eight high party functionaries (of altogether 62; i.e. 13%).

Aside from the representatives of the Belorussian Republic and the communist party of Belorus, prominant members with high party- and government positions, who apparently had no connection to Belorus, frequented this delegation. In this respect, the Belorussian delegation was unique as compared to the rest of the Socialist Republics, even though this difference had no statistical value.« [435]

In general, as far as the impact of the constitution of such party delegations was concerned, this meant that:

»the composition of party convention delegates is the result of minute screening - and not of any spontaneous vote of the delegates - subject to stiff criteria for the representation of important state and party organisations (all members of the Central Committee Bureau, of the Central Committee Secretariate, all important government positions in all provinces, in party and in official departments, in important cities. etc.) There was indeed a very restricted leeway for any personal qualifications as delegate.« [436]

As far as the assembly of the delegates is concerned, the reporter comes to the following conclusion:

»At any rate, as far as the Soviet economy is concerned, the Belorussian personnel plays a major role. It is quite probable that Minsk became the centre of special and high-tech industries, proliferating in military value. In this respect, the personally experienced discipline and penal codes in Belorus have a certain after-taste.« [437]

Another cognition fits in as well:

»Together with the other remarks of Aksjonow and with similar quotations from Petrow and Masurow, it may be assumed that in Belorus, police monitoring -either evident or covert - is extremely severe. Furthermore, Belorus was the only republic of the Union, which sent its Minister of the Interior (Home Secretary) as well as the Chief of the Secret Police as delegates to the XXII Party Congress, while representatives from Georgia, Kasachstan, Usbekistan, Baschkirien, the Tartarian ASSR, the Ukraine and Russian SSR had rather menial posts. The other republics didn't send any representatives from any of the departments at all.« [438]

Finally two last quotations from this report, which seem highly interesting:

»41 authorized delegates and twelve with advisory status belonged to this delegation. A few singular indications seem appropiate, since a total analysis is not profound due to lack of minute detail. Thirteen of them were enlisted as "Military Personnel" (wojennoslushaschtschije). As far as the political social structure of Soviet Communism is concerned, it is interesting to note that women delegates made up exactly half of the total persons without portefolio, while politically important posts are occupied by but one woman.« [439]

»If one regards the curriculum of the leading men of the central CPB (Communist Party of Belorus), then the odd fact arises that after Stalin's death, no abrupt change in personnel policies or nominations took place. However, in the first few years after the war, continuous, increasing appointments around the core of the partisan movement and of the Comsomol- and party functionaries had taken place.« [440]

A multitude of querries arise, in conjunction with the above citations. As far as economical criteria is concerned, this question will be dealt with later on. In detail: Why did Belorus have such a prerogative within the CPSU? What makes this country so particular? Doesn't it appear rather colourless? Why did the vote of the delegates involve the Secretary of the Interior (Home Secretary) along with the chief of the secret police, nominating them as party delegates? What is the significance of the undefined "Military Personnel" within Belorus, that they are presented in such great numbers. What is their field of activity? Why can both men and women share this vocation? Why do they not exist in the other republics? Is there any connection with the special status of Belorus with their field of activity? The continuous personnel policies are also odd. The men from the central CPB are all members of the partisan movement!

Note: If one assumes that military personnel were camp personnel, then the allotment between the men and women becomes plausible.

2. New Localities

The reader is reminded of the peculiar increase in the population density of Belorus, which was mentioned at the beginning of this essay. It is an increase which doesn't coincide with the official results of the census. This observation is supported by another fact. Belorus did have a substantial reduction in its population between 1939 and 1959. Here, the peculiarity of the two results for 1939 arises, which is in itself odd enough. In detail:

1939 (1. Edition)

10,500 million

1939 (2. Edition)

8,910 million

1959

8,055 million

In view of the population reductions, the following excerpt from a Soviet school book for the eigth grade sounds hilarious:

»For Belorus as for the Ukraine as well, the main problem was the reconstruction of the destroyed power stations, industry, industrial plants and localities after the war.

Aside from the reconstruction, new building sites also flourished. Thousands of new localities and towns arose.« [441]

Why did thousands of new localities and towns arise? Pending on a population reduction? One is reminded of the notation of the former chapter, which stipulates:

»that during the war, other things are more imperative. Therefore the necessary enclosure of land, the distribution of the people from overpopulated towns by creating new settlements, will take place after the war.«

Both systems, the national socialist and the communist system found it imperative to create new settlements! Odd! Considering that an acute increase in the city population had taken place, this posture is all the more debatable:

City

1941 [442]

1959[443]

1970[444]

Minsk

239000

509000

916000

Gomel

166000

272000

 

Witebsk

167000

148000

213000

Mogilew

99400

121000

202000

Bobruisk

84100

97000

138000

Brest

73000

122000

 

Baranowitschi

26000

102000

 

Orscha

31300

64000

101000

The above development portrays a continuous increase in the city population.

3. Economic Development since 1941

Detailled findings on the industrial development in the Soviet Union are hard to come by. A list of the years 1929/30 does portray a relative picture, especially the structure of the Belorussian industry before the Second World War:

Gross production according to a rough estimate for the year 1929/30 [445]

________________________________________________________________________

Industry

in 1000 rubels according to net costs for 1926/27

Produce Index

Calculatory Number

           

Construction

3.392,4

bricks

1000 pieces 57500

           
       

682

         
               

2816

 

Glass

9.944,2

   

windows

tons

5600

     
         

lamps

tons 4565

     
         

bottles

tons

4831

   

Metal

25.847,9

 

 

chaff cutters pieces(P)1560

         
         

treshers

pieces 14875

     
         

lathes

 

pieces 400

   
         

engraving machine " 200

       
         

stone cutting " pieces 425

       
         

scales

 

pieces 23430

   
         

nails

 

tons

7010

 
         

glasses, normal dozen 736000

       
         

glasses, optical dozen 324000

       

Textiles 22.659,0

   

cotton

 

1000 m 7650

       
         

garn

 

1000 m 141

   
         

nylons

 

dozen 683000

   
         

childrens socks dozen 324000

       
         

men's socks

dozen 230000

     

Leather

37.591,7

   

large skins

pieces 304495

       
         

small skins

(p) 1225000

     
         

shoes,boote

pair 2367040

     

Chemicals

4109,9

 

chem. chalk

tons 4160

         
         

paint

 

tons

800

 
         

combs

 

100 (p) 3624

   
         

buttons

 

1000(p)

37082

 

Food

22.239,9

   

yeast

 

tons

5500

   
         

confectionary

tons

2960

   
         

vegetable fats tons

5171

     
         

tobacco

tons 2800

     

Lumber

66.508,6

   

lumber produce cbm 730231

         
         

veneer

 

cbm 129343

   
         

matches

 

boxes 2450305

   

Paper

33.008,0

   

paper

 

tons

43140

   
         

cardboard

tons 5775

     
         

wallpaper

1000 (p)10900

     

Prior to World War II, Belorus had little industry; modern industrial plants were non-existant. After WW II, Belorus industry increased substantially. Citation:

»Between 1946 and 1950 the state invested more heavily in the economy of Belorus than in all the five-year-plans before the war.« [446]

»Hundreds of new plants were established, new industrial sites arose. The gross industrial production was 81 times higher in 1968 than in 1913. Particularely, the automobile, the tractor and the machine sector developed, along with mechanical and chemical engineering.« [447]

Mechanical engineering was the field where the most changes took place:

»Acute problems concerning improvements in specialisation, distribution and advanced technology must be solved in mechanical engineering, the leading economic field of the Belorussian SSR. Within 20 years, from 1941 to 1961, the most profound changes took place in structure and specialisation. New fields arose: automobile and tractor plants, the production of bridges, cranes, appliances, motorcycles, corn harvesting machines, hydro amelioration- and road construction machines, pumps for mining and chemical industries, ball-bearing, electrical measuring instruments, radios, television, watches, etc. The produce of mechanical engineering increased twenty-fold.« [448]

What made this impressive development possible?

»Prerequisites for the development of such an economic structure of the Belorussian SSR are natural conditions, which support the agricultural output, the presence of raw materials for the production of mineral fertilizers, the presence of a large number of workers and qualified cadre, the favourable geographical position of the industrially developed districts in the European part of the USSR and the socialist countries in Europe.« [449]

As far as I'm concerned the term "large number of....qualified cadre" was important. Where they not present before 1945? The fact of the large number of workers is repeated at another site:

»Because the majority of the most important industries of the republic are dependant on the transport of raw materials, the local resources of workers being nevertheless substantial, it would be an asset to develop such production methods, which employ a large number of workers while needing less raw materials.« [450]

The focal point of production lies in the eastern part of Belorus.

That's why there is the problem »of resettlement to other districts of the country, especially to the eastern zone, where lack of workers is severe.« [451]

The focal point of the economical developement seems to be in the eastern part, the former militarily administered zone, of Belorus:

»The most important centres for mechanical engineering and metal manufactoring (according to productivity) are Minsk, Gomel, Witebsk, Mogiljow, Orscha, Bobruisk and Borissow.« [452]

Here, a few examples of the multitude of questions which arise:

4. The Police Organization

Because of the typically covert attitude of the Soviet Union, it is highly improbable to receive any direct information concering the police organization of Belorus. In the few fore-going chapters, a few indications were made, namely that on the XXII Party Convention, the Minister of the Interior (Home Secretary) and the Chief of the Secret Police were participating delegates; apparently a most unusual situation. Futhermore, it was mentioned that police monitoring was extremely severe in Belorus. In 1984 and 1985 two very unusual reports were published in the West, which concerned themselves with the police organization in Belorus, giving an outstanding insight into the system. The First Secretary of the local Party Committee of Brest, Sokolow, published an essay [453] complaining about adverse influences from abroad. There, the special situation of the "frontier fortification of Brest" is mentioned. Why the term "frontier fortification of Brest" is used, is because:

»many inhabitants of Brest are bound by relative bonds to the people of the People's Republic of Poland. One should also consider that a large number of inhabitants of the area had the possibility to watch Polish television. Before martial law came to Poland, some programs shown, had anti-communistic tendencies. These paralyzed the Polish will in its fight for the ideals of the Workers Class, no appropiate criticism was made concerning the agitation of the right-winged leaders of the workers union "Solidarity" or their advisors from KOS-KOR. Quite often, historical facts were marred, unfriendly remarks against our country was tolerated.« [454]

This quotation is astounding, because a few years have passed since martial law was promulgated (in Poland). The measures which were taken were nonsense as well:

»The arsenal of preliminary measures to hinder breaches of the law has been greatly supplemented. The movement for collectives and towns to to gain the title "exceptional" is gaining momentum. Centres for a legal system and counsel to hinder infringements have been established. Over 65000 persons are involved in the work of the deputy police.« [455]

Unusual is another excerpt:

»The commanders and political functionaries of the security forces are teaching the inhabitants on site, to distinguish malicious, enemy intentions and are helping them to develop capacities, enabling them to apprehend any outlaws.« [456]

What are the problems which seem to be present? What did the Polish television show before martial law was imposed? Why does this impact linger for so many years, making such unusual measures necessary? What's the function of these deputies, and what kind of acts did these outlaws do, which still seems to occupy the police?

Note: If one supposes that the anti-communist programs, which went on the air dealt with Auschwitz, and that the inhabitants of Belorus learned that the relocated Jews were supposedly slain, wouldn't it be feasible these, as dead declared individuals, try to establish contact with the West over Poland? A year later, an interview appeared dealing with the same theme. The Minister of the Interior (Home Secretary) of the Belorussian SSR, W. Piskarjow, reported on practical measures taken since 1983 in the realm of his ministerium: [457]

»Today more than 500 000 deputies (druzinniki)are helping us and the majority is willing to affront an outlaw, as did the chief foreman of a Belorussian automobile factory, S.Sarkazkij, who was decorated post mortally. When it became known that his death was the work of a criminal, the rows of the deputies swelled to over one thousand men. All in all, I must say the the cooperation amoungst the collectives, the party organisations, and the public has taken a favourable turn, lately. The preservance of civil order has become the general ambition.« [458]

A further citation:

»(Question:) Victor Aleksejewitsch, you're stating that more than thousand new workers have come to you. But amoungst them, there are surely many ...... laymen. Surely, only professional policemen can agitate gainst a criminal, especially against an armed criminal.

(Answer:) You mentioned "laymen". I would say up until a certain period of time. We are instructing these people. Be assured: we would not employ any non-professionals.« [459]

The crimes which Piskarjow lists and for which he needs this tremendous police apparatus seems childish:

Why are 500 000 deputies necessary for these deeds? Why does Belorus apparently have armed criminals in a greater number? Are these not exceptions? Or is this one mass cover-up?

Note: Belorus had 9 million inhabitants in 1970. To illustrate this, a small excursion in arithmatic is made: 500 000 deputies for 9 million inhabitants means that one deputy is responsible for every 18 persons, including children, women and the aged. If one further considers that such a deputy would have to be in an excellent physical state, then only men in a certain age limit, 20- to 40-year-olds, would qualify. Of the 9 million inhabitants, roughly 1,5 million men would be eligible. Thus, every third individual would have to be deputy. Surely a grotesk situation. Furthermore, 500 000 deputies would also need an extensive, adequate police institution with many professionals! Belorus was indeed the prime example of a police state. All this, just for mostly mediocre crimes?

5. Marjina Gorka (Marina Gorka)

Extended coverage of Belorus commenced in Marjina Gorka and will end here. In the Soviet Union's newest publications concerning that state, the interested reader will find the following citation under the entry "Marina Gorka":

»Marina Gorka, city,...railway station Puchawitschi. Founded in the 16th century by the Radsiwil family. 1876 first school established (technical school since 1921). Population in 1867: 2,000 people. Since 1924, centre of the county Puchawizk. Census in 1937; population 6,500 inhabitants.« [466]

The reference section of that publication contains a historical map [467] of Belorus dated from 1772-1755. Marina Gorka can be seen here. So, was the military map of 1943 used by the 'Heeresgruppe Mitte', a fraud or just incomplete? Definitely not! It cannot be emphasized enough, that the Soviet side tried to obliterate facts with the help of simple tricks.

An investigation verifies that a railway station Marina Gorka as well as a place called Puchowitschi existed. During the German occupation, the railway station was enlargened into the vicinity of Puchowitschi. The Soviets named the railway station Puchowitschi, at least, considering all indications given, we are lead to this assumption. Puchowitshi and Marina Gorka were united under the name Marina Gorka.

A geographical map of Minsk dated from 1896 shows Puchowitshi, but not Marina Gorka [468]. In Ritter's Geo-Statistical Lexica of 1906, I first found the subject under the name Marinagorka and the following short notice as well: located in Russia, administration of Minsk.P. EdL.Libau-Rommy.

The editor obviously had little information to go on, because the railway line between Libeau and Rommy is already 1000 km long. Substantial information can be derived from a map dated from WW1. Here, the railway stations of Marina Gorka and the seven kilometer distant Puchowiczi are found. The first census in the Soviet Union took place in 1927. All localities, where the population exceeded 542 people, were listed. Puchowitschi with its 2,161 inhabitants, lying in the Minsk county, is mentioned but not Marina Gorka which, at that time, was supposed to have had a technical school.

In a list of the German general staff, Marjina-Gorka is named with the notice: see Puchowitschi[473]. Under that entry one finds: "Puchowitschi (Marjina Gorka"[474] and the note: "Puchowitschi's railway station lies 7-8 kilometers away." In a structural analysis of the "Ostland" all places having more than 2,000 inhabitants are mentioned. The authors used Polish and Soviet sources from 1926, 1931 and 1933 respectively. Puchowitschi is named, but Marina Gorka isn't mentioned. The list of the German General Staff, dated 1943, has Puchowitschi mentioned in postscript Nr. II, whereas Marjina Gorka appears on postscript Nr. VIII, clearly separated from Puchowitschi, as an independant and larger city. Marjina Gorka must have been of specific interest to the German Army Command. In a report over the anniliation of the 'Heeresgruppe Mitte' in 1944, published in 1955, Marjina Gorka is mentioned without any specific reference to the military situation. That's all the facts I have.

The details given in the already mentioned encyclopedia show great abberations to the historical facts.

Accordingly, Marjina Gorka must already have had a population of 2,000 inhabitants in 1897, which grew to 6,500 people in 1938. The place, having a technical school and located in the centre of the Puchawizk county, possesses regional importance. Why the insignificant neighbouring town of Puchawizk, not the city of Marjina Gorka is found on different maps dating before 1942, remains a mystery. Why Marjina Gorka is not mentioned in the 1927 census although Puchowitschi appears, is also mysterious. In naming the railway station Puchawitschi (Puchowitschi)the Soviets were practising their camouflage tactics, because the place is located 7 to 8 kilometers away from the railway line, whereas Marina Gorka lies directly beside it.

 

E. A Poem

The Russo-Jewish poet, Alexander Galitsch, dedicated the following poem to Solomon Michoels [479]:

»The Jews brought to Russia a dialect (Yiddish) from the land of their expulsion, they became Russian, but remained Jews entangled in all the turmoil wrought onto their clan. They were burned in the gas ovens, denunciated as murdering physicians. Some distant barrack and some distant morass ist still waiting for them, which they, due to kind providence, need not enter. It is still too early to renounce these barracks. They may be in decay, but our willing hands can still restore them.« [480]

Solomon Michoels is the man Stalin had liquidated in 1948, apparently because he was the leader of the Jews living in the Soviet Union!


Notes

  1. Hardmann/Wippermann, "24 Zeugen", Dokumente des Terrors. Sacharow-Hearing Kopenhagen. Würzburg (no date) p. 162.
  2. ibid. p. 162f.
  3. Martin Gilbert, Endlösung, die Vertreibung und Vernichtung der Juden. Ein Atlas. Reinbek near Hamburg 1982. p. 217. Cited as "Gilbert, Atlas" in sequence. (Final Solution: die The Epulsion and Annihilation of the Jews. An Atlas)
  4. "Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalem Militärgerichtshof Nürnberg". Nürnberg 1947. (Proceedings against the main war criminals at the International Military Tribune, Nürnberg) Vol. XXIX, 008-USSR, p. 241.
  5. ibid. p. 242.
  6. ibid. p. 241.
  7. ibid. p. 242.
  8. ibid. p. 251.
  9. Jochen von Lang. "Das Eichmann Protokoll", Tonbandaufzeichungen israelischen Verhöre. (The Eichmann Protocoll. Tapes from Israelian interrogations), Berlin 1982. p. 273.
  10. Hardmann/Wippermann… p. 163.
  11. Saul Friedländer, "Kurt Gerstein oder die Zwiespältigkeit des Guten", Gütersloh, 1968. p. 7. (Kurt Gerstein or a conflict of virtue)
  12. ibid. p. 8f.
  13. Rudolf Höß, "Kommandant in Auschwitz", Autobiographische Aufzeichungen. Herausgegeben von Martin Broszat (Höß: Commander in Auschwitz, autbiographichal notes. Martin Broszat, Publisher). Munich 1978. p. 7f.
  14. ibid. p. 9.
  15. ibid. p. 11.
  16. Arno Schulz, Berlin im Würgegriff. Berlin-Grunewald 1953, p. 489.
  17. Ibid., p. 491
  18. Goebbels Tagebücher (Goebbels Diaries) from the years 1942 – 43, including other documents. Published by Louis P. Lochner, Zürich 1948. p. 7.
  19. Ibid.
  20. Ibid., p. 87f., especially footnote on page 88.
  21. Karl Ploetz, Hauptdaten der Weltgeschichte, 27th edition. Bielefeld 1951, p. 235.
  22. Die Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken (The USSR) - Handbook. Published by N. Steinberger und H. Goeschel, Düsseldorf 1971, p. 694.
  23. Ronald Hingley, Die russische Geheimpolizei 1565 - 1970 (The Russian Secret Police), Bayreuth 1972, p. 280f.
  24. Leon Poliakov, Josef Wulf, Das Dritte Reich und die Juden (The Third Reich and the Jews) Documents and Essays. Berlin-Grunewald 1955, p. 416. Cited as Poliakov/Wulf, Jews in sequence.
  25. "Wallenberg lebt unter anderen Namen" (Wallenberg alive with new name), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 1987, p. 3.
  26. Poliakov/Wulf, Jews, p. 419.
  27. "Wallenberg lebt…", op. cit. (note ???)
  28. "Sie haben im Osten zuviel gesehen" (They've seen too much in the east), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung from July 1, 1985.
  29. Michael Heller, Alexander Nekrich, Geschichte der Sowjetunion, (History of the Soviet Union), Vol. 2, "1940 – 1980", Königstein im Taunus 1982, p. 187.
  30. Ibid.
  31. Ronald Hingley…, p. 294.
  32. "Ärtze, Juden, Intellektuelle, Spione" (Physicians, Jews, Intelligents and Spies) in Osteuropa, 1953. p. 102
  33. Michael Heller…. p. 187
  34. Ibid.
  35. Ronald Hingley…, p. 294.
  36. Hartmann/Wippmann… p. 162.
  37. Meyers Neues Lexikon (Meyers New Lexikon), Vol. 4, Leipzig, p. 459.
  38. Compare: "Ärtze, Juden…" p. 102.
  39. Compare Notice in Osteuropa, p. 119f.
  40. Kurt W. Boehme, Die Deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in Sowjetischer Hand (German POWs in Soviet Custody)" Munich, 1966, p. 319.
  41. L.Lesny, "Der Slansky Proceß" (The Slansky Trial) in Osteuropa 1953. p. 11.
  42. Ibid., p. 1.
  43. Ibid., p. 3.
  44. Ibid., p. 4.
  45. Ibid., p. 5.
  46. Ibid.
  47. Ibid., p. 9
  48. Jens W. Hacker, Der Ostblock. Entstehung, Entwicklung und Struktur 1939 - 1980 (The Eastern Block: Origin, Development and Structure), Baden-Baden 1983, p. 420f.
  49. Francois Fejtoe, Geschichte der Volksdemokratien (History of the People's Democracy), Vol. 1: „The Stalin Era 1945 – 1953", Graz - Cologne - Vienna 1972, p. 298.
  50. Zbiginiew K. Brzezinski, Der Sowjetblock. Einheit und Konflikt (The Soviet Block: Entity and Conflict), Cologne - Berlin 1962, p. 190.
  51. "Ärzte, Juden…, p. 188.
  52. "Ärzte, Juden…"p. 102.
  53. Michael Heller… p. 188.
  54. Ibid., p. 188f.
  55. Ibid., p. 191.
  56. Felix Philipp Ingold, "Assimilation oder Rückverbindung?" (Assimilation or re-connection) Jewish self-evidence in the USSR, in Osteuropa, 1975, p. 857.
  57. Ibid.,
  58. Ibid., p. 859.
  59. Ibid., p. 857.
  60. Ibid., p. 858.
  61. Rolf W. Schloss; Laß mein Volk ziehen (Let my people go) The Russian Jews between the Soviet Star and Star of David. A documentation. Munich 1971, p. 16.
  62. Ibid., p. 17.
  63. Ibid., p. 18f.
  64. Ibid., p. 19.
  65. Ibid.
  66. Felix Philipp Ingold… p. 18.
  67. Hardmann/Wippermann… p. 166.
  68. Ärzte, Juden… p. 106.
  69. Rolf W. Scholz… p. 185.
  70. John Barron, KGB. Methods and Organisation of the Soviet Secret Service in East and West. Bern and Munich 1974. p. 113.
  71. Ibid., p. 97.
  72. Ibid., p. 115.
  73. Hardmann/Wippermann… p. 167 and 163.
  74. Fellix Philipp Ingold… p. 863.
  75. Jochen von Lang… p. 273
  76. Rolf W. Schloss… p. 25.
  77. Ibid., p. 28.
  78. Ibid., p. 28f.
  79. Ibid., p. 33.
  80. Ibid.
  81. Ibid., p. 33f.
  82. Ibid., p. 39.
  83. {??? Empty)
  84. Ibid., p. 29.
  85. Ibid., p. 32.
  86. Galina V. Selegen. "Einige weitere Ergebnisse der Sowjetischen Volkszählung von 1959" Further Results of the Soviet Census in 1959. in Osteuropa, 1960, p. 488.
  87. "Die Union…" p. 39.
  88. Osteuropa Handbuch. Sowjetunion. Eastern Europe Handbook. Soviet Union. The Economic System. Published by Werner Markert, Cologne - Graz 1965, p. 117.
  89. Roy Medwedjew, Sowjetbürger in Opposition (Soviet Citizen in Opposition) Pladoyer for a socialistic Democracy. Hamburg - Düsseldorf 1973, p. 211.
  90. "Agrarproduktion und Neulanderträge der UdSSR in Zahlen" (Agricultural Production and New Land Yields of the USSR in numbers.) in Osteuropa 1960, p. 417. Further falsifications are mentioned here.
  91. Hermann Schubnell, "Bevölkerungsprobleme in der Sowjetunion" (Population discords in the Soviet Union)in Osteuropa, p. 156.
  92. Große Sowjet-Enzyklopädie Section: Countries of the World. Vol 18. Belorussian SSR. Berlin 1955, p. 28.
  93. "The Union…" p. 690.
  94. Eugen von Engelhardt, Weißruthenien (Beloruthenia) Land and People. Berlin 1943, p. 277.
  95. "The Union…" p. 690.
  96. Eugen von Engelhardt…. p. 235.
  97. Ibid., p. 236 and 279.
  98. Große Sowjet Enzyklopädie… p. 28.
  99. "The Union…. " p. 691.
  100. Hermann Schubnell…p. 157.
  101. Laszlo Reversz, Volk aus 100 Nationalitäten (People of 100 Nationalities) The Soviet question on minorities. Bern 1979, p. 209.
  102. Laszlo Reversz… p. 209.
  103. Hermann Schubnell… p. 157.
  104. Galina V. Selengen "Die Bevölkerung der UdSSR nach den letzte Zählungsergebnissen" (The Peoples of the USSR after the last census.) in Osteuropa, 1959, p. 715.
  105. Ibid., p. 716.
  106. Galina V. Selegen…. p. 488.
  107. Georges Wellers, "Die Zahl der Opfer der ‘Endlösung’ und der Koherr Bericht" (The Number of Victims of the ‘Final Solution’ and the Koherr Report.) in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B30/78 from July 29, 1978 p. 30. Apparently Wellers made the mistake of claiming the Memel country as part of the Baltic States, instead of Estonia. This was modified here.
  108. Actually the part of Bialsytok which was returned to Poland in 1945 should not be considered. But because the numbers are rounded up, a correction is not necessary.
  109. Ibid., Wellers evaluation system can be questioned, but since the default is marginal and the numbers rounded up, this system is therefore applied.
  110. Ibid., p. 31ff. Wellers assumes an anual growth of 1% and ignores the war years 1942 - 45 in his calculations.
  111. Die Sowjetunion Zahlen - Fakten - Daten. (The Soviet Union Numbers - Facts - Data) Published by Borys Lewytzkyj. Munich - New York - London - Paris 1979, p. 51.
  112. Dieter Jahn, "Nationalitäten und Nationalitätenpolitik im Spiegel Sowjetischer Volkszählungen" (Nationalities and nationality politcs in lieu of the Soviet Census), in Osteuropa, 1970, p. 314.
  113. Frank Golczweski, "Die Jüdische autonome Provinz in Sowjet-Fernost" (The Jewish autonomic Province in the Soviet Far East), in Osteuropa, 1972, p. 204ff.
  114. Rolf W. Schloss…. p. 14.
  115. Hardmann/Wippermann… p. 167.
  116. Rolf W. Schloss….. p. 45.
  117. Ibid., p. 29.
  118. Dieter Jahn…. p. 325.
  119. Georges Wellers… p. 27.
  120. "The Union…"
  121. Ibid., p. 738.
  122. Ibid., p. 736.
  123. Ibid., p. 746.
  124. Ibid., p. 742.
  125. Ibid., p. 771.
  126. Ibid., p. 755.
  127. Ibid., p. 821.
  128. Ibid., p. 820.
  129. Ibid., p. 694.
  130. Ibid., p. 690.
  131. Valdis Redelis, Partisanenkrieg (Partisan Warefare) Heidelberg 1958, p. 41.
  132. Ibid., p. 48.
  133. Ibid., p. 68.
  134. Ibid., Chart 2.
  135. "In den Wäldern Belorußlands" (In the Forests of Belorus) Memoires of Soviet Partisans and German Anti-Fascists. Responsible for the German edition: Heinz Kühnrich, Karlheinz Pech(Leiter), Dora Schaul, Berlin-East 1976. p. 7f.
  136. Kurt W. Boehme… p. 156.
  137. Ibid.
  138. Ibid., p. 319.
  139. Ibid., p. 320ff.
  140. Ibid., p. 319.
  141. Gilbert, Atlas… p. 78.
  142. Kurt W. Boehme… p. 138.
  143. Ibid., p. 149 and Graphic 11.
  144. 400 Ibid., p. 133.
  145. Ibid., p. 155.
  146. "Immer noch 400.000 Deutsche in der Sowjetunion vermißt." (Still 400 000 Germans missing in the USSR) in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung from September 9, 1988.
  147. Josef Martin Bauer, So weit die Füße tragen, Stuttgart p. 13.
  148. Hardmann/Wippermann…. p. 26.
  149. "Der Neue Paß des Sowjetbürgers" (The New Passport for Soviet Citizens), in Osteuropa – Achiv, 1977. s. A258f.
  150. Ibid., p. A250ff.
  151. Ibid., p. A260ff.
  152. Ibid., p. 255f.
  153. Zdenek Hunacek, "Inlandspässe für Kochosmitglieder? Ja, aber ‘dialektisch’" (Internal Passports for Colchose members? Yes, but dialectic), in Osteuropa, 1978, p. 250.
  154. Ibid., p. 251.
  155. Osteuropa 1952, p. 119f.
  156. List of Cities and Areas of the USSR closed for foreigners. p. 6. I have received this list from the Secretary of State of the Federal Republic of Germany in Bonn.
  157. Werner Leitmüller, "Tourismus und Aulsandsreisen im Sowjetleben" (Tourism and foreign exchange in the Soviet life), in Osteuropa, 1964, p. 81.
  158. Ibid., p. 84.
  159. Ibid., p. 85f.
  160. Ibid., p. 82.
  161. Der Große Polyglott. Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, Odessa and the Beach Resorts at the Black Sea. Munich, p. 16.
  162. Ibid.,
  163. Grieben Reiseführer (Grieben Tourist Guide) Vol. 296, USSR Routes. Munich, p. 83.
  164. Der große Polyglott, op. cit. p. 22.
  165. Wilfrid Nagel, Mit dem Auto nach Moskau, (Moscow by car) A test drive on the Olympia route. Gerlingen 1979, p. 61.
  166. Ibid., p. 21.
  167. Ibid., p. 35f.
  168. Ibid., p. 37.
  169. John Barron,…. p. 109f.
  170. Ibid., p. 111.
  171. Paul Hollander, "Grenzen - ein integraler Teil des Sowjetsystems" (Boundaries, an integral part of the Soviet system), in Osteuropa, 1969, p. 741.
  172. Ibid., p. 742.
  173. Ibid., p. 743.
  174. Ibid., p. 744.
  175. Ibid.
  176. Ibid., p. 745.
  177. Ibid., p. 743.
  178. Robert M. Slusser, "Die Sonderstellung Belorußlands" (The special role of Belorus), in Osteuropa, 1964, p. 852.
  179. Ibid.
  180. Ibid., p. 859.
  181. Ibid., p. 863.
  182. Ibid., p. 857.
  183. Ibid., p. 859.
  184. Ibid., p. 854.
  185. NN Baranski, "Die ökonomische Geographie der UdSSR (Economic Geography of the USSR), Berlin-East, p. 324.
  186. The Reichsminister for the occuppied Eastern Territories, Main Section I Area Planings: The General District of Beolruthenia. A draft. Completed on December 20, 1940, p. 9ff.
  187. The USSR: Encyklopedia of the Union of the Socialst Soviet Republics. Publisher, W. Fickenscher and H. Becker, R.Rompe, W. Steinitz, A.M. Uhlmann. Leipzig 1959, p. 850.
  188. The Union…. p. 691.
  189. Eugen von Engelhardt… The Tabula was slightly modified because of printing reasons.
  190. NN Baranski…. p. 324.
  191. The Union….. p. 694.
  192. Soviet Union. Regional Economic Geography. VV Poksisevskizkij, Editor. p. 164.
  193. Ibid., p. 162.
  194. Ibid., p. 163f.
  195. Ibid., p. 163.
  196. The USSR…. p. 851.
  197. Karin Schmid. "Brest - Bastion in Kampf gegen ‘Schädliche Einflüsse’" (Brest-bastion in the war against nefarious, foreign influence), in Osteuropa – Archiv, 1958' P. A363ff.
  198. Ibid., p. A366.
  199. Ibid., p. A368.
  200. Ibid., p. A365.
  201. "Bessere Fachkräfte und mehr Verantwortung" (Better skilled labour and more responisbility.), in Osteuropa-Archiv, 1985, p. A669ff.
  202. Ibid., p. A472.
  203. Ibid.
  204. Ibid., p. A470.
  205. Ibid., p. A471.
  206. Ibid., p. A472.
  207. idid.
  208. Beloruskaya SSR Karotkaya entsyklopedyya. Tom 1. Minsk 1978.
  209. The various methods of writing Marjina Gorka a due to the various transcriptions.
  210. Beloruskaya SSR… p. 392.
  211. Ibid., Chart before p. 169.
  212. Entsiklopedischeskiy clovar. Vol. XIX St. Petersburg 1896. p. 388.
  213. Ritters geographisch-stati(sti???)sches Lexikon, Leipzig 1906. 9th Edition. Vol. 2, p. 184.
  214. Chart of West and Central Russia. Grande Edition. Composed and drawn by G.Freytag, VI Edition, edited by Dr. K. Peucher. (???)
  215. Vsesoyusnaya perepis naselenija 1926. Vol. X, p. 214.
  216. Militärgeopraphische Angaben über das europäische Rußland. Belorus, Textnotes. Edited by the General Staff of the German Army. Department of War Maps and Charteography.(VI. Mil.Geo.). Berlin 1941.
  217. Ibid., p. 139.
  218. Ibid., p. 148.
  219. Reichskommissionar für das Ostland. Department of Area Planing Report on the Ostland. Part I, (1942) p. 154.
  220. Deutsche Heereskarte 1:300,000 Sonderausgabe 1942. Revised II/1943 Compiled area: Vilna-Davidgrodek T55/U53. Published by the German High Command/Gen.St.d.H.
  221. Deutsche Heereskarte 1:300,000 Addendum VIII, 1943. Chart Minsk U 54. Published by the German High Command/Gen.St.d.H.
  222. Hermann Gackenholz, "Zum Zusammenbruch der Heeresgruppe Mitte im Sommer 1944" (About the collapse of the Germany Army Group Mitte in the summer of 1944) in Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 3rd. quarter 1955, p. 325.
  223. Felix Philipp Ingold….. p. 866. The manner of Michoels writing is not always consecutive.
  224. Ibid.

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